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Pragmatism: A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking
William James





PRAGMATISM



A New Name for Some Old Ways of Thinking

By William James (1907)

To the Memory of John Stuart Mill

from whom I first learned the pragmatic openness of mind and whom my
fancy likes to picture as our leader were he alive to-day.



Preface

The lectures that follow were delivered at the Lowell Institute in
Boston in November and December, 1906, and in January, 1907, at
Columbia University, in New York. They are printed as delivered,
without developments or notes. The pragmatic movement, so-called--I
do not like the name, but apparently it is too late to change it--
seems to have rather suddenly precipitated itself out of the air. A
number of tendencies that have always existed in philosophy have all
at once become conscious of themselves collectively, and of their
combined mission; and this has occurred in so many countries, and
from so many different points of view, that much unconcerted
statement has resulted. I have sought to unify the picture as it
presents itself to my own eyes, dealing in broad strokes, and
avoiding minute controversy. Much futile controversy might have been
avoided, I believe, if our critics had been willing to wait until we
got our message fairly out.

If my lectures interest any reader in the general subject, he will
doubtless wish to read farther. I therefore give him a few
references.

In America, John Dewey's 'Studies in Logical Theory' are the
foundation. Read also by Dewey the articles in the Philosophical
Review, vol. xv, pp. 113 and 465, in Mind, vol. xv, p. 293, and in
the Journal of Philosophy, vol. iv, p. 197.

Probably the best statements to begin with however, are F. C. S.
Schiller's in his 'Studies in Humanism,' especially the essays
numbered i, v, vi, vii, xviii and xix. His previous essays and in
general the polemic literature of the subject are fully referred to
in his footnotes.

Furthermore, see G. Milhaud: le Rationnel, 1898, and the fine
articles by Le Roy in the Revue de Metaphysique, vols. 7, 8 and 9.
Also articles by Blondel and de Sailly in the Annales de Philosophie
Chretienne, 4me Serie, vols. 2 and 3. Papini announces a book on
Pragmatism, in the French language, to be published very soon.

To avoid one misunderstanding at least, let me say that there is no
logical connexion between pragmatism, as I understand it, and a
doctrine which I have recently set forth as 'radical empiricism.'
The latter stands on its own feet. One may entirely reject it and
still be a pragmatist.

Harvard University, April, 1907.




Contents

Lecture I

The Present Dilemma in Philosophy

Chesterton quoted. Everyone has a philosophy. Temperament is a
factor in all philosophizing. Rationalists and empiricists. The
tender-minded and the tough-minded. Most men wish both facts and
religion. Empiricism gives facts without religion. Rationalism gives
religion without facts. The layman's dilemma. The unreality in
rationalistic systems. Leibnitz on the damned, as an example. M. I.
Swift on the optimism of idealists. Pragmatism as a mediating
system. An objection. Reply: philosophies have characters like men,
and are liable to as summary judgments. Spencer as an example.

Lecture II

What Pragmatism Means

The squirrel. Pragmatism as a method. History of the method. Its
character and affinities. How it contrasts with rationalism and
intellectualism. A 'corridor theory.' Pragmatism as a theory of
truth, equivalent to 'humanism.' Earlier views of mathematical,
logical, and natural truth. More recent views. Schiller's and
Dewey's 'instrumental' view. The formation of new beliefs. Older
truth always has to be kept account of. Older truth arose similarly.
The 'humanistic' doctrine. Rationalistic criticisms of it.
Pragmatism as mediator between empiricism and religion. Barrenness
of transcendental idealism. How far the concept of the Absolute must
be called true. The true is the good in the way of belief. The clash
of truths. Pragmatism unstiffens discussion.

Lecture III

Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered

The problem of substance. The Eucharist. Berkeley's pragmatic
treatment of material substance. Locke's of personal identity. The
problem of materialism. Rationalistic treatment of it. Pragmatic
treatment. 'God' is no better than 'Matter' as a principle, unless
he promise more. Pragmatic comparison of the two principles. The
problem of design. 'Design' per se is barren. The question is WHAT
design. The problem of 'free-will.' Its relations to
'accountability.' Free-will a cosmological theory. The pragmatic
issue at stake in all these problems is what do the alternatives
PROMISE.

Lecture IV

The One and the Many

Total reflection. Philosophy seeks not only unity, but totality.
Rationalistic feeling about unity. Pragmatically considered, the
world is one in many ways. One time and space. One subject of
discourse. Its parts interact. Its oneness and manyness are co-
ordinate. Question of one origin. Generic oneness. One purpose. One
story. One knower. Value of pragmatic method. Absolute monism.
Vivekananda. Various types of union discussed. Conclusion: We must
oppose monistic dogmatism and follow empirical findings.

Lecture V

Pragmatism and Common Sense

Noetic pluralism. How our knowledge grows. Earlier ways of thinking
remain. Prehistoric ancestors DISCOVERED the common sense concepts.
List of them. They came gradually into use. Space and time.
'Things.' Kinds. 'Cause' and 'law.' Common sense one stage in mental
evolution, due to geniuses. The 'critical' stages: 1) scientific and
2) philosophic, compared with common sense. Impossible to say which
is the more 'true.'

Lecture VI

Pragmatism's Conception of Truth

The polemic situation. What does agreement with reality mean? It
means verifiability. Verifiability means ability to guide us
prosperously through experience. Completed verifications seldom
needful. 'Eternal' truths. Consistency, with language, with previous
truths. Rationalist objections. Truth is a good, like health,
wealth, etc. It is expedient thinking. The past. Truth grows.
Rationalist objections. Reply to them.

Lecture VII

Pragmatism and Humanism

The notion of THE Truth. Schiller on 'Humanism.' Three sorts of
reality of which any new truth must take account. To 'take account'
is ambiguous. Absolutely independent reality is hard to find. The
human contribution is ubiquitous and builds out the given. Essence
of pragmatism's contrast with rationalism. Rationalism affirms a
transempirical world. Motives for this. Tough-mindedness rejects
them. A genuine alternative. Pragmatism mediates.

Lecture VIII

Pragmatism and Religion

Utility of the Absolute. Whitman's poem 'To You.' Two ways of taking
it. My friend's letter. Necessities versus possibilities.
'Possibility' defined. Three views of the world's salvation.
Pragmatism is melioristic. We may create reality. Why should
anything BE? Supposed choice before creation. The healthy and the
morbid reply. The 'tender' and the 'tough' types of religion.
Pragmatism mediates.




PRAGMATISM

Lecture I

The Present Dilemma in Philosophy

In the preface to that admirable collection of essays of his called
'Heretics,' Mr. Chesterton writes these words: "There are some
people--and I am one of them--who think that the most practical and
important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We
think that for a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to
know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We
think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it is important to
know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the
enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory
of the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run,
anything else affects them."

I think with Mr. Chesterton in this matter. I know that you, ladies
and gentlemen, have a philosophy, each and all of you, and that the
most interesting and important thing about you is the way in which
it determines the perspective in your several worlds. You know the
same of me. And yet I confess to a certain tremor at the audacity of
the enterprise which I am about to begin. For the philosophy which
is so important in each of us is not a technical matter; it is our
more or less dumb sense of what life honestly and deeply means. It
is only partly got from books; it is our individual way of just
seeing and feeling the total push and pressure of the cosmos. I have
no right to assume that many of you are students of the cosmos in
the class-room sense, yet here I stand desirous of interesting you
in a philosophy which to no small extent has to be technically
treated. I wish to fill you with sympathy with a contemporaneous
tendency in which I profoundly believe, and yet I have to talk like
a professor to you who are not students. Whatever universe a
professor believes in must at any rate be a universe that lends
itself to lengthy discourse. A universe definable in two sentences
is something for which the professorial intellect has no use. No
faith in anything of that cheap kind! I have heard friends and
colleagues try to popularize philosophy in this very hall, but they
soon grew dry, and then technical, and the results were only
partially encouraging. So my enterprise is a bold one. The founder
of pragmatism himself recently gave a course of lectures at the
Lowell Institute with that very word in its title-flashes of
brilliant light relieved against Cimmerian darkness! None of us, I
fancy, understood ALL that he said--yet here I stand, making a very
similar venture.

I risk it because the very lectures I speak of DREW--they brought
good audiences. There is, it must be confessed, a curious
fascination in hearing deep things talked about, even tho neither we
nor the disputants understand them. We get the problematic thrill,
we feel the presence of the vastness. Let a controversy begin in a
smoking-room anywhere, about free-will or God's omniscience, or good
and evil, and see how everyone in the place pricks up his ears.
Philosophy's results concern us all most vitally, and philosophy's
queerest arguments tickle agreeably our sense of subtlety and
ingenuity.

Believing in philosophy myself devoutly, and believing also that a
kind of new dawn is breaking upon us philosophers, I feel impelled,
per fas aut nefas, to try to impart to you some news of the
situation.

Philosophy is at once the most sublime and the most trivial of human
pursuits. It works in the minutest crannies and it opens out the
widest vistas. It 'bakes no bread,' as has been said, but it can
inspire our souls with courage; and repugnant as its manners, its
doubting and challenging, its quibbling and dialectics, often are to
common people, no one of us can get along without the far-flashing
beams of light it sends over the world's perspectives. These
illuminations at least, and the contrast-effects of darkness and
mystery that accompany them, give to what it says an interest that
is much more than professional.

The history of philosophy is to a great extent that of a certain
clash of human temperaments. Undignified as such a treatment may
seem to some of my colleagues, I shall have to take account of this
clash and explain a good many of the divergencies of philosophers by
it. Of whatever temperament a professional philosopher is, he tries
when philosophizing to sink the fact of his temperament. Temperament
is no conventionally recognized reason, so he urges impersonal
reasons only for his conclusions. Yet his temperament really gives
him a stronger bias than any of his more strictly objective
premises. It loads the evidence for him one way or the other, making
for a more sentimental or a more hard-hearted view of the universe,
just as this fact or that principle would. He trusts his
temperament. Wanting a universe that suits it, he believes in any
representation of the universe that does suit it. He feels men of
opposite temper to be out of key with the world's character, and in
his heart considers them incompetent and 'not in it,' in the
philosophic business, even tho they may far excel him in dialectical
ability.

Yet in the forum he can make no claim, on the bare ground of his
temperament, to superior discernment or authority. There arises thus
a certain insincerity in our philosophic discussions: the potentest
of all our premises is never mentioned. I am sure it would
contribute to clearness if in these lectures we should break this
rule and mention it, and I accordingly feel free to do so.

Of course I am talking here of very positively marked men, men of
radical idiosyncracy, who have set their stamp and likeness on
philosophy and figure in its history. Plato, Locke, Hegel, Spencer,
are such temperamental thinkers. Most of us have, of course, no very
definite intellectual temperament, we are a mixture of opposite
ingredients, each one present very moderately. We hardly know our
own preferences in abstract matters; some of us are easily talked
out of them, and end by following the fashion or taking up with the
beliefs of the most impressive philosopher in our neighborhood,
whoever he may be. But the one thing that has COUNTED so far in
philosophy is that a man should see things, see them straight in his
own peculiar way, and be dissatisfied with any opposite way of
seeing them. There is no reason to suppose that this strong
temperamental vision is from now onward to count no longer in the
history of man's beliefs.

Now the particular difference of temperament that I have in mind in
making these remarks is one that has counted in literature, art,
government and manners as well as in philosophy. In manners we find
formalists and free-and-easy persons. In government, authoritarians
and anarchists. In literature, purists or academicals, and realists.
In art, classics and romantics. You recognize these contrasts as
familiar; well, in philosophy we have a very similar contrast
expressed in the pair of terms 'rationalist' and 'empiricist,'
'empiricist' meaning your lover of facts in all their crude variety,
'rationalist' meaning your devotee to abstract and eternal
principles. No one can live an hour without both facts and
principles, so it is a difference rather of emphasis; yet it breeds
antipathies of the most pungent character between those who lay the
emphasis differently; and we shall find it extraordinarily
convenient to express a certain contrast in men's ways of taking
their universe, by talking of the 'empiricist' and of the
'rationalist' temper. These terms make the contrast simple and
massive.

More simple and massive than are usually the men of whom the terms
are predicated. For every sort of permutation and combination is
possible in human nature; and if I now proceed to define more fully
what I have in mind when I speak of rationalists and empiricists, by
adding to each of those titles some secondary qualifying
characteristics, I beg you to regard my conduct as to a certain
extent arbitrary. I select types of combination that nature offers
very frequently, but by no means uniformly, and I select them solely
for their convenience in helping me to my ulterior purpose of
characterizing pragmatism. Historically we find the terms
'intellectualism' and 'sensationalism' used as synonyms of
'rationalism' and 'empiricism.' Well, nature seems to combine most
frequently with intellectualism an idealistic and optimistic
tendency. Empiricists on the other hand are not uncommonly
materialistic, and their optimism is apt to be decidedly conditional
and tremulous. Rationalism is always monistic. It starts from wholes
and universals, and makes much of the unity of things. Empiricism
starts from the parts, and makes of the whole a collection-is not
averse therefore to calling itself pluralistic. Rationalism usually
considers itself more religious than empiricism, but there is much
to say about this claim, so I merely mention it. It is a true claim
when the individual rationalist is what is called a man of feeling,
and when the individual empiricist prides himself on being hard-
headed. In that case the rationalist will usually also be in favor
of what is called free-will, and the empiricist will be a fatalist--
I use the terms most popularly current. The rationalist finally will
be of dogmatic temper in his affirmations, while the empiricist may
be more sceptical and open to discussion.

I will write these traits down in two columns. I think you will
practically recognize the two types of mental make-up that I mean if
I head the columns by the titles 'tender-minded' and 'tough-minded'
respectively.

THE TENDER-MINDED

Rationalistic (going by 'principles'),
Intellectualistic,
Idealistic,
Optimistic,
Religious,
Free-willist,
Monistic,
Dogmatical.

THE TOUGH-MINDED

Empiricist (going by 'facts'),
Sensationalistic,
Materialistic,
Pessimistic,
Irreligious,
Fatalistic,
Pluralistic,
Sceptical.

Pray postpone for a moment the question whether the two contrasted
mixtures which I have written down are each inwardly coherent and
self-consistent or not--I shall very soon have a good deal to say on
that point. It suffices for our immediate purpose that tender-minded
and tough-minded people, characterized as I have written them down,
do both exist. Each of you probably knows some well-marked example
of each type, and you know what each example thinks of the example
on the other side of the line. They have a low opinion of each
other. Their antagonism, whenever as individuals their temperaments
have been intense, has formed in all ages a part of the philosophic
atmosphere of the time. It forms a part of the philosophic
atmosphere to-day. The tough think of the tender as sentimentalists
and soft-heads. The tender feel the tough to be unrefined, callous,
or brutal. Their mutual reaction is very much like that that takes
place when Bostonian tourists mingle with a population like that of
Cripple Creek. Each type believes the other to be inferior to
itself; but disdain in the one case is mingled with amusement, in
the other it has a dash of fear.

Now, as I have already insisted, few of us are tender-foot
Bostonians pure and simple, and few are typical Rocky Mountain
toughs, in philosophy. Most of us have a hankering for the good
things on both sides of the line. Facts are good, of course--give us
lots of facts. Principles are good--give us plenty of principles.
The world is indubitably one if you look at it in one way, but as
indubitably is it many, if you look at it in another. It is both one
and many--let us adopt a sort of pluralistic monism. Everything of
course is necessarily determined, and yet of course our wills are
free: a sort of free-will determinism is the true philosophy. The
evil of the parts is undeniable; but the whole can't be evil: so
practical pessimism may be combined with metaphysical optimism. And
so forth--your ordinary philosophic layman never being a radical,
never straightening out his system, but living vaguely in one
plausible compartment of it or another to suit the temptations of
successive hours.

But some of us are more than mere laymen in philosophy. We are
worthy of the name of amateur athletes, and are vexed by too much
inconsistency and vacillation in our creed. We cannot preserve a
good intellectual conscience so long as we keep mixing incompatibles
from opposite sides of the line.

And now I come to the first positively important point which I wish
to make. Never were as many men of a decidedly empiricist proclivity
in existence as there are at the present day. Our children, one may
say, are almost born scientific. But our esteem for facts has not
neutralized in us all religiousness. It is itself almost religious.
Our scientific temper is devout. Now take a man of this type, and
let him be also a philosophic amateur, unwilling to mix a hodge-
podge system after the fashion of a common layman, and what does he
find his situation to be, in this blessed year of our Lord 1906? He
wants facts; he wants science; but he also wants a religion. And
being an amateur and not an independent originator in philosophy he
naturally looks for guidance to the experts and professionals whom
he finds already in the field. A very large number of you here
present, possibly a majority of you, are amateurs of just this sort.

Now what kinds of philosophy do you find actually offered to meet
your need? You find an empirical philosophy that is not religious
enough, and a religious philosophy that is not empirical enough for
your purpose. If you look to the quarter where facts are most
considered you find the whole tough-minded program in operation, and
the 'conflict between science and religion' in full blast. Either it
is that Rocky Mountain tough of a Haeckel with his materialistic
monism, his ether-god and his jest at your God as a 'gaseous
vertebrate'; or it is Spencer treating the world's history as a
redistribution of matter and motion solely, and bowing religion
politely out at the front door:--she may indeed continue to exist,
but she must never show her face inside the temple. For a hundred
and fifty years past the progress of science has seemed to mean the
enlargement of the material universe and the diminution of man's
importance. The result is what one may call the growth of
naturalistic or positivistic feeling. Man is no law-giver to nature,
he is an absorber. She it is who stands firm; he it is who must
accommodate himself. Let him record truth, inhuman tho it be, and
submit to it! The romantic spontaneity and courage are gone, the
vision is materialistic and depressing. Ideals appear as inert by-
products of physiology; what is higher is explained by what is lower
and treated forever as a case of 'nothing but'--nothing but
something else of a quite inferior sort. You get, in short, a
materialistic universe, in which only the tough-minded find
themselves congenially at home.

If now, on the other hand, you turn to the religious quarter for
consolation, and take counsel of the tender-minded philosophies,
what do you find?

Religious philosophy in our day and generation is, among us English-
reading people, of two main types. One of these is more radical and
aggressive, the other has more the air of fighting a slow retreat.
By the more radical wing of religious philosophy I mean the so-
called transcendental idealism of the Anglo-Hegelian school, the
philosophy of such men as Green, the Cairds, Bosanquet, and Royce.
This philosophy has greatly influenced the more studious members of
our protestant ministry. It is pantheistic, and undoubtedly it has
already blunted the edge of the traditional theism in protestantism
at large.

That theism remains, however. It is the lineal descendant, through
one stage of concession after another, of the dogmatic scholastic
theism still taught rigorously in the seminaries of the catholic
church. For a long time it used to be called among us the philosophy
of the Scottish school. It is what I meant by the philosophy that
has the air of fighting a slow retreat. Between the encroachments of
the hegelians and other philosophers of the 'Absolute,' on the one
hand, and those of the scientific evolutionists and agnostics, on
the other, the men that give us this kind of a philosophy, James
Martineau, Professor Bowne, Professor Ladd and others, must feel
themselves rather tightly squeezed. Fair-minded and candid as you
like, this philosophy is not radical in temper. It is eclectic, a
thing of compromises, that seeks a modus vivendi above all things.
It accepts the facts of darwinism, the facts of cerebral physiology,
but it does nothing active or enthusiastic with them. It lacks the
victorious and aggressive note. It lacks prestige in consequence;
whereas absolutism has a certain prestige due to the more radical
style of it.

These two systems are what you have to choose between if you turn to
the tender-minded school. And if you are the lovers of facts I have
supposed you to be, you find the trail of the serpent of
rationalism, of intellectualism, over everything that lies on that
side of the line. You escape indeed the materialism that goes with
the reigning empiricism; but you pay for your escape by losing
contact with the concrete parts of life. The more absolutistic
philosophers dwell on so high a level of abstraction that they never
even try to come down. The absolute mind which they offer us, the
mind that makes our universe by thinking it, might, for aught they
show us to the contrary, have made any one of a million other
universes just as well as this. You can deduce no single actual
particular from the notion of it. It is compatible with any state of
things whatever being true here below. And the theistic God is
almost as sterile a principle. You have to go to the world which he
has created to get any inkling of his actual character: he is the
kind of god that has once for all made that kind of a world. The God
of the theistic writers lives on as purely abstract heights as does
the Absolute. Absolutism has a certain sweep and dash about it,
while the usual theism is more insipid, but both are equally remote
and vacuous. What you want is a philosophy that will not only
exercise your powers of intellectual abstraction, but that will make
some positive connexion with this actual world of finite human
lives.

You want a system that will combine both things, the scientific
loyalty to facts and willingness to take account of them, the spirit
of adaptation and accommodation, in short, but also the old
confidence in human values and the resultant spontaneity, whether of
the religious or of the romantic type. And this is then your
dilemma: you find the two parts of your quaesitum hopelessly
separated. You find empiricism with inhumanism and irreligion; or
else you find a rationalistic philosophy that indeed may call itself
religious, but that keeps out of all definite touch with concrete
facts and joys and sorrows.

I am not sure how many of you live close enough to philosophy to
realize fully what I mean by this last reproach, so I will dwell a
little longer on that unreality in all rationalistic systems by
which your serious believer in facts is so apt to feel repelled.

I wish that I had saved the first couple of pages of a thesis which
a student handed me a year or two ago. They illustrated my point so
clearly that I am sorry I cannot read them to you now. This young
man, who was a graduate of some Western college, began by saying
that he had always taken for granted that when you entered a
philosophic class-room you had to open relations with a universe
entirely distinct from the one you left behind you in the street.
The two were supposed, he said, to have so little to do with each
other, that you could not possibly occupy your mind with them at the
same time. The world of concrete personal experiences to which the
street belongs is multitudinous beyond imagination, tangled, muddy,
painful and perplexed. The world to which your philosophy-professor
introduces you is simple, clean and noble. The contradictions of
real life are absent from it. Its architecture is classic.
Principles of reason trace its outlines, logical necessities cement
its parts. Purity and dignity are what it most expresses. It is a
kind of marble temple shining on a hill.

In point of fact it is far less an account of this actual world than
a clear addition built upon it, a classic sanctuary in which the
rationalist fancy may take refuge from the intolerably confused and
gothic character which mere facts present. It is no EXPLANATION of
our concrete universe, it is another thing altogether, a substitute
for it, a remedy, a way of escape.

Its temperament, if I may use the word temperament here, is utterly
alien to the temperament of existence in the concrete. REFINEMENT is
what characterizes our intellectualist philosophies. They
exquisitely satisfy that craving for a refined object of
contemplation which is so powerful an appetite of the mind. But I
ask you in all seriousness to look abroad on this colossal universe
of concrete facts, on their awful bewilderments, their surprises and
cruelties, on the wildness which they show, and then to tell me
whether 'refined' is the one inevitable descriptive adjective that
springs to your lips.

Refinement has its place in things, true enough. But a philosophy
that breathes out nothing but refinement will never satisfy the
empiricist temper of mind. It will seem rather a monument of
artificiality. So we find men of science preferring to turn their
backs on metaphysics as on something altogether cloistered and
spectral, and practical men shaking philosophy's dust off their feet
and following the call of the wild.

Truly there is something a little ghastly in the satisfaction with
which a pure but unreal system will fill a rationalist mind.
Leibnitz was a rationalist mind, with infinitely more interest in
facts than most rationalist minds can show. Yet if you wish for
superficiality incarnate, you have only to read that charmingly
written 'Theodicee' of his, in which he sought to justify the ways
of God to man, and to prove that the world we live in is the best of
possible worlds. Let me quote a specimen of what I mean.

Among other obstacles to his optimistic philosophy, it falls to
Leibnitz to consider the number of the eternally damned. That it is
infinitely greater, in our human case, than that of those saved he
assumes as a premise from the theologians, and then proceeds to
argue in this way. Even then, he says:

"The evil will appear as almost nothing in comparison with the good,
if we once consider the real magnitude of the City of God. Coelius
Secundus Curio has written a little book, 'De Amplitudine Regni
Coelestis,' which was reprinted not long ago. But he failed to
compass the extent of the kingdom of the heavens. The ancients had
small ideas of the works of God. ... It seemed to them that only our
earth had inhabitants, and even the notion of our antipodes gave
them pause. The rest of the world for them consisted of some shining
globes and a few crystalline spheres. But to-day, whatever be the
limits that we may grant or refuse to the Universe we must recognize
in it a countless number of globes, as big as ours or bigger, which
have just as much right as it has to support rational inhabitants,
tho it does not follow that these need all be men. Our earth is only
one among the six principal satellites of our sun. As all the fixed
stars are suns, one sees how small a place among visible things our
earth takes up, since it is only a satellite of one among them. Now
all these suns MAY be inhabited by none but happy creatures; and
nothing obliges us to believe that the number of damned persons is
very great; for a VERY FEW INSTANCES AND SAMPLES SUFFICE FOR THE
UTILITY WHICH GOOD DRAWS FROM EVIL. Moreover, since there is no
reason to suppose that there are stars everywhere, may there not be
a great space beyond the region of the stars? And this immense
space, surrounding all this region, ... may be replete with
happiness and glory. ... What now becomes of the consideration of
our Earth and of its denizens? Does it not dwindle to something
incomparably less than a physical point, since our Earth is but a
point compared with the distance of the fixed stars. Thus the part
of the Universe which we know, being almost lost in nothingness
compared with that which is unknown to us, but which we are yet
obliged to admit; and all the evils that we know lying in this
almost-nothing; it follows that the evils may be almost-nothing in
comparison with the goods that the Universe contains."

Leibnitz continues elsewhere: "There is a kind of justice which aims
neither at the amendment of the criminal, nor at furnishing an
example to others, nor at the reparation of the injury. This justice
is founded in pure fitness, which finds a certain satisfaction in
the expiation of a wicked deed. The Socinians and Hobbes objected to
this punitive justice, which is properly vindictive justice and
which God has reserved for himself at many junctures. ... It is
always founded in the fitness of things, and satisfies not only the
offended party, but all wise lookers-on, even as beautiful music or
a fine piece of architecture satisfies a well-constituted mind. It
is thus that the torments of the damned continue, even tho they
serve no longer to turn anyone away from sin, and that the rewards
of the blest continue, even tho they confirm no one in good ways.
The damned draw to themselves ever new penalties by their continuing
sins, and the blest attract ever fresh joys by their unceasing
progress in good. Both facts are founded on the principle of
fitness, ... for God has made all things harmonious in perfection as
I have already said."

Leibnitz's feeble grasp of reality is too obvious to need comment
from me. It is evident that no realistic image of the experience of
a damned soul had ever approached the portals of his mind. Nor had
it occurred to him that the smaller is the number of 'samples' of
the genus 'lost-soul' whom God throws as a sop to the eternal
fitness, the more unequitably grounded is the glory of the blest.
What he gives us is a cold literary exercise, whose cheerful
substance even hell-fire does not warm.

And do not tell me that to show the shallowness of rationalist
philosophizing I have had to go back to a shallow wigpated age. The
optimism of present-day rationalism sounds just as shallow to the
fact-loving mind. The actual universe is a thing wide open, but
rationalism makes systems, and systems must be closed. For men in
practical life perfection is something far off and still in process
of achievement. This for rationalism is but the illusion of the
finite and relative: the absolute ground of things is a perfection
eternally complete.

I find a fine example of revolt against the airy and shallow
optimism of current religious philosophy in a publication of that
valiant anarchistic writer Morrison I. Swift. Mr. Swift's anarchism
goes a little farther than mine does, but I confess that I
sympathize a good deal, and some of you, I know, will sympathize
heartily with his dissatisfaction with the idealistic optimisms now
in vogue. He begins his pamphlet on 'Human Submission' with a series
of city reporter's items from newspapers (suicides, deaths from
starvation and the like) as specimens of our civilized regime. For
instance:

"'After trudging through the snow from one end of the city to the
other in the vain hope of securing employment, and with his wife and
six children without food and ordered to leave their home in an
upper east side tenement house because of non-payment of rent, John
Corcoran, a clerk, to-day ended his life by drinking carbolic acid.
Corcoran lost his position three weeks ago through illness, and
during the period of idleness his scanty savings disappeared.
Yesterday he obtained work with a gang of city snow shovelers, but
he was too weak from illness and was forced to quit after an hour's
trial with the shovel. Then the weary task of looking for employment
was again resumed. Thoroughly discouraged, Corcoran returned to his
home late last night to find his wife and children without food and
the notice of dispossession on the door.' On the following morning
he drank the poison.

"The records of many more such cases lie before me [Mr. Swift goes
on]; an encyclopedia might easily be filled with their kind. These
few I cite as an interpretation of the universe. 'We are aware of
the presence of God in His world,' says a writer in a recent English
Review. [The very presence of ill in the temporal order is the
condition of the perfection of the eternal order, writes Professor
Royce ('The World and the Individual,' II, 385).] 'The Absolute is
the richer for every discord, and for all diversity which it
embraces,' says F. H. Bradley (Appearance and Reality, 204). He
means that these slain men make the universe richer, and that is
Philosophy. But while Professors Royce and Bradley and a whole host
of guileless thoroughfed thinkers are unveiling Reality and the
Absolute and explaining away evil and pain, this is the condition of
the only beings known to us anywhere in the universe with a
developed consciousness of what the universe is. What these people
experience IS Reality. It gives us an absolute phase of the
universe. It is the personal experience of those most qualified in
all our circle of knowledge to HAVE experience, to tell us WHAT is.
Now, what does THINKING ABOUT the experience of these persons come
to compared with directly, personally feeling it, as they feel it?
The philosophers are dealing in shades, while those who live and
feel know truth. And the mind of mankind-not yet the mind of
philosophers and of the proprietary class-but of the great mass of
the silently thinking and feeling men, is coming to this view. They
are judging the universe as they have heretofore permitted the
hierophants of religion and learning to judge THEM. ...

"This Cleveland workingman, killing his children and himself
[another of the cited cases], is one of the elemental, stupendous
facts of this modern world and of this universe. It cannot be glozed
over or minimized away by all the treatises on God, and Love, and
Being, helplessly existing in their haughty monumental vacuity. This
is one of the simple irreducible elements of this world's life after
millions of years of divine opportunity and twenty centuries of
Christ. It is in the moral world like atoms or sub-atoms in the
physical, primary, indestructible. And what it blazons to man is the
... imposture of all philosophy which does not see in such events
the consummate factor of conscious experience. These facts
invincibly prove religion a nullity. Man will not give religion two
thousand centuries or twenty centuries more to try itself and waste
human time; its time is up, its probation is ended. Its own record
ends it. Mankind has not sons and eternities to spare for trying out
discredited systems...." [Footnote: Morrison I. Swift, Human
Submission, Part Second, Philadelphia, Liberty Press, 1905, pp. 4-
10.]

Such is the reaction of an empiricist mind upon the rationalist bill
of fare. It is an absolute 'No, I thank you.' "Religion," says Mr.
Swift, "is like a sleep-walker to whom actual things are blank." And
such, tho possibly less tensely charged with feeling, is the verdict
of every seriously inquiring amateur in philosophy to-day who turns
to the philosophy-professors for the wherewithal to satisfy the
fulness of his nature's needs. Empiricist writers give him a
materialism, rationalists give him something religious, but to that
religion "actual things are blank." He becomes thus the judge of us
philosophers. Tender or tough, he finds us wanting. None of us may
treat his verdicts disdainfully, for after all, his is the typically
perfect mind, the mind the sum of whose demands is greatest, the
mind whose criticisms and dissatisfactions are fatal in the long
run.

It is at this point that my own solution begins to appear. I offer
the oddly-named thing pragmatism as a philosophy that can satisfy
both kinds of demand. It can remain religious like the rationalisms,
but at the same time, like the empiricisms, it can preserve the
richest intimacy with facts. I hope I may be able to leave many of
you with as favorable an opinion of it as I preserve myself. Yet, as
I am near the end of my hour, I will not introduce pragmatism bodily
now. I will begin with it on the stroke of the clock next time. I
prefer at the present moment to return a little on what I have said.

If any of you here are professional philosophers, and some of you I
know to be such, you will doubtless have felt my discourse so far to
have been crude in an unpardonable, nay, in an almost incredible
degree. Tender-minded and tough-minded, what a barbaric disjunction!
And, in general, when philosophy is all compacted of delicate
intellectualities and subtleties and scrupulosities, and when every
possible sort of combination and transition obtains within its
bounds, what a brutal caricature and reduction of highest things to
the lowest possible expression is it to represent its field of
conflict as a sort of rough-and-tumble fight between two hostile
temperaments! What a childishly external view! And again, how stupid
it is to treat the abstractness of rationalist systems as a crime,
and to damn them because they offer themselves as sanctuaries and
places of escape, rather than as prolongations of the world of
facts. Are not all our theories just remedies and places of escape?
And, if philosophy is to be religious, how can she be anything else
than a place of escape from the crassness of reality's surface? What
better thing can she do than raise us out of our animal senses and
show us another and a nobler home for our minds in that great
framework of ideal principles subtending all reality, which the
intellect divines? How can principles and general views ever be
anything but abstract outlines? Was Cologne cathedral built without
an architect's plan on paper? Is refinement in itself an
abomination? Is concrete rudeness the only thing that's true?

Believe me, I feel the full force of the indictment. The picture I
have given is indeed monstrously over-simplified and rude. But like
all abstractions, it will prove to have its use. If philosophers can
treat the life of the universe abstractly, they must not complain of
an abstract treatment of the life of philosophy itself. In point of
fact the picture I have given is, however coarse and sketchy,
literally true. Temperaments with their cravings and refusals do
determine men in their philosophies, and always will. The details of
systems may be reasoned out piecemeal, and when the student is
working at a system, he may often forget the forest for the single
tree. But when the labor is accomplished, the mind always performs
its big summarizing act, and the system forthwith stands over
against one like a living thing, with that strange simple note of
individuality which haunts our memory, like the wraith of the man,
when a friend or enemy of ours is dead.

Not only Walt Whitman could write "who touches this book touches a
man." The books of all the great philosophers are like so many men.
Our sense of an essential personal flavor in each one of them,
typical but indescribable, is the finest fruit of our own
accomplished philosophic education. What the system pretends to be
is a picture of the great universe of God. What it is--and oh so
flagrantly!--is the revelation of how intensely odd the personal
flavor of some fellow creature is. Once reduced to these terms (and
all our philosophies get reduced to them in minds made critical by
learning) our commerce with the systems reverts to the informal, to
the instinctive human reaction of satisfaction or dislike. We grow
as peremptory in our rejection or admission, as when a person
presents himself as a candidate for our favor; our verdicts are
couched in as simple adjectives of praise or dispraise. We measure
the total character of the universe as we feel it, against the
flavor of the philosophy proffered us, and one word is enough.

"Statt der lebendigen Natur," we say, "da Gott die Menschen schuf
hinein"--that nebulous concoction, that wooden, that straight-laced
thing, that crabbed artificiality, that musty schoolroom product,
that sick man's dream! Away with it. Away with all of them!
Impossible! Impossible!

Our work over the details of his system is indeed what gives us our
resultant impression of the philosopher, but it is on the resultant
impression itself that we react. Expertness in philosophy is
measured by the definiteness of our summarizing reactions, by the
immediate perceptive epithet with which the expert hits such complex
objects off. But great expertness is not necessary for the epithet
to come. Few people have definitely articulated philosophies of
their own. But almost everyone has his own peculiar sense of a
certain total character in the universe, and of the inadequacy fully
to match it of the peculiar systems that he knows. They don't just
cover HIS world. One will be too dapper, another too pedantic, a
third too much of a job-lot of opinions, a fourth too morbid, and a
fifth too artificial, or what not. At any rate he and we know
offhand that such philosophies are out of plumb and out of key and
out of 'whack,' and have no business to speak up in the universe's
name. Plato, Locke, Spinoza, Mill, Caird, Hegel--I prudently avoid
names nearer home!--I am sure that to many of you, my hearers, these
names are little more than reminders of as many curious personal
ways of falling short. It would be an obvious absurdity if such ways
of taking the universe were actually true. We philosophers have to
reckon with such feelings on your part. In the last resort, I
repeat, it will be by them that all our philosophies shall
ultimately be judged. The finally victorious way of looking at
things will be the most completely IMPRESSIVE way to the normal run
of minds.

One word more--namely about philosophies necessarily being abstract
outlines. There are outlines and outlines, outlines of buildings
that are FAT, conceived in the cube by their planner, and outlines
of buildings invented flat on paper, with the aid of ruler and
compass. These remain skinny and emaciated even when set up in stone
and mortar, and the outline already suggests that result. An outline
in itself is meagre, truly, but it does not necessarily suggest a
meagre thing. It is the essential meagreness of WHAT IS SUGGESTED by
the usual rationalistic philosophies that moves empiricists to their
gesture of rejection. The case of Herbert Spencer's system is much
to the point here. Rationalists feel his fearful array of
insufficiencies. His dry schoolmaster temperament, the hurdy-gurdy
monotony of him, his preference for cheap makeshifts in argument,
his lack of education even in mechanical principles, and in general
the vagueness of all his fundamental ideas, his whole system wooden,
as if knocked together out of cracked hemlock boards--and yet the
half of England wants to bury him in Westminster Abbey.

Why? Why does Spencer call out so much reverence in spite of his
weakness in rationalistic eyes? Why should so many educated men who
feel that weakness, you and I perhaps, wish to see him in the Abbey
notwithstanding?

Simply because we feel his heart to be IN THE RIGHT PLACE
philosophically. His principles may be all skin and bone, but at any
rate his books try to mould themselves upon the particular shape of
this, particular world's carcase. The noise of facts resounds
through all his chapters, the citations of fact never cease, he
emphasizes facts, turns his face towards their quarter; and that is
enough. It means the right kind of thing for the empiricist mind.

The pragmatistic philosophy of which I hope to begin talking in my
next lecture preserves as cordial a relation with facts, and, unlike
Spencer's philosophy, it neither begins nor ends by turning positive
religious constructions out of doors--it treats them cordially as
well.

I hope I may lead you to find it just the mediating way of thinking
that you require.



Lecture II

What Pragmatism Means

Some years ago, being with a camping party in the mountains, I
returned from a solitary ramble to find everyone engaged in a
ferocious metaphysical dispute. The corpus of the dispute was a
squirrel--a live squirrel supposed to be clinging to one side of a
tree-trunk; while over against the tree's opposite side a human
being was imagined to stand. This human witness tries to get sight
of the squirrel by moving rapidly round the tree, but no matter how
fast he goes, the squirrel moves as fast in the opposite direction,
and always keeps the tree between himself and the man, so that never
a glimpse of him is caught. The resultant metaphysical problem now
is this: DOES THE MAN GO ROUND THE SQUIRREL OR NOT? He goes round
the tree, sure enough, and the squirrel is on the tree; but does he
go round the squirrel? In the unlimited leisure of the wilderness,
discussion had been worn threadbare. Everyone had taken sides, and
was obstinate; and the numbers on both sides were even. Each side,
when I appeared, therefore appealed to me to make it a majority.
Mindful of the scholastic adage that whenever you meet a
contradiction you must make a distinction, I immediately sought and
found one, as follows: "Which party is right," I said, "depends on
what you PRACTICALLY MEAN by 'going round' the squirrel. If you mean
passing from the north of him to the east, then to the south, then
to the west, and then to the north of him again, obviously the man
does go round him, for he occupies these successive positions. But
if on the contrary you mean being first in front of him, then on the
right of him, then behind him, then on his left, and finally in
front again, it is quite as obvious that the man fails to go round
him, for by the compensating movements the squirrel makes, he keeps
his belly turned towards the man all the time, and his back turned
away. Make the distinction, and there is no occasion for any farther
dispute. You are both right and both wrong according as you conceive
the verb 'to go round' in one practical fashion or the other."

Altho one or two of the hotter disputants called my speech a
shuffling evasion, saying they wanted no quibbling or scholastic
hair-splitting, but meant just plain honest English 'round,' the
majority seemed to think that the distinction had assuaged the
dispute.

I tell this trivial anecdote because it is a peculiarly simple
example of what I wish now to speak of as THE PRAGMATIC METHOD. The
pragmatic method is primarily a method of settling metaphysical
disputes that otherwise might be interminable. Is the world one or
many?--fated or free?--material or spiritual?--here are notions
either of which may or may not hold good of the world; and disputes
over such notions are unending. The pragmatic method in such cases
is to try to interpret each notion by tracing its respective
practical consequences. What difference would it practically make to
anyone if this notion rather than that notion were true? If no
practical difference whatever can be traced, then the alternatives
mean practically the same thing, and all dispute is idle. Whenever a
dispute is serious, we ought to be able to show some practical
difference that must follow from one side or the other's being
right.

A glance at the history of the idea will show you still better what
pragmatism means. The term is derived from the same Greek word [pi
rho alpha gamma mu alpha], meaning action, from which our words
'practice' and 'practical' come. It was first introduced into
philosophy by Mr. Charles Peirce in 1878. In an article entitled
'How to Make Our Ideas Clear,' in the 'Popular Science Monthly' for
January of that year [Footnote: Translated in the Revue
Philosophique for January, 1879 (vol. vii).] Mr. Peirce, after
pointing out that our beliefs are really rules for action, said that
to develope a thought's meaning, we need only determine what conduct
it is fitted to produce: that conduct is for us its sole
significance. And the tangible fact at the root of all our thought-
distinctions, however subtle, is that there is no one of them so
fine as to consist in anything but a possible difference of
practice. To attain perfect clearness in our thoughts of an object,
then, we need only consider what conceivable effects of a practical
kind the object may involve--what sensations we are to expect from
it, and what reactions we must prepare. Our conception of these
effects, whether immediate or remote, is then for us the whole of
our conception of the object, so far as that conception has positive
significance at all.

This is the principle of Peirce, the principle of pragmatism. It lay
entirely unnoticed by anyone for twenty years, until I, in an
address before Professor Howison's philosophical union at the
university of California, brought it forward again and made a
special application of it to religion. By that date (1898) the times
seemed ripe for its reception. The word 'pragmatism' spread, and at
present it fairly spots the pages of the philosophic journals. On
all hands we find the 'pragmatic movement' spoken of, sometimes with
respect, sometimes with contumely, seldom with clear understanding.
It is evident that the term applies itself conveniently to a number
of tendencies that hitherto have lacked a collective name, and that
it has 'come to stay.'

To take in the importance of Peirce's principle, one must get
accustomed to applying it to concrete cases. I found a few years ago
that Ostwald, the illustrious Leipzig chemist, had been making
perfectly distinct use of the principle of pragmatism in his
lectures on the philosophy of science, tho he had not called it by
that name.

"All realities influence our practice," he wrote me, "and that
influence is their meaning for us. I am accustomed to put questions
to my classes in this way: In what respects would the world be
different if this alternative or that were true? If I can find
nothing that would become different, then the alternative has no
sense."

That is, the rival views mean practically the same thing, and
meaning, other than practical, there is for us none. Ostwald in a
published lecture gives this example of what he means. Chemists have
long wrangled over the inner constitution of certain bodies called
'tautomerous.' Their properties seemed equally consistent with the
notion that an instable hydrogen atom oscillates inside of them, or
that they are instable mixtures of two bodies. Controversy raged;
but never was decided. "It would never have begun," says Ostwald,
"if the combatants had asked themselves what particular experimental
fact could have been made different by one or the other view being
correct. For it would then have appeared that no difference of fact
could possibly ensue; and the quarrel was as unreal as if,
theorizing in primitive times about the raising of dough by yeast,
one party should have invoked a 'brownie,' while another insisted on
an 'elf' as the true cause of the phenomenon." [Footnote: 'Theorie
und Praxis,' Zeitsch. des Oesterreichischen Ingenieur u.
Architecten-Vereines, 1905, Nr. 4 u. 6. I find a still more radical
pragmatism than Ostwald's in an address by Professor W. S. Franklin:
"I think that the sickliest notion of physics, even if a student
gets it, is that it is 'the science of masses, molecules and the
ether.' And I think that the healthiest notion, even if a student
does not wholly get it, is that physics is the science of the ways
of taking hold of bodies and pushing them!" (Science, January 2,
1903.)]

It is astonishing to see how many philosophical disputes collapse
into insignificance the moment you subject them to this simple test
of tracing a concrete consequence. There can BE no difference any-
where that doesn't MAKE a difference elsewhere--no difference in
abstract truth that doesn't express itself in a difference in
concrete fact and in conduct consequent upon that fact, imposed on
somebody, somehow, somewhere and somewhen. The whole function of
philosophy ought to be to find out what definite difference it will
make to you and me, at definite instants of our life, if this world-
formula or that world-formula be the true one.

There is absolutely nothing new in the pragmatic method. Socrates
was an adept at it. Aristotle used it methodically. Locke, Berkeley
and Hume made momentous contributions to truth by its means.
Shadworth Hodgson keeps insisting that realities are only what they
are 'known-as.' But these forerunners of pragmatism used it in
fragments: they were preluders only. Not until in our time has it
generalized itself, become conscious of a universal mission,
pretended to a conquering destiny. I believe in that destiny, and I
hope I may end by inspiring you with my belief.

Pragmatism represents a perfectly familiar attitude in philosophy,
the empiricist attitude, but it represents it, as it seems to me,
both in a more radical and in a less objectionable form than it has
ever yet assumed. A pragmatist turns his back resolutely and once
for all upon a lot of inveterate habits dear to professional
philosophers. He turns away from abstraction and insufficiency, from
verbal solutions, from bad a priori reasons, from fixed principles,
closed systems, and pretended absolutes and origins. He turns
towards concreteness and adequacy, towards facts, towards action,
and towards power. That means the empiricist temper regnant, and the
rationalist temper sincerely given up. It means the open air and
possibilities of nature, as against dogma, artificiality and the
pretence of finality in truth.

At the same time it does not stand for any special results. It is a
method only. But the general triumph of that method would mean an
enormous change in what I called in my last lecture the
'temperament' of philosophy. Teachers of the ultra-rationalistic
type would be frozen out, much as the courtier type is frozen out in
republics, as the ultramontane type of priest is frozen out in
protestant lands. Science and metaphysics would come much nearer
together, would in fact work absolutely hand in hand.

Metaphysics has usually followed a very primitive kind of quest. You
know how men have always hankered after unlawful magic, and you know
what a great part, in magic, WORDS have always played. If you have
his name, or the formula of incantation that binds him, you can
control the spirit, genie, afrite, or whatever the power may be.
Solomon knew the names of all the spirits, and having their names,
he held them subject to his will. So the universe has always
appeared to the natural mind as a kind of enigma, of which the key
must be sought in the shape of some illuminating or power-bringing
word or name. That word names the universe's PRINCIPLE, and to
possess it is, after a fashion, to possess the universe itself.
'God,' 'Matter,' 'Reason,' 'the Absolute,' 'Energy,' are so many
solving names. You can rest when you have them. You are at the end
of your metaphysical quest.

But if you follow the pragmatic method, you cannot look on any such
word as closing your quest. You must bring out of each word its
practical cash-value, set it at work within the stream of your
experience. It appears less as a solution, then, than as a program
for more work, and more particularly as an indication of the ways in
which existing realities may be CHANGED.

THEORIES THUS BECOME INSTRUMENTS, NOT ANSWERS TO ENIGMAS, IN WHICH
WE CAN REST. We don't lie back upon them, we move forward, and, on
occasion, make nature over again by their aid. Pragmatism unstiffens
all our theories, limbers them up and sets each one at work. Being
nothing essentially new, it harmonizes with many ancient philosophic
tendencies. It agrees with nominalism for instance, in always
appealing to particulars; with utilitarianism in emphasizing
practical aspects; with positivism in its disdain for verbal
solutions, useless questions, and metaphysical abstractions.

All these, you see, are ANTI-INTELLECTUALIST tendencies. Against
rationalism as a pretension and a method, pragmatism is fully armed
and militant. But, at the outset, at least, it stands for no
particular results. It has no dogmas, and no doctrines save its
method. As the young Italian pragmatist Papini has well said, it
lies in the midst of our theories, like a corridor in a hotel.
Innumerable chambers open out of it. In one you may find a man
writing an atheistic volume; in the next someone on his knees
praying for faith and strength; in a third a chemist investigating a
body's properties. In a fourth a system of idealistic metaphysics is
being excogitated; in a fifth the impossibility of metaphysics is
being shown. But they all own the corridor, and all must pass
through it if they want a practicable way of getting into or out of
their respective rooms.

No particular results then, so far, but only an attitude of
orientation, is what the pragmatic method means. THE ATTITUDE OF
LOOKING AWAY FROM FIRST THINGS, PRINCIPLES, 'CATEGORIES,' SUPPOSED
NECESSITIES; AND OF LOOKING TOWARDS LAST THINGS, FRUITS,
CONSEQUENCES, FACTS.

So much for the pragmatic method! You may say that I have been
praising it rather than explaining it to you, but I shall presently
explain it abundantly enough by showing how it works on some
familiar problems. Meanwhile the word pragmatism has come to be used
in a still wider sense, as meaning also a certain theory of TRUTH. I
mean to give a whole lecture to the statement of that theory, after
first paving the way, so I can be very brief now. But brevity is
hard to follow, so I ask for your redoubled attention for a quarter
of an hour. If much remains obscure, I hope to make it clearer in
the later lectures.

One of the most successfully cultivated branches of philosophy in
our time is what is called inductive logic, the study of the
conditions under which our sciences have evolved. Writers on this
subject have begun to show a singular unanimity as to what the laws
of nature and elements of fact mean, when formulated by
mathematicians, physicists and chemists. When the first
mathematical, logical and natural uniformities, the first LAWS, were
discovered, men were so carried away by the clearness, beauty and
simplification that resulted, that they believed themselves to have
deciphered authentically the eternal thoughts of the Almighty. His
mind also thundered and reverberated in syllogisms. He also thought
in conic sections, squares and roots and ratios, and geometrized
like Euclid. He made Kepler's laws for the planets to follow; he
made velocity increase proportionally to the time in falling bodies;
he made the law of the sines for light to obey when refracted; he
established the classes, orders, families and genera of plants and
animals, and fixed the distances between them. He thought the
archetypes of all things, and devised their variations; and when we
rediscover any one of these his wondrous institutions, we seize his
mind in its very literal intention.

But as the sciences have developed farther, the notion has gained
ground that most, perhaps all, of our laws are only approximations.
The laws themselves, moreover, have grown so numerous that there is
no counting them; and so many rival formulations are proposed in all
the branches of science that investigators have become accustomed to
the notion that no theory is absolutely a transcript of reality, but
that any one of them may from some point of view be useful. Their
great use is to summarize old facts and to lead to new ones. They
are only a man-made language, a conceptual shorthand, as someone
calls them, in which we write our reports of nature; and languages,
as is well known, tolerate much choice of expression and many
dialects.

Thus human arbitrariness has driven divine necessity from scientific
logic. If I mention the names of Sigwart, Mach, Ostwald, Pearson,
Milhaud, Poincare, Duhem, Ruyssen, those of you who are students
will easily identify the tendency I speak of, and will think of
additional names.

Riding now on the front of this wave of scientific logic Messrs.
Schiller and Dewey appear with their pragmatistic account of what
truth everywhere signifies. Everywhere, these teachers say, 'truth'
in our ideas and beliefs means the same thing that it means in
science. It means, they say, nothing but this, THAT IDEAS (WHICH
THEMSELVES ARE BUT PARTS OF OUR EXPERIENCE) BECOME TRUE JUST IN SO
FAR AS THEY HELP US TO GET INTO SATISFACTORY RELATION WITH OTHER
PARTS OF OUR EXPERIENCE, to summarize them and get about among them
by conceptual short-cuts instead of following the interminable
succession of particular phenomena. Any idea upon which we can ride,
so to speak; any idea that will carry us prosperously from any one
part of our experience to any other part, linking things
satisfactorily, working securely, simplifying, saving labor; is true
for just so much, true in so far forth, true INSTRUMENTALLY. This is
the 'instrumental' view of truth taught so successfully at Chicago,
the view that truth in our ideas means their power to 'work,'
promulgated so brilliantly at Oxford.

Messrs. Dewey, Schiller and their allies, in reaching this general
conception of all truth, have only followed the example of
geologists, biologists and philologists. In the establishment of
these other sciences, the successful stroke was always to take some
simple process actually observable in operation--as denudation by
weather, say, or variation from parental type, or change of dialect
by incorporation of new words and pronunciations--and then to
generalize it, making it apply to all times, and produce great
results by summating its effects through the ages.

The observable process which Schiller and Dewey particularly singled
out for generalization is the familiar one by which any individual
settles into NEW OPINIONS. The process here is always the same. The
individual has a stock of old opinions already, but he meets a new
experience that puts them to a strain. Somebody contradicts them; or
in a reflective moment he discovers that they contradict each other;
or he hears of facts with which they are incompatible; or desires
arise in him which they cease to satisfy. The result is an inward
trouble to which his mind till then had been a stranger, and from
which he seeks to escape by modifying his previous mass of opinions.
He saves as much of it as he can, for in this matter of belief we
are all extreme conservatives. So he tries to change first this
opinion, and then that (for they resist change very variously),
until at last some new idea comes up which he can graft upon the
ancient stock with a minimum of disturbance of the latter, some idea
that mediates between the stock and the new experience and runs them
into one another most felicitously and expediently.

This new idea is then adopted as the true one. It preserves the
older stock of truths with a minimum of modification, stretching
them just enough to make them admit the novelty, but conceiving that
in ways as familiar as the case leaves possible. An outree
explanation, violating all our preconceptions, would never pass for
a true account of a novelty. We should scratch round industriously
till we found something less excentric. The most violent revolutions
in an individual's beliefs leave most of his old order standing.
Time and space, cause and effect, nature and history, and one's own
biography remain untouched. New truth is always a go-between, a
smoother-over of transitions. It marries old opinion to new fact so
as ever to show a minimum of jolt, a maximum of continuity. We hold
a theory true just in proportion to its success in solving this
'problem of maxima and minima.' But success in solving this problem
is eminently a matter of approximation. We say this theory solves it
on the whole more satisfactorily than that theory; but that means
more satisfactorily to ourselves, and individuals will emphasize
their points of satisfaction differently. To a certain degree,
therefore, everything here is plastic.

The point I now urge you to observe particularly is the part played
by the older truths. Failure to take account of it is the source of
much of the unjust criticism leveled against pragmatism. Their
influence is absolutely controlling. Loyalty to them is the first
principle--in most cases it is the only principle; for by far the
most usual way of handling phenomena so novel that they would make
for a serious rearrangement of our preconceptions is to ignore them
altogether, or to abuse those who bear witness for them.

You doubtless wish examples of this process of truth's growth, and
the only trouble is their superabundance. The simplest case of new
truth is of course the mere numerical addition of new kinds of
facts, or of new single facts of old kinds, to our experience--an
addition that involves no alteration in the old beliefs. Day follows
day, and its contents are simply added. The new contents themselves
are not true, they simply COME and ARE. Truth is what we say about
them, and when we say that they have come, truth is satisfied by the
plain additive formula.

But often the day's contents oblige a rearrangement. If I should now
utter piercing shrieks and act like a maniac on this platform, it
would make many of you revise your ideas as to the probable worth of
my philosophy. 'Radium' came the other day as part of the day's
content, and seemed for a moment to contradict our ideas of the
whole order of nature, that order having come to be identified with
what is called the conservation of energy. The mere sight of radium
paying heat away indefinitely out of its own pocket seemed to
violate that conservation. What to think? If the radiations from it
were nothing but an escape of unsuspected 'potential' energy, pre-
existent inside of the atoms, the principle of conservation would be
saved. The discovery of 'helium' as the radiation's outcome, opened
a way to this belief. So Ramsay's view is generally held to be true,
because, altho it extends our old ideas of energy, it causes a
minimum of alteration in their nature.

I need not multiply instances. A new opinion counts as 'true' just
in proportion as it gratifies the individual's desire to assimilate
the novel in his experience to his beliefs in stock. It must both
lean on old truth and grasp new fact; and its success (as I said a
moment ago) in doing this, is a matter for the individual's
appreciation. When old truth grows, then, by new truth's addition,
it is for subjective reasons. We are in the process and obey the
reasons. That new idea is truest which performs most felicitously
its function of satisfying our double urgency. It makes itself true,
gets itself classed as true, by the way it works; grafting itself
then upon the ancient body of truth, which thus grows much as a tree
grows by the activity of a new layer of cambium.

Now Dewey and Schiller proceed to generalize this observation and to
apply it to the most ancient parts of truth. They also once were
plastic. They also were called true for human reasons. They also
mediated between still earlier truths and what in those days were
novel observations. Purely objective truth, truth in whose
establishment the function of giving human satisfaction in marrying
previous parts of experience with newer parts played no role
whatever, is nowhere to be found. The reasons why we call things
true is the reason why they ARE true, for 'to be true' MEANS only to
perform this marriage-function.

The trail of the human serpent is thus over everything. Truth
independent; truth that we FIND merely; truth no longer malleable to
human need; truth incorrigible, in a word; such truth exists indeed
superabundantly--or is supposed to exist by rationalistically minded
thinkers; but then it means only the dead heart of the living tree,
and its being there means only that truth also has its paleontology
and its 'prescription,' and may grow stiff with years of veteran
service and petrified in men's regard by sheer antiquity. But how
plastic even the oldest truths nevertheless really are has been
vividly shown in our day by the transformation of logical and
mathematical ideas, a transformation which seems even to be invading
physics. The ancient formulas are reinterpreted as special
expressions of much wider principles, principles that our ancestors
never got a glimpse of in their present shape and formulation.

Mr. Schiller still gives to all this view of truth the name of
'Humanism,' but, for this doctrine too, the name of pragmatism seems
fairly to be in the ascendant, so I will treat it under the name of
pragmatism in these lectures.

Such then would be the scope of pragmatism--first, a method; and
second, a genetic theory of what is meant by truth. And these two
things must be our future topics.

What I have said of the theory of truth will, I am sure, have
appeared obscure and unsatisfactory to most of you by reason of us
brevity. I shall make amends for that hereafter. In a lecture on
'common sense' I shall try to show what I mean by truths grown
petrified by antiquity. In another lecture I shall expatiate on the
idea that our thoughts become true in proportion as they
successfully exert their go-between function. In a third I shall
show how hard it is to discriminate subjective from objective
factors in Truth's development. You may not follow me wholly in
these lectures; and if you do, you may not wholly agree with me. But
you will, I know, regard me at least as serious, and treat my effort
with respectful consideration.

You will probably be surprised to learn, then, that Messrs.
Schiller's and Dewey's theories have suffered a hailstorm of
contempt and ridicule. All rationalism has risen against them. In
influential quarters Mr. Schiller, in particular, has been treated
like an impudent schoolboy who deserves a spanking. I should not
mention this, but for the fact that it throws so much sidelight upon
that rationalistic temper to which I have opposed the temper of
pragmatism. Pragmatism is uncomfortable away from facts. Rationalism
is comfortable only in the presence of abstractions. This pragmatist
talk about truths in the plural, about their utility and
satisfactoriness, about the success with which they 'work,' etc.,
suggests to the typical intellectualist mind a sort of coarse lame
second-rate makeshift article of truth. Such truths are not real
truth. Such tests are merely subjective. As against this, objective
truth must be something non-utilitarian, haughty, refined, remote,
august, exalted. It must be an absolute correspondence of our
thoughts with an equally absolute reality. It must be what we OUGHT
to think, unconditionally. The conditioned ways in which we DO think
are so much irrelevance and matter for psychology. Down with
psychology, up with logic, in all this question!

See the exquisite contrast of the types of mind! The pragmatist
clings to facts and concreteness, observes truth at its work in
particular cases, and generalizes. Truth, for him, becomes a class-
name for all sorts of definite working-values in experience. For the
rationalist it remains a pure abstraction, to the bare name of which
we must defer. When the pragmatist undertakes to show in detail just
WHY we must defer, the rationalist is unable to recognize the
concretes from which his own abstraction is taken. He accuses us of
DENYING truth; whereas we have only sought to trace exactly why
people follow it and always ought to follow it. Your typical ultra-
abstractionist fairly shudders at concreteness: other things equal,
he positively prefers the pale and spectral. If the two universes
were offered, he would always choose the skinny outline rather than
the rich thicket of reality. It is so much purer, clearer, nobler.

I hope that as these lectures go on, the concreteness and closeness
to facts of the pragmatism which they advocate may be what approves
itself to you as its most satisfactory peculiarity. It only follows
here the example of the sister-sciences, interpreting the unobserved
by the observed. It brings old and new harmoniously together. It
converts the absolutely empty notion of a static relation of
'correspondence' (what that may mean we must ask later) between our
minds and reality, into that of a rich and active commerce (that
anyone may follow in detail and understand) between particular
thoughts of ours, and the great universe of other experiences in
which they play their parts and have their uses.

But enough of this at present? The justification of what I say must
be postponed. I wish now to add a word in further explanation of the
claim I made at our last meeting, that pragmatism may be a happy
harmonizer of empiricist ways of thinking, with the more religious
demands of human beings.

Men who are strongly of the fact-loving temperament, you may
remember me to have said, are liable to be kept at a distance by the
small sympathy with facts which that philosophy from the present-day
fashion of idealism offers them. It is far too intellectualistic.
Old fashioned theism was bad enough, with its notion of God as an
exalted monarch, made up of a lot of unintelligible or preposterous
'attributes'; but, so long as it held strongly by the argument from
design, it kept some touch with concrete realities. Since, however,
darwinism has once for all displaced design from the minds of the
'scientific,' theism has lost that foothold; and some kind of an
immanent or pantheistic deity working IN things rather than above
them is, if any, the kind recommended to our contemporary
imagination. Aspirants to a philosophic religion turn, as a rule,
more hopefully nowadays towards idealistic pantheism than towards
the older dualistic theism, in spite of the fact that the latter
still counts able defenders.

But, as I said in my first lecture, the brand of pantheism offered
is hard for them to assimilate if they are lovers of facts, or
empirically minded. It is the absolutistic brand, spurning the dust
and reared upon pure logic. It keeps no connexion whatever with
concreteness. Affirming the Absolute Mind, which is its substitute
for God, to be the rational presupposition of all particulars of
fact, whatever they may be, it remains supremely indifferent to what
the particular facts in our world actually are. Be they what they
may, the Absolute will father them. Like the sick lion in Esop's
fable, all footprints lead into his den, but nulla vestigia
retrorsum. You cannot redescend into the world of particulars by the
Absolute's aid, or deduce any necessary consequences of detail
important for your life from your idea of his nature. He gives you
indeed the assurance that all is well with Him, and for his eternal
way of thinking; but thereupon he leaves you to be finitely saved by
your own temporal devices.

Far be it from me to deny the majesty of this conception, or its
capacity to yield religious comfort to a most respectable class of
minds. But from the human point of view, no one can pretend that it
doesn't suffer from the faults of remoteness and abstractness. It is
eminently a product of what I have ventured to call the
rationalistic temper. It disdains empiricism's needs. It substitutes
a pallid outline for the real world's richness. It is dapper; it is
noble in the bad sense, in the sense in which to be noble is to be
inapt for humble service. In this real world of sweat and dirt, it
seems to me that when a view of things is 'noble,' that ought to
count as a presumption against its truth, and as a philosophic
disqualification. The prince of darkness may be a gentleman, as we
are told he is, but whatever the God of earth and heaven is, he can
surely be no gentleman. His menial services are needed in the dust
of our human trials, even more than his dignity is needed in the
empyrean.

Now pragmatism, devoted tho she be to facts, has no such
materialistic bias as ordinary empiricism labors under. Moreover,
she has no objection whatever to the realizing of abstractions, so
long as you get about among particulars with their aid and they
actually carry you somewhere. Interested in no conclusions but those
which our minds and our experiences work out together, she has no a
priori prejudices against theology. IF THEOLOGICAL IDEAS PROVE TO
HAVE A VALUE FOR CONCRETE LIFE, THEY WILL BE TRUE, FOR PRAGMATISM,
IN THE SENSE OF BEING GOOD FOR SO MUCH. FOR HOW MUCH MORE THEY ARE
TRUE, WILL DEPEND ENTIRELY ON THEIR RELATIONS TO THE OTHER TRUTHS
THAT ALSO HAVE TO BE ACKNOWLEDGED.

What I said just now about the Absolute of transcendental idealism
is a case in point. First, I called it majestic and said it yielded
religious comfort to a class of minds, and then I accused it of
remoteness and sterility. But so far as it affords such comfort, it
surely is not sterile; it has that amount of value; it performs a
concrete function. As a good pragmatist, I myself ought to call the
Absolute true 'in so far forth,' then; and I unhesitatingly now do
so.

But what does TRUE IN SO FAR FORTH mean in this case? To answer, we
need only apply the pragmatic method. What do believers in the
Absolute mean by saying that their belief affords them comfort? They
mean that since in the Absolute finite evil is 'overruled' already,
we may, therefore, whenever we wish, treat the temporal as if it
were potentially the eternal, be sure that we can trust its outcome,
and, without sin, dismiss our fear and drop the worry of our finite
responsibility. In short, they mean that we have a right ever and
anon to take a moral holiday, to let the world wag in its own way,
feeling that its issues are in better hands than ours and are none
of our business.

The universe is a system of which the individual members may relax
their anxieties occasionally, in which the don't-care mood is also
right for men, and moral holidays in order--that, if I mistake not,
is part, at least, of what the Absolute is 'known-as,' that is the
great difference in our particular experiences which his being true
makes for us, that is part of his cash-value when he is
pragmatically interpreted. Farther than that the ordinary lay-reader
in philosophy who thinks favorably of absolute idealism does not
venture to sharpen his conceptions. He can use the Absolute for so
much, and so much is very precious. He is pained at hearing you
speak incredulously of the Absolute, therefore, and disregards your
criticisms because they deal with aspects of the conception that he
fails to follow.

If the Absolute means this, and means no more than this, who can
possibly deny the truth of it? To deny it would be to insist that
men should never relax, and that holidays are never in order. I am
well aware how odd it must seem to some of you to hear me say that
an idea is 'true' so long as to believe it is profitable to our
lives. That it is GOOD, for as much as it profits, you will gladly
admit. If what we do by its aid is good, you will allow the idea
itself to be good in so far forth, for we are the better for
possessing it. But is it not a strange misuse of the word 'truth,'
you will say, to call ideas also 'true' for this reason?

To answer this difficulty fully is impossible at this stage of my
account. You touch here upon the very central point of Messrs.
Schiller's, Dewey's and my own doctrine of truth, which I cannot
discuss with detail until my sixth lecture. Let me now say only
this, that truth is ONE SPECIES OF GOOD, and not, as is usually
supposed, a category distinct from good, and co-ordinate with it.
THE TRUE IS THE NAME OF WHATEVER PROVES ITSELF TO BE GOOD IN THE WAY
OF BELIEF, AND GOOD, TOO, FOR DEFINITE, ASSIGNABLE REASONS. Surely
you must admit this, that if there were NO good for life in true
ideas, or if the knowledge of them were positively disadvantageous
and false ideas the only useful ones, then the current notion that
truth is divine and precious, and its pursuit a duty, could never
have grown up or become a dogma. In a world like that, our duty
would be to SHUN truth, rather. But in this world, just as certain
foods are not only agreeable to our taste, but good for our teeth,
our stomach and our tissues; so certain ideas are not only agreeable
to think about, or agreeable as supporting other ideas that we are
fond of, but they are also helpful in life's practical struggles. If
there be any life that it is really better we should lead, and if
there be any idea which, if believed in, would help us to lead that
life, then it would be really BETTER FOR US to believe in that idea,
UNLESS, INDEED, BELIEF IN IT INCIDENTALLY CLASHED WITH OTHER GREATER
VITAL BENEFITS.

'What would be better for us to believe'! This sounds very like a
definition of truth. It comes very near to saying 'what we OUGHT to
believe': and in THAT definition none of you would find any oddity.
Ought we ever not to believe what it is BETTER FOR US to believe?
And can we then keep the notion of what is better for us, and what
is true for us, permanently apart?

Pragmatism says no, and I fully agree with her. Probably you also
agree, so far as the abstract statement goes, but with a suspicion
that if we practically did believe everything that made for good in
our own personal lives, we should be found indulging all kinds of
fancies about this world's affairs, and all kinds of sentimental
superstitions about a world hereafter. Your suspicion here is
undoubtedly well founded, and it is evident that something happens
when you pass from the abstract to the concrete, that complicates
the situation.

I said just now that what is better for us to believe is true UNLESS
THE BELIEF INCIDENTALLY CLASHES WITH SOME OTHER VITAL BENEFIT. Now
in real life what vital benefits is any particular belief of ours
most liable to clash with? What indeed except the vital benefits
yielded by OTHER BELIEFS when these prove incompatible with the
first ones? In other words, the greatest enemy of any one of our
truths may be the rest of our truths. Truths have once for all this
desperate instinct of self-preservation and of desire to extinguish
whatever contradicts them. My belief in the Absolute, based on the
good it does me, must run the gauntlet of all my other beliefs.
Grant that it may be true in giving me a moral holiday.
Nevertheless, as I conceive it,--and let me speak now
confidentially, as it were, and merely in my own private person,--it
clashes with other truths of mine whose benefits I hate to give up
on its account. It happens to be associated with a kind of logic of
which I am the enemy, I find that it entangles me in metaphysical
paradoxes that are inacceptable, etc., etc.. But as I have enough
trouble in life already without adding the trouble of carrying these
intellectual inconsistencies, I personally just give up the
Absolute. I just TAKE my moral holidays; or else as a professional
philosopher, I try to justify them by some other principle.

If I could restrict my notion of the Absolute to its bare holiday-
giving value, it wouldn't clash with my other truths. But we cannot
easily thus restrict our hypotheses. They carry supernumerary
features, and these it is that clash so. My disbelief in the
Absolute means then disbelief in those other supernumerary features,
for I fully believe in the legitimacy of taking moral holidays.

You see by this what I meant when I called pragmatism a mediator and
reconciler and said, borrowing the word from Papini, that he
unstiffens our theories. She has in fact no prejudices whatever, no
obstructive dogmas, no rigid canons of what shall count as proof.
She is completely genial. She will entertain any hypothesis, she
will consider any evidence. It follows that in the religious field
she is at a great advantage both over positivistic empiricism, with
its anti-theological bias, and over religious rationalism, with its
exclusive interest in the remote, the noble, the simple, and the
abstract in the way of conception.

In short, she widens the field of search for God. Rationalism sticks
to logic and the empyrean. Empiricism sticks to the external senses.
Pragmatism is willing to take anything, to follow either logic or
the senses, and to count the humblest and most personal experiences.
She will count mystical experiences if they have practical
consequences. She will take a God who lives in the very dirt of
private fact-if that should seem a likely place to find him.

Her only test of probable truth is what works best in the way of
leading us, what fits every part of life best and combines with the
collectivity of experience's demands, nothing being omitted. If
theological ideas should do this, if the notion of God, in
particular, should prove to do it, how could pragmatism possibly
deny God's existence? She could see no meaning in treating as 'not
true' a notion that was pragmatically so successful. What other kind
of truth could there be, for her, than all this agreement with
concrete reality?

In my last lecture I shall return again to the relations of
pragmatism with religion. But you see already how democratic she is.
Her manners are as various and flexible, her resources as rich and
endless, and her conclusions as friendly as those of mother nature.



Lecture III

Some Metaphysical Problems Pragmatically Considered

I am now to make the pragmatic method more familiar by giving you
some illustrations of its application to particular problems. I will
begin with what is driest, and the first thing I shall take will be
the problem of Substance. Everyone uses the old distinction between
substance and attribute, enshrined as it is in the very structure of
human language, in the difference between grammatical subject and
predicate. Here is a bit of blackboard crayon. Its modes,
attributes, properties, accidents, or affections,--use which term
you will,--are whiteness, friability, cylindrical shape,
insolubility in water, etc., etc. But the bearer of these attributes
is so much chalk, which thereupon is called the substance in which
they inhere. So the attributes of this desk inhere in the substance
'wood,' those of my coat in the substance 'wool,' and so forth.
Chalk, wood and wool, show again, in spite of their differences,
common properties, and in so far forth they are themselves counted
as modes of a still more primal substance, matter, the attributes of
which are space occupancy and impenetrability. Similarly our
thoughts and feelings are affections or properties of our several
souls, which are substances, but again not wholly in their own
right, for they are modes of the still deeper substance 'spirit.'

Now it was very early seen that all we know of the chalk is the
whiteness, friability, etc., all WE KNOW of the wood is the
combustibility and fibrous structure. A group of attributes is what
each substance here is known-as, they form its sole cash-value for
our actual experience. The substance is in every case revealed
through THEM; if we were cut off from THEM we should never suspect
its existence; and if God should keep sending them to us in an
unchanged order, miraculously annihilating at a certain moment the
substance that supported them, we never could detect the moment, for
our experiences themselves would be unaltered. Nominalists
accordingly adopt the opinion that substance is a spurious idea due
to our inveterate human trick of turning names into things.
Phenomena come in groups--the chalk-group, the wood-group, etc.--and
each group gets its name. The name we then treat as in a way
supporting the group of phenomena. The low thermometer to-day, for
instance, is supposed to come from something called the 'climate.'
Climate is really only the name for a certain group of days, but it
is treated as if it lay BEHIND the day, and in general we place the
name, as if it were a being, behind the facts it is the name of. But
the phenomenal properties of things, nominalists say, surely do not
really inhere in names, and if not in names then they do not inhere
in anything. They ADhere, or COhere, rather, WITH EACH OTHER, and
the notion of a substance inaccessible to us, which we think
accounts for such cohesion by supporting it, as cement might support
pieces of mosaic, must be abandoned. The fact of the bare cohesion
itself is all that the notion of the substance signifies. Behind
that fact is nothing.

Scholasticism has taken the notion of substance from common sense
and made it very technical and articulate. Few things would seem to
have fewer pragmatic consequences for us than substances, cut off as
we are from every contact with them. Yet in one case scholasticism
has proved the importance of the substance-idea by treating it
pragmatically. I refer to certain disputes about the mystery of the
Eucharist. Substance here would appear to have momentous pragmatic
value. Since the accidents of the wafer don't change in the Lord's
supper, and yet it has become the very body of Christ, it must be
that the change is in the substance solely. The bread-substance must
have been withdrawn, and the divine substance substituted
miraculously without altering the immediate sensible properties. But
tho these don't alter, a tremendous difference has been made, no
less a one than this, that we who take the sacrament, now feed upon
the very substance of divinity. The substance-notion breaks into
life, then, with tremendous effect, if once you allow that
substances can separate from their accidents, and exchange these
latter.

This is the only pragmatic application of the substance-idea with
which I am acquainted; and it is obvious that it will only be
treated seriously by those who already believe in the 'real
presence' on independent grounds.

MATERIAL SUBSTANCE was criticized by Berkeley with such telling
effect that his name has reverberated through all subsequent
philosophy. Berkeley's treatment of the notion of matter is so well
known as to need hardly more than a mention. So far from denying the
external world which we know, Berkeley corroborated it. It was the
scholastic notion of a material substance unapproachable by us,
BEHIND the external world, deeper and more real than it, and needed
to support it, which Berkeley maintained to be the most effective of
all reducers of the external world to unreality. Abolish that
substance, he said, believe that God, whom you can understand and
approach, sends you the sensible world directly, and you confirm the
latter and back it up by his divine authority. Berkeley's criticism
of 'matter' was consequently absolutely pragmatistic. Matter is
known as our sensations of colour, figure, hardness and the like.
They are the cash-value of the term. The difference matter makes to
us by truly being is that we then get such sensations; by not being,
is that we lack them. These sensations then are its sole meaning.
Berkeley doesn't deny matter, then; he simply tells us what it
consists of. It is a true name for just so much in the way of
sensations.

Locke, and later Hume, applied a similar pragmatic criticism to the
notion of SPIRITUAL SUBSTANCE. I will only mention Locke's treatment
of our 'personal identity.' He immediately reduces this notion to
its pragmatic value in terms of experience. It means, he says, so
much consciousness,' namely the fact that at one moment of life we
remember other moments, and feel them all as parts of one and the
same personal history. Rationalism had explained this practical
continuity in our life by the unity of our soul-substance. But Locke
says: suppose that God should take away the consciousness, should WE
be any the better for having still the soul-principle? Suppose he
annexed the same consciousness to different souls, | should we, as
WE realize OURSELVES, be any the worse for that fact? In Locke's day
the soul was chiefly a thing to be rewarded or punished. See how
Locke, discussing it from this point of view, keeps the question
pragmatic:

Suppose, he says, one to think himself to be the same soul that once
was Nestor or Thersites. Can he think their actions his own any more
than the actions of any other man that ever existed? But | let him
once find himself CONSCIOUS of any of the actions of Nestor, he then
finds himself the same person with Nestor. ... In this personal
identity is founded all the right and justice of reward and
punishment. It may be reasonable to think, no one shall be made to
answer for what he knows nothing of, but shall receive his doom, his
consciousness accusing or excusing. Supposing a man punished now for
what he had done in another life, whereof he could be made to have
no consciousness at all, what difference is there between that
punishment and being created miserable?

Our personal identity, then, consists, for Locke, solely in
pragmatically definable particulars. Whether, apart from these
verifiable facts, it also inheres in a spiritual principle, is a
merely curious speculation. Locke, compromiser that he was,
passively tolerated the belief in a substantial soul behind our
consciousness. But his successor Hume, and most empirical
psychologists after him, have denied the soul, save as the name for
verifiable cohesions in our inner life. They redescend into the
stream of experience with it, and cash it into so much small-change
value in the way of 'ideas' and their peculiar connexions with each
other. As I said of Berkeley's matter, the soul is good or 'true'
for just SO MUCH, but no more.

The mention of material substance naturally suggests the doctrine of
'materialism,' but philosophical materialism is not necessarily knit
up with belief in 'matter,' as a metaphysical principle. One may
deny matter in that sense, as strongly as Berkeley did, one may be a
phenomenalist like Huxley, and yet one may still be a materialist in
the wider sense, of explaining higher phenomena by lower ones, and
leaving the destinies of the world at the mercy of its blinder parts
and forces. It is in this wider sense of the word that materialism
is opposed to spiritualism or theism. The laws of physical nature
are what run things, materialism says. The highest productions of
human genius might be ciphered by one who had complete acquaintance
with the facts, out of their physiological conditions, regardless
whether nature be there only for our minds, as idealists contend, or
not. Our minds in any case would have to record the kind of nature
it is, and write it down as operating through blind laws of physics.
This is the complexion of present day materialism, which may better
be called naturalism. Over against it stands 'theism,' or what in a
wide sense may be termed 'spiritualism.' Spiritualism says that mind
not only witnesses and records things, but also runs and operates
them: the world being thus guided, not by its lower, but by its
higher element.

Treated as it often is, this question becomes little more than a
conflict between aesthetic preferences. Matter is gross, coarse,
crass, muddy; spirit is pure, elevated, noble; and since it is more
consonant with the dignity of the universe to give the primacy in it
to what appears superior, spirit must be affirmed as the ruling
principle. To treat abstract principles as finalities, before which
our intellects may come to rest in a state of admiring
contemplation, is the great rationalist failing. Spiritualism, as
often held, may be simply a state of admiration for one kind, and of
dislike for another kind, of abstraction. I remember a worthy
spiritualist professor who always referred to materialism as the
'mud-philosophy,' and deemed it thereby refuted.

To such spiritualism as this there is an easy answer, and Mr.
Spencer makes it effectively. In some well-written pages at the end
of the first volume of his Psychology he shows us that a 'matter' so
infinitely subtile, and performing motions as inconceivably quick
and fine as those which modern science postulates in her
explanations, has no trace of grossness left. He shows that the
conception of spirit, as we mortals hitherto have framed it, is
itself too gross to cover the exquisite tenuity of nature's facts.
Both terms, he says, are but symbols, pointing to that one
unknowable reality in which their oppositions cease.

To an abstract objection an abstract rejoinder suffices; and so far
as one's opposition to materialism springs from one's disdain of
matter as something 'crass,' Mr. Spencer cuts the ground from under
one. Matter is indeed infinitely and incredibly refined. To anyone
who has ever looked on the face of a dead child or parent the mere
fact that matter COULD have taken for a time that precious form,
ought to make matter sacred ever after. It makes no difference what
the PRINCIPLE of life may be, material or immaterial, matter at any
rate co-operates, lends itself to all life's purposes. That beloved
incarnation was among matter's possibilities.

But now, instead of resting in principles after this stagnant
intellectualist fashion, let us apply the pragmatic method to the
question. What do we MEAN by matter? What practical difference can
it make NOW that the world should be run by matter or by spirit? I
think we find that the problem takes with this a rather different
character.

And first of all I call your attention to a curious fact. It makes
not a single jot of difference so far as the PAST of the world goes,
whether we deem it to have been the work of matter or whether we
think a divine spirit was its author.

Imagine, in fact, the entire contents of the world to be once for
all irrevocably given. Imagine it to end this very moment, and to
have no future; and then let a theist and a materialist apply their
rival explanations to its history. The theist shows how a God made
it; the materialist shows, and we will suppose with equal success,
how it resulted from blind physical forces. Then let the pragmatist
be asked to choose between their theories. How can he apply his test
if the world is already completed? Concepts for him are things to
come back into experience with, things to make us look for
differences. But by hypothesis there is to be no more experience and
no possible differences can now be looked for. Both theories have
shown all their consequences and, by the hypothesis we are adopting,
these are identical. The pragmatist must consequently say that the
two theories, in spite of their different-sounding names, mean
exactly the same thing, and that the dispute is purely verbal. [I am
opposing, of course, that the theories HAVE been equally successful
in their explanations of what is.]

For just consider the case sincerely, and say what would be the
WORTH of a God if he WERE there, with his work accomplished arid his
world run down. He would be worth no more than just that world was
worth. To that amount of result, with its mixed merits and defects,
his creative power could attain, but go no farther. And since there
is to be no future; since the whole value and meaning of the world
has been already paid in and actualized in the feelings that went
with it in the passing, and now go with it in the ending; since it
draws no supplemental significance (such as our real world draws)
from its function of preparing something yet to come; why then, by
it we take God's measure, as it were. He is the Being who could once
for all do THAT; and for that much we are thankful to him, but for
nothing more. But now, on the contrary hypothesis, namely, that the
bits of matter following their laws could make that world and do no
less, should we not be just as thankful to them? Wherein should we
suffer loss, then, if we dropped God as an hypothesis and made the
matter alone responsible? Where would any special deadness, or
crassness, come in? And how, experience being what is once for all,
would God's presence in it make it any more living or richer?

Candidly, it is impossible to give any answer to this question. The
actually experienced world is supposed to be the same in its details
on either hypothesis, "the same, for our praise or blame," as
Browning says. It stands there indefeasibly: a gift which can't be
taken back. Calling matter the cause of it retracts no single one of
the items that have made it up, nor does calling God the cause
augment them. They are the God or the atoms, respectively, of just
that and no other world. The God, if there, has been doing just what
atoms could do--appearing in the character of atoms, so to speak--
and earning such gratitude as is due to atoms, and no more. If his
presence lends no different turn or issue to the performance, it
surely can lend it no increase of dignity. Nor would indignity come
to it were he absent, and did the atoms remain the only actors on
the stage. When a play is once over, and the curtain down, you
really make it no better by claiming an illustrious genius for its
author, just as you make it no worse by calling him a common hack.

Thus if no future detail of experience or conduct is to be deduced
from our hypothesis, the debate between materialism and theism
becomes quite idle and insignificant. Matter and God in that event
mean exactly the same thing--the power, namely, neither more nor
less, that could make just this completed world--and the wise man is
he who in such a case would turn his back on such a supererogatory
discussion. Accordingly, most men instinctively, and positivists and
scientists deliberately, do turn their backs on philosophical
disputes from which nothing in the line of definite future
consequences can be seen to follow. The verbal and empty character
of philosophy is surely a reproach with which we are, but too
familiar. If pragmatism be true, it is a perfectly sound reproach
unless the theories under fire can be shown to have alternative
practical outcomes, however delicate and distant these may be. The
common man and the scientist say they discover no such outcomes, and
if the metaphysician can discern none either, the others certainly
are in the right of it, as against him. His science is then but
pompous trifling; and the endowment of a professorship for such a
being would be silly.

Accordingly, in every genuine metaphysical debate some practical
issue, however conjectural and remote, is involved. To realize this,
revert with me to our question, and place yourselves this time in
the world we live in, in the world that HAS a future, that is yet
uncompleted whilst we speak. In this unfinished world the
alternative of 'materialism or theism?' is intensely practical; and
it is worth while for us to spend some minutes of our hour in seeing
that it is so.

How, indeed, does the program differ for us, according as we
consider that the facts of experience up to date are purposeless
configurations of blind atoms moving according to eternal laws, or
that on the other hand they are due to the providence of God? As far
as the past facts go, indeed there is no difference. Those facts are
in, are bagged, are captured; and the good that's in them is gained,
be the atoms or be the God their cause. There are accordingly many
materialists about us to-day who, ignoring altogether the future and
practical aspects of the question, seek to eliminate the odium
attaching to the word materialism, and even to eliminate the word
itself, by showing that, if matter could give birth to all these
gains, why then matter, functionally considered, is just as divine
an entity as God, in fact coalesces with God, is what you mean by
God. Cease, these persons advise us, to use either of these terms,
with their outgrown opposition. Use a term free of the clerical
connotations, on the one hand; of the suggestion of gross-ness,
coarseness, ignobility, on the other. Talk of the primal mystery, of
the unknowable energy, of the one and only power, instead of saying
either God or matter. This is the course to which Mr. Spencer urges
us; and if philosophy were purely retrospective, he would thereby
proclaim himself an excellent pragmatist.

But philosophy is prospective also, and, after finding what the
world has been and done and yielded, still asks the further question
'what does the world PROMISE?' Give us a matter that promises
SUCCESS, that is bound by its laws to lead our world ever nearer to
perfection, and any rational man will worship that matter as readily
as Mr. Spencer worships his own so-called unknowable power. It not
only has made for righteousness up to date, but it will make for
righteousness forever; and that is all we need. Doing practically
all that a God can do, it is equivalent to God, its function is a
God's function, and is exerted in a world in which a God would now
be superfluous; from such a world a God could never lawfully be
missed. 'Cosmic emotion' would here be the right name for religion.

But is the matter by which Mr. Spencer's process of cosmic evolution
is carried on any such principle of never-ending perfection as this?
Indeed it is not, for the future end of every cosmically evolved
thing or system of things is foretold by science to be death and
tragedy; and Mr. Spencer, in confining himself to the aesthetic and
ignoring the practical side of the controversy, has really
contributed nothing serious to its relief. But apply now our
principle of practical results, and see what a vital significance
the question of materialism or theism immediately acquires.

Theism and materialism, so indifferent when taken retrospectively,
point, when we take them prospectively, to wholly different outlooks
of experience. For, according to the theory of mechanical evolution,
the laws of redistribution of matter and motion, tho they are
certainly to thank for all the good hours which our organisms have
ever yielded us and for all the ideals which our minds now frame,
are yet fatally certain to undo their work again, and to redissolve
everything that they have once evolved. You all know the picture of
the last state of the universe which evolutionary science foresees.
I cannot state it better than in Mr. Balfour's words: "The energies
of our system will decay, the glory of the sun will be dimmed, and
the earth, tideless and inert, will no longer tolerate the race
which has for a moment disturbed its solitude. Man will go down into
the pit, and all his thoughts will perish. The uneasy, consciousness
which in this obscure corner has for a brief space broken the
contented silence of the universe, will be at rest. Matter will know
itself no longer. 'Imperishable monuments' and 'immortal deeds,'
death itself, and love stronger than death, will be as though they
had never been. Nor will anything that is, be better or be worse for
all that the labour, genius, devotion, and suffering of man have
striven through countless generations to effect." [Footnote: The
Foundations of Belief, p. 30.]

That is the sting of it, that in the vast driftings of the cosmic
weather, tho many a jeweled shore appears, and many an enchanted
cloud-bank floats away, long lingering ere it be dissolved--even as
our world now lingers, for our joy-yet when these transient products
are gone, nothing, absolutely NOTHING remains, of represent those
particular qualities, those elements of preciousness which they may
have enshrined. Dead and gone are they, gone utterly from the very
sphere and room of being. Without an echo; without a memory; without
an influence on aught that may come after, to make it care for
similar ideals. This utter final wreck and tragedy is of the essence
of scientific materialism as at present understood. The lower and
not the higher forces are the eternal forces, or the last surviving
forces within the only cycle of evolution which we can definitely
see. Mr. Spencer believes this as much as anyone; so why should he
argue with us as if we were making silly aesthetic objections to the
'grossness' of 'matter and motion,' the principles of his
philosophy, when what really dismays us is the disconsolateness of
its ulterior practical results?

No the true objection to materialism is not positive but negative.
It would be farcical at this day to make complaint of it for what it
IS for 'grossness.' Grossness is what grossness DOES--we now know
THAT. We make complaint of it, on the contrary, for what it is NOT--
not a permanent warrant for our more ideal interests, not a
fulfiller of our remotest hopes.

The notion of God, on the other hand, however inferior it may be in
clearness to those mathematical notions so current in mechanical
philosophy, has at least this practical superiority over them, that
it guarantees an ideal order that shall be permanently preserved. A
world with a God in it to say the last word, may indeed burn up or
freeze, but we then think of him as still mindful of the old ideals
and sure to bring them elsewhere to fruition; so that, where he is,
tragedy is only provisional and partial, and shipwreck and
dissolution not the absolutely final things. This need of an eternal
moral order is one of the deepest needs of our breast. And those
poets, like Dante and Wordsworth, who live on the conviction of such
an order, owe to that fact the extraordinary tonic and consoling
power of their verse. Here then, in these different emotional and
practical appeals, in these adjustments of our concrete attitudes of
hope and expectation, and all the delicate consequences which their
differences entail, lie the real meanings of materialism and
spiritualism--not in hair-splitting abstractions about matter's
inner essence, or about the metaphysical attributes of God.
Materialism means simply the denial that the moral order is eternal,
and the cutting off of ultimate hopes; spiritualism means the
affirmation of an eternal moral order and the letting loose of hope.
Surely here is an issue genuine enough, for anyone who feels it;
and, as long as men are men, it will yield matter for a serious
philosophic debate.

But possibly some of you may still rally to their defence. Even
whilst admitting that spiritualism and materialism make different
prophecies of the world's future, you may yourselves pooh-pooh the
difference as something so infinitely remote as to mean nothing for
a sane mind. The essence of a sane mind, you may say, is to take
shorter views, and to feel no concern about such chimaeras as the
latter end of the world. Well, I can only say that if you say this,
you do injustice to human nature. Religious melancholy is not
disposed of by a simple flourish of the word insanity. The absolute
things, the last things, the overlapping things, are the truly
philosophic concerns; all superior minds feel seriously about them,
and the mind with the shortest views is simply the mind of the more
shallow man.

The issues of fact at stake in the debate are of course vaguely
enough conceived by us at present. But spiritualistic faith in all
its forms deals with a world of PROMISE, while materialism's sun
sets in a sea of disappointment. Remember what I said of the
Absolute: it grants us moral holidays. Any religious view does this.
It not only incites our more strenuous moments, but it also takes
our joyous, careless, trustful moments, and it justifies them. It
paints the grounds of justification vaguely enough, to be sure. The
exact features of the saving future facts that our belief in God
insures, will have to be ciphered out by the interminable methods of
science: we can STUDY our God only by studying his Creation. But we
can ENJOY our God, if we have one, in advance of all that labor. I
myself believe that the evidence for God lies primarily in inner
personal experiences. When they have once given you your God, his
name means at least the benefit of the holiday. You remember what I
said yesterday about the way in which truths clash and try to 'down'
each other. The truth of 'God' has to run the gauntlet of all our
other truths. It is on trial by them and they on trial by it. Our
FINAL opinion about God can be settled only after all the truths
have straightened themselves out together. Let us hope that they
shall find a modus vivendi!

Let me pass to a very cognate philosophic problem, the QUESTION of
DESIGN IN NATURE. God's existence has from time immemorial been held
to be proved by certain natural facts. Many facts appear as if
expressly designed in view of one another. Thus the woodpecker's
bill, tongue, feet, tail, etc., fit him wondrously for a world of
trees with grubs hid in their bark to feed upon. The parts of our
eye fit the laws of light to perfection, leading its rays to a sharp
picture on our retina. Such mutual fitting of things diverse in
origin argued design, it was held; and the designer was always
treated as a man-loving deity.

The first step in these arguments was to prove that the design
existed. Nature was ransacked for results obtained through separate
things being co-adapted. Our eyes, for instance, originate in intra-
uterine darkness, and the light originates in the sun, yet see how
they fit each other. They are evidently made FOR each other. Vision
is the end designed, light and eyes the separate means devised for
its attainment.

It is strange, considering how unanimously our ancestors felt the
force of this argument, to see how little it counts for since the
triumph of the darwinian theory. Darwin opened our minds to the
power of chance-happenings to bring forth 'fit' results if only they
have time to add themselves together. He showed the enormous waste
of nature in producing results that get destroyed because of their
unfitness. He also emphasized the number of adaptations which, if
designed, would argue an evil rather than a good designer. Here all
depends upon the point of view. To the grub under the bark the
exquisite fitness of the woodpecker's organism to extract him would
certainly argue a diabolical designer.

Theologians have by this time stretched their minds so as to embrace
the darwinian facts, and yet to interpret them as still showing
divine purpose. It used to be a question of purpose AGAINST
mechanism, of one OR the other. It was as if one should say "My
shoes are evidently designed to fit my feet, hence it is impossible
that they should have been produced by machinery." We know that they
are both: they are made by a machinery itself designed to fit the
feet with shoes. Theology need only stretch similarly the designs of
God. As the aim of a football-team is not merely to get the ball to
a certain goal (if that were so, they would simply get up on some
dark night and place it there), but to get it there by a fixed
MACHINERY OF CONDITIONS--the game's rules and the opposing players;
so the aim of God is not merely, let us say, to make men and to save
them, but rather to get this done through the sole agency of
nature's vast machinery. Without nature's stupendous laws and
counterforces, man's creation and perfection, we might suppose,
would be too insipid achievements for God to have designed them.

This saves the form of the design-argument at the expense of its old
easy human content. The designer is no longer the old man-like
deity. His designs have grown so vast as to be incomprehensible to
us humans. The WHAT of them so overwhelms us that to establish the
mere THAT of a designer for them becomes of very little consequence
in comparison. We can with difficulty comprehend the character of a
cosmic mind whose purposes are fully revealed by the strange mixture
of goods and evils that we find in this actual world's particulars.
Or rather we cannot by any possibility comprehend it. The mere word
'design' by itself has, we see, no consequences and explains
nothing. It is the barrenest of principles. The old question of
WHETHER there is design is idle. The real question is WHAT is the
world, whether or not it have a designer--and that can be revealed
only by the study of all nature's particulars.

Remember that no matter what nature may have produced or may be
producing, the means must necessarily have been adequate, must have
been FITTED TO THAT PRODUCTION. The argument from fitness to design
would consequently always apply, whatever were the product's
character. The recent Mont-Pelee eruption, for example, required all
previous history to produce that exact combination of ruined houses,
human and animal corpses, sunken ships, volcanic ashes, etc., in
just that one hideous configuration of positions. France had to be a
nation and colonize Martinique. Our country had to exist and send
our ships there. IF God aimed at just that result, the means by
which the centuries bent their influences towards it, showed
exquisite intelligence. And so of any state of things whatever,
either in nature or in history, which we find actually realized. For
the parts of things must always make SOME definite resultant, be it
chaotic or harmonious. When we look at what has actually come, the
conditions must always appear perfectly designed to ensure it. We
can always say, therefore, in any conceivable world, of any
conceivable character, that the whole cosmic machinery MAY have been
designed to produce it.

Pragmatically, then, the abstract word 'design' is a blank
cartridge. It carries no consequences, it does no execution. What
sort of design? and what sort of a designer? are the only serious
questions, and the study of facts is the only way of getting even
approximate answers. Meanwhile, pending the slow answer from facts,
anyone who insists that there is a designer and who is sure he is a
divine one, gets a certain pragmatic benefit from the term--the
same, in fact which we saw that the terms God, Spirit, or the
Absolute, yield us 'Design,' worthless tho it be as a mere
rationalistic principle set above or behind things for our
admiration, becomes, if our faith concretes it into something
theistic, a term of PROMISE. Returning with it into experience, we
gain a more confiding outlook on the future. If not a blind force
but a seeing force runs things, we may reasonably expect better
issues. This vague confidence in the future is the sole pragmatic
meaning at present discernible in the terms design and designer. But
if cosmic confidence is right not wrong, better not worse, that is a
most important meaning. That much at least of possible 'truth' the
terms will then have in them.

Let me take up another well-worn controversy, THE FREE-WILL PROBLEM.
Most persons who believe in what is called their free-will do so
after the rationalistic fashion. It is a principle, a positive
faculty or virtue added to man, by which his dignity is
enigmatically augmented. He ought to believe it for this reason.
Determinists, who deny it, who say that individual men originate
nothing, but merely transmit to the future the whole push of the
past cosmos of which they are so small an expression, diminish man.
He is less admirable, stripped of this creative principle. I imagine
that more than half of you share our instinctive belief in free-
will, and that admiration of it as a principle of dignity has much
to do with your fidelity.

But free-will has also been discussed pragmatically, and, strangely
enough, the same pragmatic interpretation has been put upon it by
both disputants. You know how large a part questions of
ACCOUNTABILITY have played in ethical controversy. To hear some
persons, one would suppose that all that ethics aims at is a code of
merits and demerits. Thus does the old legal and theological leaven,
the interest in crime and sin and punishment abide with us. 'Who's
to blame? whom can we punish? whom will God punish?'--these
preoccupations hang like a bad dream over man's religious history.

So both free-will and determinism have been inveighed against and
called absurd, because each, in the eyes of its enemies, has seemed
to prevent the 'imputability' of good or bad deeds to their authors.
Queer antinomy this! Free-will means novelty, the grafting on to the
past of something not involved therein. If our acts were
predetermined, if we merely transmitted the push of the whole past,
the free-willists say, how could we be praised or blamed for
anything? We should be 'agents' only, not 'principals,' and where
then would be our precious imputability and responsibility?

But where would it be if we HAD free-will? rejoin the determinists.
If a 'free' act be a sheer novelty, that comes not FROM me, the
previous me, but ex nihilo, and simply tacks itself on to me, how
can _I_, the previous I, be responsible? How can I have any
permanent CHARACTER that will stand still long enough for praise or
blame to be awarded? The chaplet of my days tumbles into a cast of
disconnected beads as soon as the thread of inner necessity is drawn
out by the preposterous indeterminist doctrine. Messrs. Fullerton
and McTaggart have recently laid about them doughtily with this
argument.

It may be good ad hominem, but otherwise it is pitiful. For I ask
you, quite apart from other reasons, whether any man, woman or
child, with a sense for realities, ought not to be ashamed to plead
such principles as either dignity or imputability. Instinct and
utility between them can safely be trusted to carry on the social
business of punishment and praise. If a man does good acts we shall
praise him, if he does bad acts we shall punish him--anyhow, and
quite apart from theories as to whether the acts result from what
was previous in him or are novelties in a strict sense. To make our
human ethics revolve about the question of 'merit' is a piteous
unreality--God alone can know our merits, if we have any. The real
ground for supposing free-will is indeed pragmatic, but it has
nothing to do with this contemptible right to punish which had made
such a noise in past discussions of the subject.

Free-will pragmatically means NOVELTIES IN THE WORLD, the right to
expect that in its deepest elements as well as in its surface
phenomena, the future may not identically repeat and imitate the
past. That imitation en masse is there, who can deny? The general
'uniformity of nature' is presupposed by every lesser law. But
nature may be only approximately uniform; and persons in whom
knowledge of the world's past has bred pessimism (or doubts as to
the world's good character, which become certainties if that
character be supposed eternally fixed) may naturally welcome free-
will as a MELIORISTIC doctrine. It holds up improvement as at least
possible; whereas determinism assures us that our whole notion of
possibility is born of human ignorance, and that necessity and
impossibility between them rule the destinies of the world.

Free-will is thus a general cosmological theory of PROMISE, just
like the Absolute, God, Spirit or Design. Taken abstractly, no one
of these terms has any inner content, none of them gives us any
picture, and no one of them would retain the least pragmatic value
in a world whose character was obviously perfect from the start.
Elation at mere existence, pure cosmic emotion and delight, would,
it seems to me, quench all interest in those speculations, if the
world were nothing but a lubberland of happiness already. Our
interest in religious metaphysics arises in the fact that our
empirical future feels to us unsafe, and needs some higher
guarantee. If the past and present were purely good, who could wish
that the future might possibly not resemble them? Who could desire
free-will? Who would not say, with Huxley, "let me be wound up every
day like a watch, to go right fatally, and I ask no better freedom."
'Freedom' in a world already perfect could only mean freedom to BE
WORSE, and who could be so insane as to wish that? To be necessarily
what it is, to be impossibly aught else, would put the last touch of
perfection upon optimism's universe. Surely the only POSSIBILITY
that one can rationally claim is the possibility that things may be
BETTER. That possibility, I need hardly say, is one that, as the
actual world goes, we have ample grounds for desiderating.

Free-will thus has no meaning unless it be a doctrine of RELIEF. As
such, it takes its place with other religious doctrines. Between
them, they build up the old wastes and repair the former
desolations. Our spirit, shut within this courtyard of sense-
experience, is always saying to the intellect upon the tower:
'Watchman, tell us of the night, if it aught of promise bear,' and
the intellect gives it then these terms of promise.

Other than this practical significance, the words God, free-will,
design, etc., have none. Yet dark tho they be in themselves, or
intellectualistically taken, when we bear them into life's thicket
with us the darkness THERE grows light about us. If you stop, in
dealing with such words, with their definition, thinking that to be
an intellectual finality, where are you? Stupidly staring at a
pretentious sham! "Deus est Ens, a se, extra et supra omne genus,
necessarium, unum, infinite perfectum, simplex, immutabile,
immensum, aeternum, intelligens," etc.,--wherein is such a
definition really instructive? It means less, than nothing, in its
pompous robe of adjectives. Pragmatism alone can read a positive
meaning into it, and for that she turns her back upon the
intellectualist point of view altogether. 'God's in his heaven;
all's right with the world!'--THAT'S the heart of your theology, and
for that you need no rationalist definitions.

Why shouldn't we all of us, rationalists as well as pragmatists,
confess this? Pragmatism, so far from keeping her eyes bent on the
immediate practical foreground, as she is accused of doing, dwells
just as much upon the world's remotest perspectives.

See then how all these ultimate questions turn, as it were, up their
hinges; and from looking backwards upon principles, upon an
erkenntnisstheoretische Ich, a God, a Kausalitaetsprinzip, a Design,
a Free-will, taken in themselves, as something august and exalted
above facts,--see, I say, how pragmatism shifts the emphasis and
looks forward into facts themselves. The really vital question for
us all is, What is this world going to be? What is life eventually
to make of itself? The centre of gravity of philosophy must
therefore alter its place. The earth of things, long thrown into
shadow by the glories of the upper ether, must resume its rights. To
shift the emphasis in this way means that philosophic questions will
fall to be treated by minds of a less abstractionist type than
heretofore, minds more scientific and individualistic in their tone
yet not irreligious either. It will be an alteration in 'the seat of
authority' that reminds one almost of the protestant reformation.
And as, to papal minds, protestantism has often seemed a mere mess
of anarchy and confusion, such, no doubt, will pragmatism often seem
to ultra-rationalist minds in philosophy. It will seem so much sheer
trash, philosophically. But life wags on, all the same, and
compasses its ends, in protestant countries. I venture to think that
philosophic protestantism will compass a not dissimilar prosperity.




Lecture IV

The One and the Many

We saw in the last lecture that the pragmatic method, in its
dealings with certain concepts, instead of ending with admiring
contemplation, plunges forward into the river of experience with
them and prolongs the perspective by their means. Design, free-will,
the absolute mind, spirit instead of matter, have for their sole
meaning a better promise as to this world's outcome. Be they false
or be they true, the meaning of them is this meliorism. I have
sometimes thought of the phenomenon called 'total reflexion' in
optics as a good symbol of the relation between abstract ideas and
concrete realities, as pragmatism conceives it. Hold a tumbler of
water a little above your eyes and look up through the water at its
surface--or better still look similarly through the flat wall of an
aquarium. You will then see an extraordinarily brilliant reflected
image say of a candle-flame, or any other clear object, situated on
the opposite side of the vessel. No candle-ray, under these
circumstances gets beyond the water's surface: every ray is totally
reflected back into the depths again. Now let the water represent
the world of sensible facts, and let the air above it represent the
world of abstract ideas. Both worlds are real, of course, and
interact; but they interact only at their boundary, and the locus of
everything that lives, and happens to us, so far as full experience
goes, is the water. We are like fishes swimming in the sea of sense,
bounded above by the superior element, but unable to breathe it pure
or penetrate it. We get our oxygen from it, however, we touch it
incessantly, now in this part, now in that, and every time we touch
it we are reflected back into the water with our course re-
determined and re-energized. The abstract ideas of which the air
consists, indispensable for life, but irrespirable by themselves, as
it were, and only active in their re-directing function. All similes
are halting but this one rather takes my fancy. It shows how
something, not sufficient for life in itself, may nevertheless be an
effective determinant of life elsewhere.

In this present hour I wish to illustrate the pragmatic method by
one more application. I wish to turn its light upon the ancient
problem of 'the one and the many.' I suspect that in but few of you
has this problem occasioned sleepless nights, and I should not be
astonished if some of you told me it had never vexed you. I myself
have come, by long brooding over it, to consider it the most central
of all philosophic problems, central because so pregnant. I mean by
this that if you know whether a man is a decided monist or a decided
pluralist, you perhaps know more about the rest of his opinions than
if you give him any other name ending in IST. To believe in the one
or in the many, that is the classification with the maximum number
of consequences. So bear with me for an hour while I try to inspire
you with my own interest in the problem.

Philosophy has often been defined as the quest or the vision of the
world's unity. We never hear this definition challenged, and it is
true as far as it goes, for philosophy has indeed manifested above
all things its interest in unity. But how about the VARIETY in
things? Is that such an irrelevant matter? If instead of using the
term philosophy, we talk in general of our intellect and its needs
we quickly see that unity is only one of these. Acquaintance with
the details of fact is always reckoned, along with their reduction
to system, as an indispensable mark of mental greatness. Your
'scholarly' mind, of encyclopedic, philological type, your man
essentially of learning, has never lacked for praise along with your
philosopher. What our intellect really aims at is neither variety
nor unity taken singly but totality.[Footnote: Compare  A.
Bellanger: Les concepts de Cause, et l'activite intentionelle de
l'Esprit. Paris, Alcan, 1905, p. 79 ff.] In this, acquaintance with
reality's diversities is as important as understanding their
connexion. The human passion of curiosity runs on all fours with the
systematizing passion.

In spite of this obvious fact the unity of things has always been
considered more illustrious, as it were, than their variety. When a
young man first conceives the notion that the whole world forms one
great fact, with all its parts moving abreast, as it were, and
interlocked, he feels as if he were enjoying a great insight, and
looks superciliously on all who still fall short of this sublime
conception. Taken thus abstractly as it first comes to one, the
monistic insight is so vague as hardly to seem worth defending
intellectually. Yet probably everyone in this audience in some way
cherishes it. A certain abstract monism, a certain emotional
response to the character of oneness, as if it were a feature of the
world not coordinate with its manyness, but vastly more excellent
and eminent, is so prevalent in educated circles that we might
almost call it a part of philosophic common sense. Of COURSE the
world is one, we say. How else could it be a world at all?
Empiricists as a rule, are as stout monists of this abstract kind as
rationalists are.

The difference is that the empiricists are less dazzled. Unity
doesn't blind them to everything else, doesn't quench their
curiosity for special facts, whereas there is a kind of rationalist
who is sure to interpret abstract unity mystically and to forget
everything else, to treat it as a principle; to admire and worship
it; and thereupon to come to a full stop intellectually.

'The world is One!'--the formula may become a sort of number-
worship. 'Three' and 'seven' have, it is true, been reckoned sacred
numbers; but, abstractly taken, why is 'one' more excellent than
'forty-three,' or than 'two million and ten'? In this first vague
conviction of the world's unity, there is so little to take hold of
that we hardly know what we mean by it.

The only way to get forward with our notion is to treat it
pragmatically. Granting the oneness to exist, what facts will be
different in consequence? What will the unity be known-as? The world
is one--yes, but HOW one? What is the practical value of the oneness
for US?

Asking such questions, we pass from the vague to the definite, from
the abstract to the concrete. Many distinct ways in which oneness
predicated of the universe might make a difference, come to view. I
will note successively the more obvious of these ways.

1. First, the world is at least ONE SUBJECT OF DISCOURSE. If its
manyness were so irremediable as to permit NO union whatever of it
parts, not even our minds could 'mean' the whole of it at once: the
would be like eyes trying to look in opposite directions. But in
point of fact we mean to cover the whole of it by our abstract term
'world' or 'universe,' which expressly intends that no part shall be
left out. Such unity of discourse carries obviously no farther
monistic specifications. A 'chaos,' once so named, has as much unity
of discourse as a cosmos. It is an odd fact that many monists
consider a great victory scored for their side when pluralists say
'the universe is many.' "'The universe'!" they chuckle--"his speech
bewrayeth him. He stands confessed of monism out of his own mouth."
Well, let things be one in that sense! You can then fling such a
word as universe at the whole collection of them, but what matters
it? It still remains to be ascertained whether they are one in any
other sense that is more valuable.

2. Are they, for example, CONTINUOUS? Can you pass from one to
another, keeping always in your one universe without any danger of
falling out? In other words, do the parts of our universe HANG
together, instead of being like detached grains of sand?

Even grains of sand hang together through the space in which they
are embedded, and if you can in any way move through such space, you
can pass continuously from number one of them to number two. Space
and time are thus vehicles of continuity, by which the world's parts
hang together. The practical difference to us, resultant from these
forms of union, is immense. Our whole motor life is based upon
them.

3. There are innumerable other paths of practical continuity among
things. Lines of INFLUENCE can be traced by which they together.
Following any such line you pass from one thing to another till you
may have covered a good part of the universe's extent. Gravity and
heat-conduction are such all-uniting influences, so far as the
physical world goes. Electric, luminous and chemical influences
follow similar lines of influence. But opaque and inert bodies
interrupt the continuity here, so that you have to step round them,
or change your mode of progress if you wish to get farther on that
day. Practically, you have then lost your universe's unity, SO FAR
AS IT WAS CONSTITUTED BY THOSE FIRST LINES OF INFLUENCE. There are
innumerable kinds of connexion that special things have with other
special things; and the ENSEMBLE of any one of these connexions
forms one sort of system by which things are conjoined. Thus men are
conjoined in a vast network of ACQUAINTANCESHIP. Brown knows Jones,
Jones knows Robinson, etc.; and BY CHOOSING YOUR FARTHER
INTERMEDIARIES RIGHTLY you may carry a message from Jones to the
Empress of China, or the Chief of the African Pigmies, or to anyone
else in the inhabited world. But you are stopped short, as by a non-
conductor, when you choose one man wrong in this experiment. What
may be called love-systems are grafted on the acquaintance-system. A
loves (or hates) B; B loves (or hates) C, etc. But these systems are
smaller than the great acquaintance-system that they presuppose.

Human efforts are daily unifying the world more and more in definite
systematic ways. We found colonial, postal, consular, commercial
systems, all the parts of which obey definite influences that
propagate themselves within the system but not to facts outside of
it. The result is innumerable little hangings-together of the
world's parts within the larger hangings-together, little worlds,
not only of discourse but of operation, within the wider universe.
Each system exemplifies one type or grade of union, its parts being
strung on that peculiar kind of relation, and the same part may
figure in many different systems, as a man may hold several offices
and belong to various clubs. From this 'systematic' point of view,
therefore, the pragmatic value of the world's unity is that all
these definite networks actually and practically exist. Some are
more enveloping and extensive, some less so; they are superposed
upon each other; and between them all they let no individual
elementary part of the universe escape. Enormous as is the amount of
disconnexion among things (for these systematic influences and
conjunctions follow rigidly exclusive paths), everything that exists
is influenced in SOME way by something else, if you can only pick
the way out rightly Loosely speaking, and in general, it may be said
that all things cohere and adhere to each other SOMEHOW, and that
the universe exists practically in reticulated or concatenated forms
which make of it a continuous or 'integrated' affair. Any kind of
influence whatever helps to make the world one, so far as you can
follow it from next to next. You may then say that 'the world IS
One'--meaning in these respects, namely, and just so far as they
obtain. But just as definitely is it NOT one, so far as they do not
obtain; and there is no species of connexion which will not fail,
if, instead of choosing conductors for it, you choose non-
conductors. You are then arrested at your very first step and have
to write the world down as a pure MANY from that particular point of
view. If our intellect had been as much interested in disjunctive as
it is in conjunctive relations, philosophy would have equally
successfully celebrated the world's DISUNION.

The great point is to notice that the oneness and the manyness are
absolutely co-ordinate here. Neither is primordial or more essential
or excellent than the other. Just as with space, whose separating of
things seems exactly on a par with its uniting of them, but
sometimes one function and sometimes the other is what come home to
us most, so, in our general dealings with the world of influences,
we now need conductors and now need non-conductors, and wisdom lies
in knowing which is which at the appropriate moment.

4. All these systems of influence or non-influence may be listed
under the general problem of the world's CAUSAL UNITY. If the minor
causal influences among things should converge towards one common
causal origin of them in the past, one great first cause for all
that is, one might then speak of the absolute causal unity of the
world. God's fiat on creation's day has figured in traditional
philosophy as such an absolute cause and origin. Transcendental
Idealism, translating 'creation' into 'thinking' (or 'willing to'
think') calls the divine act 'eternal' rather than 'first'; but the
union of the many here is absolute, just the same--the many would
not BE, save for the One. Against this notion of the unity of origin
of all there has always stood the pluralistic notion of an eternal
self-existing many in the shape of atoms or even of spiritual units
of some sort. The alternative has doubtless a pragmatic meaning, but
perhaps, as far as these lectures go, we had better leave the
question of unity of origin unsettled.

5. The most important sort of union that obtains among things,
pragmatically speaking, is their GENERIC UNITY. Things exist in
kinds, there are many specimens in each kind, and what the 'kind'
implies for one specimen, it implies also for every other specimen
of that kind. We can easily conceive that every fact in the world
might be singular, that is, unlike any other fact and sole of its
kind. In such a world of singulars our logic would be useless, for
logic works by predicating of the single instance what is true of
all its kind. With no two things alike in the world, we should be
unable to reason from our past experiences to our future ones. The
existence of so much generic unity in things is thus perhaps the
most momentous pragmatic specification of what it may mean to say
'the world is One.' ABSOLUTE generic unity would obtain if there
were one summum genus under which all things without exception could
be eventually subsumed. 'Beings,' 'thinkables,' 'experiences,' would
be candidates for this position. Whether the alternatives expressed
by such words have any pragmatic significance or not, is another
question which I prefer to leave unsettled just now.

6. Another specification of what the phrase 'the world is One' may
mean is UNITY OF PURPOSE. An enormous number of things in the world
subserve a common purpose. All the man-made systems, administrative,
industrial, military, or what not, exist each for its controlling
purpose. Every living being pursues its own peculiar purposes. They
co-operate, according to the degree of their development, in
collective or tribal purposes, larger ends thus enveloping lesser
ones, until an absolutely single, final and climacteric purpose
subserved by all things without exception might conceivably be
reached. It is needless to say that the appearances conflict with
such a view. Any resultant, as I said in my third lecture, MAY have
been purposed in advance, but none of the results we actually know
in is world have in point of fact been purposed in advance in all
their details. Men and nations start with a vague notion of being
rich, or great, or good. Each step they make brings unforeseen
chances into sight, and shuts out older vistas, and the
specifications of the general purpose have to be daily changed. What
is reached in the end may be better or worse than what was proposed,
but it is always more complex and different.

Our different purposes also are at war with each other. Where one
can't crush the other out, they compromise; and the result is again
different from what anyone distinctly proposed beforehand. Vaguely
and generally, much of what was purposed may be gained; but
everything makes strongly for the view that our world is
incompletely unified teleologically and is still trying to get its
unification better organized.

Whoever claims ABSOLUTE teleological unity, saying that there is one
purpose that every detail of the universe subserves, dogmatizes at
his own risk. Theologians who dogmalize thus find it more and more
impossible, as our acquaintance with the warring interests of the
world's parts grows more concrete, to imagine what the one
climacteric purpose may possibly be like. We see indeed that certain
evils minister to ulterior goods, that the bitter makes the cocktail
better, and that a bit of danger or hardship puts us agreeably to
our trumps. We can vaguely generalize this into the doctrine that
all the evil in the universe is but instrumental to its greater
perfection. But the scale of the evil actually in sight defies all
human tolerance; and transcendental idealism, in the pages of a
Bradley or a Royce, brings us no farther than the book of Job did--
God's ways are not our ways, so let us put our hands upon our mouth.
A God who can relish such superfluities of horror is no God for
human beings to appeal to. His animal spirits are too high. In other
words the 'Absolute' with his one purpose, is not the man-like God
of common people.

7. AESTHETIC UNION among things also obtains, and is very analogous
to ideological union. Things tell a story. Their parts hang together
so as to work out a climax. They play into each other's hands
expressively. Retrospectively, we can see that altho no definite
purpose presided over a chain of events, yet the events fell into a
dramatic form, with a start, a middle, and a finish. In point of
fact all stories end; and here again the point of view of a many is
that more natural one to take. The world is full of partial stories
that run parallel to one another, beginning and ending at odd times.
They mutually interlace and interfere at points, but we cannot unify
them completely in our minds. In following your life-history, I must
temporarily turn my attention from my own. Even a biographer of
twins would have to press them alternately upon his reader's
attention.

It follows that whoever says that the whole world tells one story
utters another of those monistic dogmas that a man believes at his
risk. It is easy to see the world's history pluralistically, as a
rope of which each fibre tells a separate tale; but to conceive of
each cross-section of the rope as an absolutely single fact, and to
sum the whole longitudinal series into one being living an undivided
life, is harder. We have indeed the analogy of embryology to help
us. The microscopist makes a hundred flat cross-sections of a given
embryo, and mentally unites them into one solid whole. But the great
world's ingredients, so far as they are beings, seem, like the
rope's fibres, to be discontinuous cross-wise, and to cohere only in
the longitudinal direction. Followed in that direction they are
many. Even the embryologist, when he follows the DEVELOPMENT of his
object, has to treat the history of each single organ in turn.
ABSOLUTE aesthetic union is thus another barely abstract ideal. The
world appears as something more epic than dramatic.

So far, then, we see how the world is unified by its many systems,
kinds, purposes, and dramas. That there is more union in all these
ways than openly appears is certainly true. That there MAY be one
sovereign purpose, system, kind, and story, is a legitimate
hypothesis. All I say here is that it is rash to affirm this
dogmatically without better evidence than we possess at present.

8. The GREAT monistic DENKMITTEL for a hundred years past has been
the notion of THE ONE KNOWER. The many exist only as objects for his
thought--exist in his dream, as it were; and AS HE KNOWS them, they
have one purpose, form one system, tell one tale for him. This
notion of an ALL-ENVELOPING NOETIC UNITY in things is the sublimest
achievement of intellectualist philosophy. Those who believe in the
Absolute, as the all-knower is termed, usually say that they do so
for coercive reasons, which clear thinkers cannot evade. The
Absolute has far-reaching practical consequences, some of which I
drew attention in my second lecture. Many kinds of difference
important to us would surely follow from its being true. I cannot
here enter into all the logical proofs of such a Being's existence,
farther than to say that none of them seem to me sound. I must
therefore treat the notion of an All-Knower simply as an hypothesis,
exactly on a par logically with the pluralist notion that there is
no point of view, no focus of information extant, from which the
entire content of the universe is visible at once. "God's
consciousness," says Professor Royce,[Footnote: The Conception of
God, New York, 1897, p. 292.] "forms in its wholeness one luminously
transparent conscious moment"--this is the type of noetic unity on
which rationalism insists. Empiricism on the other hand is satisfied
with the type of noetic unity that is humanly familiar. Everything
gets known by SOME knower along with something else; but the knowers
may in the end be irreducibly many, and the greatest knower of them
all may yet not know the whole of everything, or even know what he
does know at one single stroke:--he may be liable to forget.
Whichever type obtained, the world would still be a universe
noetically. Its parts would be conjoined by knowledge, but in the
one case the knowledge would be absolutely unified, in the other it
would be strung along and overlapped.

The notion of one instantaneous or eternal Knower--either adjective
here means the same thing--is, as I said, the great intellectualist
achievement of our time. It has practically driven out that
conception of 'Substance' which earlier philosophers set such store
by, and by which so much unifying work used to be done--universal
substance which alone has being in and from itself, and of which all
the particulars of experience are but forms to which it gives
support. Substance has succumbed to the pragmatic criticisms of the
English school. It appears now only as another name for the fact
that phenomena as they come are actually grouped and given in
coherent forms, the very forms in which we finite knowers experience
or think them together. These forms of conjunction are as much parts
of the tissue of experience as are the terms which they connect; and
it is a great pragmatic achievement for recent idealism to have made
the world hang together in these directly representable ways instead
of drawing its unity from the 'inherence' of its parts--whatever
that may mean--in an unimaginable principle behind the scenes.

'The world is one,' therefore, just so far as we experience it to be
concatenated, one by as many definite conjunctions as appear. But
then also NOT one by just as many definite DISjunctions as we find.
The oneness and the manyness of it thus obtain in respects which can
be separately named. It is neither a universe pure and simple nor a
multiverse pure and simple. And its various manners of being one
suggest, for their accurate ascertainment, so many distinct programs
of scientific work. Thus the pragmatic question 'What is the oneness
known-as? What practical difference will it make?' saves us from all
feverish excitement over it as a principle of sublimity and carries
us forward into the stream of experience with a cool head. The
stream may indeed reveal far more connexion and union than we now
suspect, but we are not entitled on pragmatic principles to claim
absolute oneness in any respect in advance.

It is so difficult to see definitely what absolute oneness can mean,
that probably the majority of you are satisfied with the sober
attitude which we have reached. Nevertheless there are possibly some
radically monistic souls among you who are not content to leave the
one and the many on a par. Union of various grades, union of diverse
types, union that stops at non-conductors, union that merely goes
from next to next, and means in many cases outer nextness only, and
not a more internal bond, union of concatenation, in short; all that
sort of thing seems to you a halfway stage of thought. The oneness
of things, superior to their manyness, you think must also be more
deeply true, must be the more real aspect of the world. The
pragmatic view, you are sure, gives us a universe imperfectly
rational. The real universe must form an unconditional unit of
being, something consolidated, with its parts co-implicated through
and through. Only then could we consider our estate completely
rational. There is no doubt whatever that this ultra-monistic way of
thinking means a great deal to many minds. "One Life, One Truth, one
Love, one Principle, One Good, One God"--I quote from a Christian
Science leaflet which the day's mail brings into my hands--beyond
doubt such a confession of faith has pragmatically an emotional
value, and beyond doubt the word 'one' contributes to the value
quite as much as the other words. But if we try to realize
INTELLECTUALLY what we can possibly MEAN by such a glut of oneness
we are thrown right back upon our pragmatistic determinations again.
It means either the mere name One, the universe of discourse; or it
means the sum total of all the ascertainable particular conjunctions
and concatenations; or, finally, it means some one vehicle of
conjunction treated as all-inclusive, like one origin, one purpose,
or one knower. In point of fact it always means one KNOWER to those
who take it intellectually to-day. The one knower involves, they
think, the other forms of conjunction. His world must have all its
parts co-implicated in the one logical-aesthetical-teleological
unit-picture which is his eternal dream.

The character of the absolute knower's picture is however so
impossible for us to represent clearly, that we may fairly suppose
that the authority which absolute monism undoubtedly possesses, and
probably always will possess over some persons, draws its strength
far less from intellectual than from mystical grounds. To interpret
absolute monism worthily, be a mystic. Mystical states of mind in
every degree are shown by history, usually tho not always, to make
for the monistic view. This is no proper occasion to enter upon the
general subject of mysticism, but I will quote one mystical
pronouncement to show just what I mean. The paragon of all monistic
systems is the Vedanta philosophy of Hindostan, and the paragon of
Vedantist missionaries was the late Swami Vivekananda who visited
our shores some years ago. The method of Vedantism is the mystical
method. You do not reason, but after going through a certain
discipline YOU SEE, and having seen, you can report the truth.
Vivekananda thus reports the truth in one of his lectures here:

"Where is any more misery for him who sees this Oneness in the
Universe...this Oneness of life, Oneness of everything? ...This
separation between man and man, man and woman, man and child, nation
from nation, earth from moon, moon from sun, this separation between
atom and atom is the cause really of all the misery, and the Vedanta
says this separation does not exist, it is not real. It is merely
apparent, on the surface. In the heart of things there is Unity
still. If you go inside you find that Unity between man and man,
women and children, races and races, high and low, rich and poor,
the gods and men: all are One, and animals too, if you go deep
enough, and he who has attained to that has no more delusion. ...
Where is any more delusion for him? What can delude him? He knows
the reality of everything, the secret of everything. Where is there
any more misery for him? What does he desire? He has traced the
reality of everything unto the Lord, that centre, that Unity of
everything, and that is Eternal Bliss, Eternal Knowledge, Eternal
Existence. Neither death nor disease, nor sorrow nor misery, nor
discontent is there ... in the centre, the reality, there is no one
to be mourned for, no one to be sorry for. He has penetrated
everything, the Pure One, the Formless, the Bodiless, the Stainless,
He the Knower, He the Great Poet, the Self-Existent, He who is
giving to everyone what he deserves."

Observe how radical the character of the monism here is. Separation
is not simply overcome by the One, it is denied to exist. There is
no many. We are not parts of the One; It has no parts; and since in
a sense we undeniably ARE, it must be that each of us is the One,
indivisibly and totally. AN ABSOLUTE ONE, AND I THAT ONE--surely we
have here a religion which, emotionally considered, has a high
pragmatic value; it imparts a perfect sumptuosity of security. As
our Swami says in another place:

"When man has seen himself as one with the infinite Being of the
universe, when all separateness has ceased, when all men, all women,
all angels, all gods, all animals, all plants, the whole universe
has been melted into that oneness, then all fear disappears. Whom to
fear? Can I hurt myself? Can I kill myself? Can I injure myself? Do
you fear yourself? Then will all sorrow disappear. What can cause me
sorrow? I am the One Existence of the universe. Then all jealousies
will disappear; of whom to be jealous? Of myself? Then all bad
feelings disappear. Against whom will I have this bad feeling?
Against myself? There is none in the universe but me. ... Kill out
this differentiation; kill out this superstition that there are
many. 'He who, in this world of many, sees that One; he who in this
mass of insentiency sees that One Sentient Being; he who in this
world of shadow catches that Reality, unto him belongs eternal
peace, unto none else, unto none else.'"

We all have some ear for this monistic music: it elevates and
reassures. We all have at least the germ of mysticism in us. And
when our idealists recite their arguments for the Absolute, saying
that the slightest union admitted anywhere carries logically
absolute Oneness with it, and that the slightest separation admitted
anywhere logically carries disunion remediless and complete, I
cannot help suspecting that the palpable weak places in the
intellectual reasonings they use are protected from their own
criticism by a mystical feeling that, logic or no logic, absolute
Oneness must somehow at any cost be true. Oneness overcomes MORAL
separateness at any rate. In the passion of love we have the mystic
germ of what might mean a total union of all sentient life. This
mystical germ wakes up in us on hearing the monistic utterances,
acknowledges their authority, and assigns to intellectual
considerations a secondary place.

I will dwell no longer on these religious and moral aspects of the
question in this lecture. When I come to my final lecture there will
be something more to say.

Leave then out of consideration for the moment the authority which
mystical insights may be conjectured eventually to possess; treat
the problem of the One and the Many in a purely intellectual way;
and we see clearly enough where pragmatism stands. With her
criterion of the practical differences that theories make, we see
that she must equally abjure absolute monism and absolute pluralism.
The world is one just so far as its parts hang together by any
definite connexion. It is many just so far as any definite connexion
fails to obtain. And finally it is growing more and more unified by
those systems of connexion at least which human energy keeps framing
as time goes on.

It is possible to imagine alternative universes to the one we know,
in which the most various grades and types of union should be
embodied. Thus the lowest grade of universe would be a world of mere
WITHNESS, of which the parts were only strung together by the
conjunction 'and.' Such a universe is even now the collection of our
several inner lives. The spaces and times of your imagination, the
objects and events of your day-dreams are not only more or less
incoherent inter se, but are wholly out of definite relation with
the similar contents of anyone else's mind. Our various reveries now
as we sit here compenetrate each other idly without influencing or
interfering. They coexist, but in no order and in no receptacle,
being the nearest approach to an absolute 'many' that we can
conceive. We cannot even imagine any reason why they SHOULD be known
all together, and we can imagine even less, if they were known
together, how they could be known as one systematic whole.

But add our sensations and bodily actions, and the union mounts to a
much higher grade. Our audita et visa and our acts fall into those
receptacles of time and space in which each event finds its date and
place. They form 'things' and are of 'kinds' too, and can be
classed. Yet we can imagine a world of things and of kinds in which
the causal interactions with which we are so familiar should not
exist. Everything there might be inert towards everything else, and
refuse to propagate its influence. Or gross mechanical influences
might pass, but no chemical action. Such worlds would be far less
unified than ours. Again there might be complete physico-chemical
interaction, but no minds; or minds, but altogether private ones,
with no social life; or social life limited to acquaintance, but no
love; or love, but no customs or institutions that should
systematize it. No one of these grades of universe would be
absolutely irrational or disintegrated, inferior tho it might appear
when looked at from the higher grades. For instance, if our minds
should ever become 'telepathically' connected, so that we knew
immediately, or could under certain conditions know immediately,
each what the other was thinking, the world we now live in would
appear to the thinkers in that world to have been of an inferior
grade.

With the whole of past eternity open for our conjectures to range
in, it may be lawful to wonder whether the various kinds of union
now realized in the universe that we inhabit may not possibly have
been successively evolved after the fashion in which we now see
human systems evolving in consequence of human needs. If such an
hypothesis were legitimate, total oneness would appear at the end of
things rather than at their origin. In other words the notion of the
'Absolute' would have to be replaced by that of the 'Ultimate.' The
two notions would have the same content--the maximally unified
content of fact, namely--but their time-relations would be
positively reversed. [Footnote: Compare on the Ultimate, Mr.
Schiller's essay "Activity and Substance," in his book entitled
Humanism, p. 204.]

After discussing the unity of the universe in this pragmatic way,
you ought to see why I said in my second lecture, borrowing the word
from my friend G. Papini, that pragmatism tends to UNSTIFFEN all our
theories. The world's oneness has generally been affirmed abstractly
only, and as if anyone who questioned it must be an idiot. The
temper of monists has been so vehement, as almost at times to be
convulsive; and this way of holding a doctrine does not easily go
with reasonable discussion and the drawing of distinctions. The
theory of the Absolute, in particular, has had to be an article of
faith, affirmed dogmatically and exclusively. The One and All, first
in the order of being and of knowing, logically necessary itself,
and uniting all lesser things in the bonds of mutual necessity, how
could it allow of any mitigation of its inner rigidity? The
slightest suspicion of pluralism, the minutest wiggle of
independence of any one of its parts from the control of the
totality, would ruin it. Absolute unity brooks no degrees--as well
might you claim absolute purity for a glass of water because it
contains but a single little cholera-germ. The independence, however
infinitesimal, of a part, however small, would be to the Absolute as
fatal as a cholera-germ.

Pluralism on the other hand has no need of this dogmatic rigoristic
temper. Provided you grant SOME separation among things, some tremor
of independence, some free play of parts on one another, some real
novelty or chance, however minute, she is amply satisfied, and will
allow you any amount, however great, of real union. How much of
union there may be is a question that she thinks can only be decided
empirically. The amount may be enormous, colossal; but absolute
monism is shattered if, along with all the union, there has to be
granted the slightest modicum, the most incipient nascency, or the
most residual trace, of a separation that is not 'overcome.'

Pragmatism, pending the final empirical ascertainment of just what
the balance of union and disunion among things may be, must
obviously range herself upon the pluralistic side. Some day, she
admits, even total union, with one knower, one origin, and a
universe consolidated in every conceivable way, may turn out to be
the most acceptable of all hypotheses. Meanwhile the opposite
hypothesis, of a world imperfectly unified still, and perhaps always
to remain so, must be sincerely entertained. This latter hypothesis
is pluralism's doctrine. Since absolute monism forbids its being
even considered seriously, branding it as irrational from the start,
it is clear that pragmatism must turn its back on absolute monism,
and follow pluralism's more empirical path.

This leaves us with the common-sense world, in which we find things
partly joined and partly disjoined. 'Things,' then, and their
'conjunctions'--what do such words mean, pragmatically handled? In
my next lecture, I will apply the pragmatic method to the stage of
philosophizing known as Common Sense.



Lecture V

Pragmatism and Common Sense

In the last lecture we turned ourselves from the usual way of
talking of the universe's oneness as a principle, sublime in all its
blankness, towards a study of the special kinds of union which the
universe enfolds. We found many of these to coexist with kinds of
separation equally real. "How far am I verified?" is the question
which each kind of union and each kind of separation asks us here,
so as good pragmatists we have to turn our face towards experience,
towards 'facts.'

Absolute oneness remains, but only as an hypothesis, and that
hypothesis is reduced nowadays to that of an omniscient knower who
sees all things without exception as forming one single systematic
fact. But the knower in question may still be conceived either as an
Absolute or as an Ultimate; and over against the hypothesis of him
in either form the counter-hypothesis that the widest field of
knowledge that ever was or will be still contains some ignorance,
may be legitimately held. Some bits of information always may
escape.

This is the hypothesis of NOETIC PLURALISM, which monists consider
so absurd. Since we are bound to treat it as respectfully as noetic
monism, until the facts shall have tipped the beam, we find that our
pragmatism, tho originally nothing but a method, has forced us to be
friendly to the pluralistic view. It MAY be that some parts of the
world are connected so loosely with some other parts as to be strung
along by nothing but the copula AND. They might even come and go
without those other parts suffering any internal change. This
pluralistic view, of a world of ADDITIVE constitution, is one that
pragmatism is unable to rule out from serious consideration. But
this view leads one to the farther hypothesis that the actual world,
instead of being complete 'eternally,' as the monists assure us, may
be eternally incomplete, and at all times subject to addition or
liable to loss.

It IS at any rate incomplete in one respect, and flagrantly so. The
very fact that we debate this question shows that our KNOWLEDGE is
incomplete at present and subject to addition. In respect of the
knowledge it contains the world does genuinely change and grow. Some
general remarks on the way in which our knowledge completes itself--
when it does complete itself--will lead us very conveniently into
our subject for this lecture, which is 'Common Sense.'

To begin with, our knowledge grows IN SPOTS. The spots may be large
or small, but the knowledge never grows all over: some old knowledge
always remains what it was. Your knowledge of pragmatism, let us
suppose, is growing now. Later, its growth may involve considerable
modification of opinions which you previously held to be true. But
such modifications are apt to be gradual. To take the nearest
possible example, consider these lectures of mine. What you first
gain from them is probably a small amount of new information, a few
new definitions, or distinctions, or points of view. But while these
special ideas are being added, the rest of your knowledge stands
still, and only gradually will you 'line up' your previous opinions
with the novelties I am trying to instil, and modify to some slight
degree their mass.

You listen to me now, I suppose, with certain prepossessions as to
my competency, and these affect your reception of what I say, but
were I suddenly to break off lecturing, and to begin to sing 'We
won't go home till morning' in a rich baritone voice, not only would
that new fact be added to your stock, but it would oblige you to
define me differently, and that might alter your opinion of the
pragmatic philosophy, and in general bring about a rearrangement of
a number of your ideas. Your mind in such processes is strained, and
sometimes painfully so, between its older beliefs and the novelties
which experience brings along.

Our minds thus grow in spots; and like grease-spots, the spots
spread. But we let them spread as little as possible: we keep
unaltered as much of our old knowledge, as many of our old
prejudices and beliefs, as we can. We patch and tinker more than we
renew. The novelty soaks in; it stains the ancient mass; but it is
also tinged by what absorbs it. Our past apperceives and co-
operates; and in the new equilibrium in which each step forward in
the process of learning terminates, it happens relatively seldom
that the new fact is added RAW. More usually it is embedded cooked,
as one might say, or stewed down in the sauce of the old.

New truths thus are resultants of new experiences and of old truths
combined and mutually modifying one another. And since this is the
case in the changes of opinion of to-day, there is no reason to
assume that it has not been so at all times. It follows that very
ancient modes of thought may have survived through all the later
changes in men's opinions. The most primitive ways of thinking may
not yet be wholly expunged. Like our five fingers, our ear-bones,
our rudimentary caudal appendage, or our other 'vestigial'
peculiarities, they may remain as indelible tokens of events in our
race-history. Our ancestors may at certain moments have struck into
ways of thinking which they might conceivably not have found. But
once they did so, and after the fact, the inheritance continues.
When you begin a piece of music in a certain key, you must keep the
key to the end. You may alter your house ad libitum, but the ground-
plan of the first architect persists--you can make great changes,
but you cannot change a Gothic church into a Doric temple. You may
rinse and rinse the bottle, but you can't get the taste of the
medicine or whiskey that first filled it wholly out.

My thesis now is this, that OUR FUNDAMENTAL WAYS OF THINKING ABOUT
THINGS ARE DISCOVERIES OF EXCEEDINGLY REMOTE ANCESTORS, WHICH HAVE
BEEN ABLE TO PRESERVE THEMSELVES THROUGHOUT THE EXPERIENCE OF ALL
SUBSEQUENT TIME. They form one great stage of equilibrium in the
human mind's development, the stage of common sense. Other stages
have grafted themselves upon this stage, but have never succeeded in
displacing it. Let us consider this common-sense stage first, as if
it might be final.

In practical talk, a man's common sense means his good judgment, his
freedom from excentricity, his GUMPTION, to use the vernacular word.
In philosophy it means something entirely different, it means his
use of certain intellectual forms or categories of thought. Were we
lobsters, or bees, it might be that our organization would have led
to our using quite different modes from these of apprehending our
experiences. It MIGHT be too (we cannot dogmatically deny this) that
such categories, unimaginable by us to-day, would have proved on the
whole as serviceable for handling our experiences mentally as those
which we actually use.

If this sounds paradoxical to anyone, let him think of analytical
geometry. The identical figures which Euclid defined by intrinsic
relations were defined by Descartes by the relations of their points
to adventitious co-ordinates, the result being an absolutely
different and vastly more potent way of handling curves. All our
conceptions are what the Germans call denkmittel, means by which we
handle facts by thinking them. Experience merely as such doesn't
come ticketed and labeled, we have first to discover what it is.
Kant speaks of it as being in its first intention a gewuehl der
erscheinungen, a rhapsodie der wahrnehmungen, a mere motley which we
have to unify by our wits. What we usually do is first to frame some
system of concepts mentally classified, serialized, or connected in
some intellectual way, and then to use this as a tally by which we
'keep tab' on the impressions that present themselves. When each is
referred to some possible place in the conceptual system, it is
thereby 'understood.' This notion of parallel 'manifolds' with their
elements standing reciprocally in 'one-to-one relations,' is proving
so convenient nowadays in mathematics and logic as to supersede more
and more the older classificatory conceptions. There are many
conceptual systems of this sort; and the sense manifold is also such
a system. Find a one-to-one relation for your sense-impressions
ANYWHERE among the concepts, and in so far forth you rationalize the
impressions. But obviously you can rationalize them by using various
conceptual systems.

The old common-sense way of rationalizing them is by a set of
concepts of which the most important are these:

Thing;

The same or different;

Kinds;

Minds;

Bodies;

One Time;

One Space;

Subjects and attributes;

Causal influences;

The fancied;

The real.

We are now so familiar with the order that these notions have woven
for us out of the everlasting weather of our perceptions that we
find it hard to realize how little of a fixed routine the
perceptions follow when taken by themselves. The word weather is a
good one to use here. In Boston, for example, the weather has almost
no routine, the only law being that if you have had any weather for
two days, you will probably but not certainly have another weather
on the third. Weather-experience as it thus comes to Boston, is
discontinuous and chaotic. In point of temperature, of wind, rain or
sunshine, it MAY change three times a day. But the Washington
weather-bureau intellectualizes this disorder by making each
successive bit of Boston weather EPISODIC. It refers it to its place
and moment in a continental cyclone, on the history of which the
local changes everywhere are strung as beads are strung upon a cord.

Now it seems almost certain that young children and the inferior
animals take all their experiences very much as uninstructed
Bostonians take their weather. They know no more of time or space as
world-receptacles, or of permanent subjects and changing predicates,
or of causes, or kinds, or thoughts, or things, than our common
people know of continental cyclones. A baby's rattle drops out of
his hand, but the baby looks not for it. It has 'gone out' for him,
as a candle-flame goes out; and it comes back, when you replace it
in his hand, as the flame comes back when relit. The idea of its
being a 'thing,' whose permanent existence by itself he might
interpolate between its successive apparitions has evidently not
occurred to him. It is the same with dogs. Out of sight, out of
mind, with them. It is pretty evident that they have no GENERAL
tendency to interpolate 'things.' Let me quote here a passage from
my colleague G. Santayana's book.

"If a dog, while sniffing about contentedly, sees afar off his
master arriving after long absence...the poor brute asks for no
reason why his master went, why he has come again, why he should be
loved, or why presently while lying at his feet you forget him and
begin to grunt and dream of the chase--all that is an utter mystery,
utterly unconsidered. Such experience has variety, scenery, and a
certain vital rhythm; its story might be told in dithyrambic verse.
It moves wholly by inspiration; every event is providential, every
act unpremeditated. Absolute freedom and absolute helplessness have
met together: you depend wholly on divine favour, yet that
unfathomable agency is not distinguishable from your own life.
...[But] the figures even of that disordered drama have their exits
and their entrances; and their cues can be gradually discovered by a
being capable of fixing his attention and retaining the order of
events. ...In proportion as such understanding advances each moment
of experience becomes consequential and prophetic of the rest. The
calm places in life are filled with power and its spasms with
resource. No emotion can overwhelm the mind, for of none is the
basis or issue wholly hidden; no event can disconcert it altogether,
because it sees beyond. Means can be looked for to escape from the
worst predicament; and whereas each moment had been formerly filled
with nothing but its own adventure and surprised emotion, each now
makes room for the lesson of what went before and surmises what may
be the plot of the whole."[Footnote: The Life of Reason: Reason in
Common Sense, 1905, p. 59.]

Even to-day science and philosophy are still laboriously trying to
part fancies from realities in our experience; and in primitive
times they made only the most incipient distinctions in this line.
Men believed whatever they thought with any liveliness, and they
mixed their dreams with their realities inextricably. The categories
of 'thought' and 'things' are indispensable here--instead of being
realities we now call certain experiences only 'thoughts.' There is
not a category, among those enumerated, of which we may not imagine
the use to have thus originated historically and only gradually
spread.

That one Time which we all believe in and in which each event has
its definite date, that one Space in which each thing has its
position, these abstract notions unify the world incomparably; but
in their finished shape as concepts how different they are from the
loose unordered time-and-space experiences of natural men!
Everything that happens to us brings its own duration and extension,
and both are vaguely surrounded by a marginal 'more' that runs into
the duration and extension of the next thing that comes. But we soon
lose all our definite bearings; and not only do our children make no
distinction between yesterday and the day before yesterday, the
whole past being churned up together, but we adults still do so
whenever the times are large. It is the same with spaces. On a map I
can distinctly see the relation of London, Constantinople, and Pekin
to the place where I am; in reality I utterly fail to FEEL the facts
which the map symbolizes. The directions and distances are vague,
confused and mixed. Cosmic space and cosmic time, so far from being
the intuitions that Kant said they were, are constructions as
patently artificial as any that science can show. The great majority
of the human race never use these notions, but live in plural times
and spaces, interpenetrant and DURCHEINANDER.

Permanent 'things' again; the 'same' thing and its various
'appearances' and 'alterations'; the different 'kinds' of thing;
with the 'kind' used finally as a 'predicate,' of which the thing
remains the 'subject'--what a straightening of the tangle of our
experience's immediate flux and sensible variety does this list of
terms suggest! And it is only the smallest part of his experience's
flux that anyone actually does straighten out by applying to it
these conceptual instruments. Out of them all our lowest ancestors
probably used only, and then most vaguely and inaccurately, the
notion of 'the same again.' But even then if you had asked them
whether the same were a 'thing' that had endured throughout the
unseen interval, they would probably have been at a loss, and would
have said that they had never asked that question, or considered
matters in that light.

Kinds, and sameness of kind--what colossally useful DENKMITTEL for
finding our way among the many! The manyness might conceivably have
been absolute. Experiences might have all been singulars, no one of
them occurring twice. In such a world logic would have had no
application; for kind and sameness of kind are logic's only
instruments. Once we know that whatever is of a kind is also of that
kind's kind, we can travel through the universe as if with seven-
league boots. Brutes surely never use these abstractions, and
civilized men use them in most various amounts.

Causal influence, again! This, if anything, seems to have been an
antediluvian conception; for we find primitive men thinking that
almost everything is significant and can exert influence of some
sort. The search for the more definite influences seems to have
started in the question: "Who, or what, is to blame?"--for any
illness, namely, or disaster, or untoward thing. From this centre
the search for causal influences has spread. Hume and 'Science'
together have tried to eliminate the whole notion of influence,
substituting the entirely different DENKMITTEL of 'law.' But law is
a comparatively recent invention, and influence reigns supreme in
the older realm of common sense.

The 'possible,' as something less than the actual and more than the
wholly unreal, is another of these magisterial notions of common
sense. Criticize them as you may, they persist; and we fly back to
them the moment critical pressure is relaxed. 'Self,' 'body,' in the
substantial or metaphysical sense--no one escapes subjection to
THOSE forms of thought. In practice, the common-sense DENKMITTEL are
uniformly victorious. Everyone, however instructed, still thinks of
a 'thing' in the common-sense way, as a permanent unit-subject that
'supports' its attributes interchangeably. No one stably or
sincerely uses the more critical notion, of a group of sense-
qualities united by a law. With these categories in our hand, we
make our plans and plot together, and connect all the remoter parts
of experience with what lies before our eyes. Our later and more
critical philosophies are mere fads and fancies compared with this
natural mother-tongue of thought.

Common sense appears thus as a perfectly definite stage in our
understanding of things, a stage that satisfies in an
extraordinarily successful way the purposes for which we think.
'Things' do exist, even when we do not see them. Their 'kinds' also
exist. Their 'qualities' are what they act by, and are what we act
on; and these also exist. These lamps shed their quality of light on
every object in this room. We intercept IT on its way whenever we
hold up an opaque screen. It is the very sound that my lips emit
that travels into your ears. It is the sensible heat of the fire
that migrates into the water in which we boil an egg; and we can
change the heat into coolness by dropping in a lump of ice. At this
stage of philosophy all non-European men without exception have
remained. It suffices for all the necessary practical ends of life;
and, among our own race even, it is only the highly sophisticated
specimens, the minds debauched by learning, as Berkeley calls them,
who have ever even suspected common sense of not being absolutely
true.

But when we look back, and speculate as to how the common-sense
categories may have achieved their wonderful supremacy, no reason
appears why it may not have been by a process just like that by
which the conceptions due to Democritus, Berkeley, or Darwin,
achieved their similar triumphs in more recent times. In other
words, they may have been successfully DISCOVERED by prehistoric
geniuses whose names the night of antiquity has covered up; they may
have been verified by the immediate facts of experience which they
first fitted; and then from fact to fact and from man to man they
may have SPREAD, until all language rested on them and we are now
incapable of thinking naturally in any other terms. Such a view
would only follow the rule that has proved elsewhere so fertile, of
assuming the vast and remote to conform to the laws of formation
that we can observe at work in the small and near.

For all utilitarian practical purposes these conceptions amply
suffice; but that they began at special points of discovery and only
gradually spread from one thing to another, seems proved by the
exceedingly dubious limits of their application to-day. We assume
for certain purposes one 'objective' Time that AEQUABILITER FLUIT,
but we don't livingly believe in or realize any such equally-flowing
time. 'Space' is a less vague notion; but 'things,' what are they?
Is a constellation properly a thing? or an army? or is an ENS
RATIONIS such as space or justice a thing? Is a knife whose handle
and blade are changed the 'same'? Is the 'changeling,' whom Locke so
seriously discusses, of the human 'kind'? Is 'telepathy' a 'fancy'
or a 'fact'? The moment you pass beyond the practical use of these
categories (a use usually suggested sufficiently by the
circumstances of the special case) to a merely curious or
speculative way of thinking, you find it impossible to say within
just what limits of fact any one of them shall apply.

The peripatetic philosophy, obeying rationalist propensities, has
tried to eternalize the common-sense categories by treating them
very technically and articulately. A 'thing' for instance is a
being, or ENS. An ENS is a subject in which qualities 'inhere.' A
subject is a substance. Substances are of kinds, and kinds are
definite in number, and discrete. These distinctions are fundamental
and eternal. As terms of DISCOURSE they are indeed magnificently
useful, but what they mean, apart from their use in steering our
discourse to profitable issues, does not appear. If you ask a
scholastic philosopher what a substance may be in itself, apart from
its being the support of attributes, he simply says that your
intellect knows perfectly what the word means.

But what the intellect knows clearly is only the word itself and its
steering function. So it comes about that intellects SIBI PERMISSI,
intellects only curious and idle, have forsaken the common-sense
level for what in general terms may be called the 'critical' level
of thought. Not merely SUCH intellects either--your Humes and
Berkeleys and Hegels; but practical observers of facts, your
Galileos, Daltons, Faradays, have found it impossible to treat the
NAIFS sense-termini of common sense as ultimately real. As common
sense interpolates her constant 'things' between our intermittent
sensations, so science EXTRApolates her world of 'primary'
qualities, her atoms, her ether, her magnetic fields, and the like,
beyond the common-sense world. The 'things' are now invisible
impalpable things; and the old visible common-sense things are
supposed to result from the mixture of these invisibles. Or else the
whole NAIF conception of thing gets superseded, and a thing's name
is interpreted as denoting only the law or REGEL DER VERBINDUNG by
which certain of our sensations habitually succeed or coexist.

Science and critical philosophy thus burst the bounds of common
sense. With science NAIF realism ceases: 'Secondary' qualities
become unreal; primary ones alone remain. With critical philosophy,
havoc is made of everything. The common-sense categories one and all
cease to represent anything in the way of BEING; they are but
sublime tricks of human thought, our ways of escaping bewilderment
in the midst of sensation's irremediable flow.

But the scientific tendency in critical thought, tho inspired at
first by purely intellectual motives, has opened an entirely
unexpected range of practical utilities to our astonished view.
Galileo gave us accurate clocks and accurate artillery-practice; the
chemists flood us with new medicines and dye-stuffs; Ampere and
Faraday have endowed us with the New York subway and with Marconi
telegrams. The hypothetical things that such men have invented,
defined as they have defined them, are showing an extraordinary
fertility in consequences verifiable by sense. Our logic can deduce
from them a consequence due under certain conditions, we can then
bring about the conditions, and presto, the consequence is there
before our eyes. The scope of the practical control of nature newly
put into our hand by scientific ways of thinking vastly exceeds the
scope of the old control grounded on common sense. Its rate of
increase accelerates so that no one can trace the limit; one may
even fear that the BEING of man may be crushed by his own powers,
that his fixed nature as an organism may not prove adequate to stand
the strain of the ever increasingly tremendous functions, almost
divine creative functions, which his intellect will more and more
enable him to wield. He may drown in his wealth like a child in a
bath-tub, who has turned on the water and who cannot turn it off.

The philosophic stage of criticism, much more thorough in its
negations than the scientific stage, so far gives us no new range of
practical power. Locke, Hume, Berkeley, Kant, Hegel, have all been
utterly sterile, so far as shedding any light on the details of
nature goes, and I can think of no invention or discovery that can
be directly traced to anything in their peculiar thought, for
neither with Berkeley's tar-water nor with Kant's nebular hypothesis
had their respective philosophic tenets anything to do. The
satisfactions they yield to their disciples are intellectual, not
practical; and even then we have to confess that there is a large
minus-side to the account.

There are thus at least three well-characterized levels, stages or
types of thought about the world we live in, and the notions of one
stage have one kind of merit, those of another stage another kind.
It is impossible, however, to say that any stage as yet in sight is
absolutely more TRUE than any other. Common sense is the more
CONSOLIDATED stage, because it got its innings first, and made all
language into its ally. Whether it or science be the more AUGUST
stage may be left to private judgment. But neither consolidation nor
augustness are decisive marks of truth. If common sense were true,
why should science have had to brand the secondary qualities, to
which our world owes all its living interest, as false, and to
invent an invisible world of points and curves and mathematical
equations instead? Why should it have needed to transform causes and
activities into laws of 'functional variation'? Vainly did
scholasticism, common sense's college-trained younger sister, seek
to stereotype the forms the human family had always talked with, to
make them definite and fix them for eternity. Substantial forms (in
other words our secondary qualities) hardly outlasted the year of
our Lord 1600. People were already tired of them then; and Galileo,
and Descartes, with his 'new philosophy,' gave them only a little
later their coup de grace.

But now if the new kinds of scientific 'thing,' the corpuscular and
etheric world, were essentially more 'true,' why should they have
excited so much criticism within the body of science itself?
Scientific logicians are saying on every hand that these entities
and their determinations, however definitely conceived, should not
be held for literally real. It is AS IF they existed; but in reality
they are like co-ordinates or logarithms, only artificial short-cuts
for taking us from one part to another of experience's flux. We can
cipher fruitfully with them; they serve us wonderfully; but we must
not be their dupes.

There is no RINGING conclusion possible when we compare these types
of thinking, with a view to telling which is the more absolutely
true. Their naturalness, their intellectual economy, their
fruitfulness for practice, all start up as distinct tests of their
veracity, and as a result we get confused. Common sense is BETTER
for one sphere of life, science for another, philosophic criticism
for a third; but whether either be TRUER absolutely, Heaven only
knows. Just now, if I understand the matter rightly, we are
witnessing a curious reversion to the common-sense way of looking at
physical nature, in the philosophy of science favored by such men as
Mach, Ostwald and Duhem. According to these teachers no hypothesis
is truer than any other in the sense of being a more literal copy of
reality. They are all but ways of talking on our part, to be
compared solely from the point of view of their USE. The only
literally true thing is REALITY; and the only reality we know is,
for these logicians, sensible reality, the flux of our sensations
and emotions as they pass. 'Energy' is the collective name
(according to Ostwald) for the sensations just as they present
themselves (the movement, heat, magnetic pull, or light, or whatever
it may be) when they are measured in certain ways. So measuring
them, we are enabled to describe the correlated changes which they
show us, in formulas matchless for their simplicity and fruitfulness
for human use. They are sovereign triumphs of economy in thought.

No one can fail to admire the 'energetic' philosophy. But the
hypersensible entities, the corpuscles and vibrations, hold their
own with most physicists and chemists, in spite of its appeal. It
seems too economical to be all-sufficient. Profusion, not economy,
may after all be reality's key-note.

I am dealing here with highly technical matters, hardly suitable for
popular lecturing, and in which my own competence is small. All the
better for my conclusion, however, which at this point is this. The
whole notion of truth, which naturally and without reflexion we
assume to mean the simple duplication by the mind of a ready-made
and given reality, proves hard to understand clearly. There is no
simple test available for adjudicating offhand between the divers
types of thought that claim to possess it. Common sense, common
science or corpuscular philosophy, ultra-critical science, or
energetics, and critical or idealistic philosophy, all seem
insufficiently true in some regard and leave some dissatisfaction.
It is evident that the conflict of these so widely differing systems
obliges us to overhaul the very idea of truth, for at present we
have no definite notion of what the word may mean. I shall face that
task in my next lecture, and will add but a few words, in finishing
the present one.

There are only two points that I wish you to retain from the present
lecture. The first one relates to common sense. We have seen reason
to suspect it, to suspect that in spite of their being so venerable,
of their being so universally used and built into the very structure
of language, its categories may after all be only a collection of
extraordinarily successful hypotheses (historically discovered or
invented by single men, but gradually communicated, and used by
everybody) by which our forefathers have from time immemorial
unified and straightened the discontinuity of their immediate
experiences, and put themselves into an equilibrium with the surface
of nature so satisfactory for ordinary practical purposes that it
certainly would have lasted forever, but for the excessive
intellectual vivacity of Democritus, Archimedes, Galileo, Berkeley,
and other excentric geniuses whom the example of such men inflamed.
Retain, I pray you, this suspicion about common sense.

The other point is this. Ought not the existence of the various
types of thinking which we have reviewed, each so splendid for
certain purposes, yet all conflicting still, and neither one of them
able to support a claim of absolute veracity, to awaken a
presumption favorable to the pragmatistic view that all our theories
are INSTRUMENTAL, are mental modes of ADAPTATION to reality, rather
than revelations or gnostic answers to some divinely instituted
world-enigma? I expressed this view as clearly as I could in the
second of these lectures. Certainly the restlessness of the actual
theoretic situation, the value for some purposes of each thought-
level, and the inability of either to expel the others decisively,
suggest this pragmatistic view, which I hope that the next lectures
may soon make entirely convincing. May there not after all be a
possible ambiguity in truth?



Lecture VI

Pragmatism's Conception of Truth

When Clerk Maxwell was a child it is written that he had a mania for
having everything explained to him, and that when people put him off
with vague verbal accounts of any phenomenon he would interrupt them
impatiently by saying, "Yes; but I want you to tell me the
PARTICULAR GO of it!" Had his question been about truth, only a
pragmatist could have told him the particular go of it. I believe
that our contemporary pragmatists, especially Messrs. Schiller and
Dewey, have given the only tenable account of this subject. It is a
very ticklish subject, sending subtle rootlets into all kinds of
crannies, and hard to treat in the sketchy way that alone befits a
public lecture. But the Schiller-Dewey view of truth has been so
ferociously attacked by rationalistic philosophers, and so
abominably misunderstood, that here, if anywhere, is the point where
a clear and simple statement should be made.

I fully expect to see the pragmatist view of truth run through the
classic stages of a theory's career. First, you know, a new theory
is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but obvious
and insignificant; finally it is seen to be so important that its
adversaries claim that they themselves discovered it. Our doctrine
of truth is at present in the first of these three stages, with
symptoms of the second stage having begun in certain quarters. I
wish that this lecture might help it beyond the first stage in the
eyes of many of you.

Truth, as any dictionary will tell you, is a property of certain of
our ideas. It means their 'agreement,' as falsity means their
disagreement, with 'reality.' Pragmatists and intellectualists both
accept this definition as a matter of course. They begin to quarrel
only after the question is raised as to what may precisely be meant
by the term 'agreement,' and what by the term 'reality,' when
reality is taken as something for our ideas to agree with.

In answering these questions the pragmatists are more analytic and
painstaking, the intellectualists more offhand and irreflective. The
popular notion is that a true idea must copy its reality. Like other
popular views, this one follows the analogy of the most usual
experience. Our true ideas of sensible things do indeed copy them.
Shut your eyes and think of yonder clock on the wall, and you get
just such a true picture or copy of its dial. But your idea of its
'works' (unless you are a clock-maker) is much less of a copy, yet
it passes muster, for it in no way clashes with the reality. Even
tho it should shrink to the mere word 'works,' that word still
serves you truly; and when you speak of the 'time-keeping function'
of the clock, or of its spring's 'elasticity,' it is hard to see
exactly what your ideas can copy.

You perceive that there is a problem here. Where our ideas cannot
copy definitely their object, what does agreement with that object
mean? Some idealists seem to say that they are true whenever they
are what God means that we ought to think about that object. Others
hold the copy-view all through, and speak as if our ideas possessed
truth just in proportion as they approach to being copies of the
Absolute's eternal way of thinking.

These views, you see, invite pragmatistic discussion. But the great
assumption of the intellectualists is that truth means essentially
an inert static relation. When you've got your true idea of
anything, there's an end of the matter. You're in possession; you
KNOW; you have fulfilled your thinking destiny. You are where you
ought to be mentally; you have obeyed your categorical imperative;
and nothing more need follow on that climax of your rational
destiny. Epistemologically you are in stable equilibrium.

Pragmatism, on the other hand, asks its usual question. "Grant an
idea or belief to be true," it says, "what concrete difference will
its being true make in anyone's actual life? How will the truth be
realized? What experiences will be different from those which would
obtain if the belief were false? What, in short, is the truth's
cash-value in experiential terms?"

The moment pragmatism asks this question, it sees the answer: TRUE
IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CAN ASSIMILATE, VALIDATE, CORROBORATE AND
VERIFY. FALSE IDEAS ARE THOSE THAT WE CANNOT. That is the practical
difference it makes to us to have true ideas; that, therefore, is
the meaning of truth, for it is all that truth is known-as.

This thesis is what I have to defend. The truth of an idea is not a
stagnant property inherent in it. Truth HAPPENS to an idea. It
BECOMES true, is MADE true by events. Its verity is in fact an
event, a process: the process namely of its verifying itself, its
veri-FICATION. Its validity is the process of its valid-ATION.

But what do the words verification and validation themselves
pragmatically mean? They again signify certain practical
consequences of the verified and validated idea. It is hard to find
any one phrase that characterizes these consequences better than the
ordinary agreement-formula--just such consequences being what we
have in mind whenever we say that our ideas 'agree' with reality.
They lead us, namely, through the acts and other ideas which they
instigate, into or up to, or towards, other parts of experience with
which we feel all the while-such feeling being among our
potentialities--that the original ideas remain in agreement. The
connexions and transitions come to us from point to point as being
progressive, harmonious, satisfactory. This function of agreeable
leading is what we mean by an idea's verification. Such an account
is vague and it sounds at first quite trivial, but it has results
which it will take the rest of my hour to explain.

Let me begin by reminding you of the fact that the possession of
true thoughts means everywhere the possession of invaluable
instruments of action; and that our duty to gain truth, so far from
being a blank command from out of the blue, or a 'stunt' self-
imposed by our intellect, can account for itself by excellent
practical reasons.

The importance to human life of having true beliefs about matters of
fact is a thing too notorious. We live in a world of realities that
can be infinitely useful or infinitely harmful. Ideas that tell us
which of them to expect count as the true ideas in all this primary
sphere of verification, and the pursuit of such ideas is a primary
human duty. The possession of truth, so far from being here an end
in itself, is only a preliminary means towards other vital
satisfactions. If I am lost in the woods and starved, and find what
looks like a cow-path, it is of the utmost importance that I should
think of a human habitation at the end of it, for if I do so and
follow it, I save myself. The true thought is useful here because
the house which is its object is useful. The practical value of true
ideas is thus primarily derived from the practical importance of
their objects to us. Their objects are, indeed, not important at all
times. I may on another occasion have no use for the house; and then
my idea of it, however verifiable, will be practically irrelevant,
and had better remain latent. Yet since almost any object may some
day become temporarily important, the advantage of having a general
stock of extra truths, of ideas that shall be true of merely
possible situations, is obvious. We store such extra truths away in
our memories, and with the overflow we fill our books of reference.
Whenever such an extra truth becomes practically relevant to one of
our emergencies, it passes from cold-storage to do work in the
world, and our belief in it grows active. You can say of it then
either that 'it is useful because it is true' or that 'it is true
because it is useful.' Both these phrases mean exactly the same
thing, namely that here is an idea that gets fulfilled and can be
verified. True is the name for whatever idea starts the
verification-process, useful is the name for its completed function
in experience. True ideas would never have been singled out as such,
would never have acquired a class-name, least of all a name
suggesting value, unless they had been useful from the outset in
this way.

From this simple cue pragmatism gets her general notion of truth as
something essentially bound up with the way in which one moment in
our experience may lead us towards other moments which it will be
worth while to have been led to. Primarily, and on the common-sense
level, the truth of a state of mind means this function of A LEADING
THAT IS WORTH WHILE. When a moment in our experience, of any kind
whatever, inspires us with a thought that is true, that means that
sooner or later we dip by that thought's guidance into the
particulars of experience again and make advantageous connexion with
them. This is a vague enough statement, but I beg you to retain it,
for it is essential.

Our experience meanwhile is all shot through with regularities. One
bit of it can warn us to get ready for another bit, can 'intend' or
be 'significant of' that remoter object. The object's advent is the
significance's verification. Truth, in these cases, meaning nothing
but eventual verification, is manifestly incompatible with
waywardness on our part. Woe to him whose beliefs play fast and
loose with the order which realities follow in his experience: they
will lead him nowhere or else make false connexions.

By 'realities' or 'objects' here, we mean either things of common
sense, sensibly present, or else common-sense relations, such as
dates, places, distances, kinds, activities. Following our mental
image of a house along the cow-path, we actually come to see the
house; we get the image's full verification. SUCH SIMPLY AND FULLY
VERIFIED LEADINGS ARE CERTAINLY THE ORIGINALS AND PROTOTYPES OF THE
TRUTH-PROCESS. Experience offers indeed other forms of truth-
process, but they are all conceivable as being primary verifications
arrested, multiplied or substituted one for another.

Take, for instance, yonder object on the wall. You and I consider it
to be a 'clock,' altho no one of us has seen the hidden works that
make it one. We let our notion pass for true without attempting to
verify. If truths mean verification-process essentially, ought we
then to call such unverified truths as this abortive? No, for they
form the overwhelmingly large number of the truths we live by.
Indirect as well as direct verifications pass muster. Where
circumstantial evidence is sufficient, we can go without eye-
witnessing. Just as we here assume Japan to exist without ever
having been there, because it WORKS to do so, everything we know
conspiring with the belief, and nothing interfering, so we assume
that thing to be a clock. We USE it as a clock, regulating the
length of our lecture by it. The verification of the assumption here
means its leading to no frustration or contradiction. VerifiABILITY
of wheels and weights and pendulum is as good as verification. For
one truth-process completed there are a million in our lives that
function in this state of nascency. They turn us TOWARDS direct
verification; lead us into the SURROUNDINGS of the objects they
envisage; and then, if everything runs on harmoniously, we are so
sure that verification is possible that we omit it, and are usually
justified by all that happens.

Truth lives, in fact, for the most part on a credit system. Our
thoughts and beliefs 'pass,' so long as nothing challenges them,
just as bank-notes pass so long as nobody refuses them. But this all
points to direct face-to-face verifications somewhere, without which
the fabric of truth collapses like a financial system with no cash-
basis whatever. You accept my verification of one thing, I yours of
another. We trade on each other's truth. But beliefs verified
concretely by SOMEBODY are the posts of the whole superstructure.

Another great reason--beside economy of time--for waiving complete
verification in the usual business of life is that all things exist
in kinds and not singly. Our world is found once for all to have
that peculiarity. So that when we have once directly verified our
ideas about one specimen of a kind, we consider ourselves free to
apply them to other specimens without verification. A mind that
habitually discerns the kind of thing before it, and acts by the law
of the kind immediately, without pausing to verify, will be a 'true'
mind in ninety-nine out of a hundred emergencies, proved so by its
conduct fitting everything it meets, and getting no refutation.

INDIRECTLY OR ONLY POTENTIALLY VERIFYING PROCESSES MAY THUS BE TRUE
AS WELL AS FULL VERIFICATION-PROCESSES. They work as true processes
would work, give us the same advantages, and claim our recognition
for the same reasons. All this on the common-sense level of, matters
of fact, which we are alone considering.

But matters of fact are not our only stock in trade. RELATIONS AMONG
PURELY MENTAL IDEAS form another sphere where true and false beliefs
obtain, and here the beliefs are absolute, or unconditional. When
they are true they bear the name either of definitions or of
principles. It is either a principle or a definition that 1 and 1
make 2, that 2 and 1 make 3, and so on; that white differs less from
gray than it does from black; that when the cause begins to act the
effect also commences. Such propositions hold of all possible
'ones,' of all conceivable 'whites' and 'grays' and 'causes.' The
objects here are mental objects. Their relations are perceptually
obvious at a glance, and no sense-verification is necessary.
Moreover, once true, always true, of those same mental objects.
Truth here has an 'eternal' character. If you can find a concrete
thing anywhere that is 'one' or 'white' or 'gray,' or an 'effect,'
then your principles will everlastingly apply to it. It is but a
case of ascertaining the kind, and then applying the law of its kind
to the particular object. You are sure to get truth if you can but
name the kind rightly, for your mental relations hold good of
everything of that kind without exception. If you then,
nevertheless, failed to get truth concretely, you would say that you
had classed your real objects wrongly.

In this realm of mental relations, truth again is an affair of
leading. We relate one abstract idea with another, framing in the
end great systems of logical and mathematical truth, under the
respective terms of which the sensible facts of experience
eventually arrange themselves, so that our eternal truths hold good
of realities also. This marriage of fact and theory is endlessly
fertile. What we say is here already true in advance of special
verification, IF WE HAVE SUBSUMED OUR OBJECTS RIGHTLY. Our ready-
made ideal framework for all sorts of possible objects follows from
the very structure of our thinking. We can no more play fast and
loose with these abstract relations than we can do so with our
sense-experiences. They coerce us; we must treat them consistently,
whether or not we like the results. The rules of addition apply to
our debts as rigorously as to our assets. The hundredth decimal of
pi, the ratio of the circumference to its diameter, is predetermined
ideally now, tho no one may have computed it. If we should ever need
the figure in our dealings with an actual circle we should need to
have it given rightly, calculated by the usual rules; for it is the
same kind of truth that those rules elsewhere calculate.

Between the coercions of the sensible order and those of the ideal
order, our mind is thus wedged tightly. Our ideas must agree with
realities, be such realities concrete or abstract, be they facts or
be they principles, under penalty of endless inconsistency and
frustration. So far, intellectualists can raise no protest. They can
only say that we have barely touched the skin of the matter.

Realities mean, then, either concrete facts, or abstract kinds of
things and relations perceived intuitively between them. They
furthermore and thirdly mean, as things that new ideas of ours must
no less take account of, the whole body of other truths already in
our possession. But what now does 'agreement' with such three-fold
realities mean?--to use again the definition that is current.

Here it is that pragmatism and intellectualism begin to part
company. Primarily, no doubt, to agree means to copy, but we saw
that the mere word 'clock' would do instead of a mental picture of
its works, and that of many realities our ideas can only be symbols
and not copies. 'Past time,' 'power,' 'spontaneity'--how can our
mind copy such realities?

To 'agree' in the widest sense with a reality, CAN ONLY MEAN TO BE
GUIDED EITHER STRAIGHT UP TO IT OR INTO ITS SURROUNDINGS, OR TO BE
PUT INTO SUCH WORKING TOUCH WITH IT AS TO HANDLE EITHER IT OR
SOMETHING CONNECTED WITH IT BETTER THAN IF WE DISAGREED. Better
either intellectually or practically! And often agreement will only
mean the negative fact that nothing contradictory from the quarter
of that reality comes to interfere with the way in which our ideas
guide us elsewhere. To copy a reality is, indeed, one very important
way of agreeing with it, but it is far from being essential. The
essential thing is the process of being guided. Any idea that helps
us to DEAL, whether practically or intellectually, with either the
reality or its belongings, that doesn't entangle our progress in
frustrations, that FITS, in fact, and adapts our life to the
reality's whole setting, will agree sufficiently to meet the
requirement. It will hold true of that reality.

Thus, NAMES are just as 'true' or 'false' as definite mental
pictures are. They set up similar verification-processes, and lead
to fully equivalent practical results.

All human thinking gets discursified; we exchange ideas; we lend and
borrow verifications, get them from one another by means of social
intercourse. All truth thus gets verbally built out, stored up, and
made available for everyone. Hence, we must TALK consistently just
as we must THINK consistently: for both in talk and thought we deal
with kinds. Names are arbitrary, but once understood they must be
kept to. We mustn't now call Abel 'Cain' or Cain 'Abel.' If we do,
we ungear ourselves from the whole book of Genesis, and from all its
connexions with the universe of speech and fact down to the present
time. We throw ourselves out of whatever truth that entire system of
speech and fact may embody.

The overwhelming majority of our true ideas admit of no direct or
face-to-face verification-those of past history, for example, as of
Cain and Abel. The stream of time can be remounted only verbally, or
verified indirectly by the present prolongations or effects of what
the past harbored. Yet if they agree with these verbalities and
effects, we can know that our ideas of the past are true. AS TRUE AS
PAST TIME ITSELF WAS, so true was Julius Caesar, so true were
antediluvian monsters, all in their proper dates and settings. That
past time itself was, is guaranteed by its coherence with everything
that's present. True as the present is, the past was also.

Agreement thus turns out to be essentially an affair of leading--
leading that is useful because it is into quarters that contain
objects that are important. True ideas lead us into useful verbal
and conceptual quarters as well as directly up to useful sensible
termini. They lead to consistency, stability and flowing human
intercourse. They lead away from excentricity and isolation, from
foiled and barren thinking. The untrammeled flowing of the leading-
process, its general freedom from clash and contradiction, passes
for its indirect verification; but all roads lead to Rome, and in
the end and eventually, all true processes must lead to the face of
directly verifying sensible experiences SOMEWHERE, which somebody's
ideas have copied.

Such is the large loose way in which the pragmatist interprets the
word agreement. He treats it altogether practically. He lets it
cover any process of conduction from a present idea to a future
terminus, provided only it run prosperously. It is only thus that
'scientific' ideas, flying as they do beyond common sense, can be
said to agree with their realities. It is, as I have already said,
as if reality were made of ether, atoms or electrons, but we mustn't
think so literally. The term 'energy' doesn't even pretend to stand
for anything 'objective.' It is only a way of measuring the surface
of phenomena so as to string their changes on a simple formula.

Yet in the choice of these man-made formulas we cannot be capricious
with impunity any more than we can be capricious on the common-sense
practical level. We must find a theory that will WORK; and that
means something extremely difficult; for our theory must mediate
between all previous truths and certain new experiences. It must
derange common sense and previous belief as little as possible, and
it must lead to some sensible terminus or other that can be verified
exactly. To 'work' means both these things; and the squeeze is so
tight that there is little loose play for any hypothesis. Our
theories are wedged and controlled as nothing else is. Yet sometimes
alternative theoretic formulas are equally compatible with all the
truths we know, and then we choose between them for subjective
reasons. We choose the kind of theory to which we are already
partial; we follow 'elegance' or 'economy.' Clerk Maxwell somewhere
says it would be "poor scientific taste" to choose the more
complicated of two equally well-evidenced conceptions; and you will
all agree with him. Truth in science is what gives us the maximum
possible sum of satisfactions, taste included, but consistency both
with previous truth and with novel fact is always the most imperious
claimant.

I have led you through a very sandy desert. But now, if I may be
allowed so vulgar an expression, we begin to taste the milk in the
cocoanut. Our rationalist critics here discharge their batteries
upon us, and to reply to them will take us out from all this dryness
into full sight of a momentous philosophical alternative.

Our account of truth is an account of truths in the plural, of
processes of leading, realized in rebus, and having only this
quality in common, that they PAY. They pay by guiding us into or
towards some part of a system that dips at numerous points into
sense-percepts, which we may copy mentally or not, but with which at
any rate we are now in the kind of commerce vaguely designated as
verification. Truth for us is simply a collective name for
verification-processes, just as health, wealth, strength, etc., are
names for other processes connected with life, and also pursued
because it pays to pursue them. Truth is MADE, just as health,
wealth and strength are made, in the course of experience.

Here rationalism is instantaneously up in arms against us. I can
imagine a rationalist to talk as follows:

"Truth is not made," he will say; "it absolutely obtains, being a
unique relation that does not wait upon any process, but shoots
straight over the head of experience, and hits its reality every
time. Our belief that yon thing on the wall is a clock is true
already, altho no one in the whole history of the world should
verify it. The bare quality of standing in that transcendent
relation is what makes any thought true that possesses it, whether
or not there be verification. You pragmatists put the cart before
the horse in making truth's being reside in verification-processes.
These are merely signs of its being, merely our lame ways of
ascertaining after the fact, which of our ideas already has
possessed the wondrous quality. The quality itself is timeless, like
all essences and natures. Thoughts partake of it directly, as they
partake of falsity or of irrelevancy. It can't be analyzed away into
pragmatic consequences."

The whole plausibility of this rationalist tirade is due to the fact
to which we have already paid so much attention. In our world,
namely, abounding as it does in things of similar kinds and
similarly associated, one verification serves for others of its
kind, and one great use of knowing things is to be led not so much
to them as to their associates, especially to human talk about them.
The quality of truth, obtaining ante rem, pragmatically means, then,
the fact that in such a world innumerable ideas work better by their
indirect or possible than by their direct and actual verification.
Truth ante rem means only verifiability, then; or else it is a case
of the stock rationalist trick of treating the NAME of a concrete
phenomenal reality as an independent prior entity, and placing it
behind the reality as its explanation. Professor Mach quotes
somewhere an epigram of Lessing's:

Sagt Hanschen Schlau zu Vetter Fritz,
"Wie kommt es, Vetter Fritzen,
Dass grad' die Reichsten in der Welt,
Das meiste Geld besitzen?"

Hanschen Schlau here treats the principle 'wealth' as something
distinct from the facts denoted by the man's being rich. It
antedates them; the facts become only a sort of secondary
coincidence with the rich man's essential nature.

In the case of 'wealth' we all see the fallacy. We know that wealth
is but a name for concrete processes that certain men's lives play a
part in, and not a natural excellence found in Messrs. Rockefeller
and Carnegie, but not in the rest of us.

Like wealth, health also lives in rebus. It is a name for processes,
as digestion, circulation, sleep, etc., that go on happily, tho in
this instance we are more inclined to think of it as a principle and
to say the man digests and sleeps so well BECAUSE he is so healthy.

With 'strength' we are, I think, more rationalistic still, and
decidedly inclined to treat it as an excellence pre-existing in the
man and explanatory of the herculean performances of his muscles.

With 'truth' most people go over the border entirely, and treat the
rationalistic account as self-evident. But really all these words in
TH are exactly similar. Truth exists ante rem just as much and as
little as the other things do.

The scholastics, following Aristotle, made much of the distinction
between habit and act. Health in actu means, among other things,
good sleeping and digesting. But a healthy man need not always be
sleeping, or always digesting, any more than a wealthy man need be
always handling money, or a strong man always lifting weights. All
such qualities sink to the status of 'habits' between their times of
exercise; and similarly truth becomes a habit of certain of our
ideas and beliefs in their intervals of rest from their verifying
activities. But those activities are the root of the whole matter,
and the condition of there being any habit to exist in the
intervals.

'The true,' to put it very briefly, is only the expedient in the way
of our thinking, just as 'the right' is only the expedient in the
way of our behaving. Expedient in almost any fashion; and expedient
in the long run and on the whole of course; for what meets
expediently all the experience in sight won't necessarily meet all
farther experiences equally satisfactorily. Experience, as we know,
has ways of BOILING OVER, and making us correct our present
formulas.

The 'absolutely' true, meaning what no farther experience will ever
alter, is that ideal vanishing-point towards which we imagine that
all our temporary truths will some day converge. It runs on all
fours with the perfectly wise man, and with the absolutely complete
experience; and, if these ideals are ever realized, they will all be
realized together. Meanwhile we have to live to-day by what truth we
can get to-day, and be ready to-morrow to call it falsehood.
Ptolemaic astronomy, euclidean space, aristotelian logic, scholastic
metaphysics, were expedient for centuries, but human experience has
boiled over those limits, and we now call these things only
relatively true, or true within those borders of experience.
'Absolutely' they are false; for we know that those limits were
casual, and might have been transcended by past theorists just as
they are by present thinkers.

When new experiences lead to retrospective judgments, using the past
tense, what these judgments utter WAS true, even tho no past thinker
had been led there. We live forwards, a Danish thinker has said, but
we understand backwards. The present sheds a backward light on the
world's previous processes. They may have been truth-processes for
the actors in them. They are not so for one who knows the later
revelations of the story.

This regulative notion of a potential better truth to be established
later, possibly to be established some day absolutely, and having
powers of retroactive legislation, turns its face, like all
pragmatist notions, towards concreteness of fact, and towards the
future. Like the half-truths, the absolute truth will have to be
MADE, made as a relation incidental to the growth of a mass of
verification-experience, to which the half-true ideas are all along
contributing their quota.

I have already insisted on the fact that truth is made largely out
of previous truths. Men's beliefs at any time are so much experience
funded. But the beliefs are themselves parts of the sum total of the
world's experience, and become matter, therefore, for the next day's
funding operations. So far as reality means experienceable reality,
both it and the truths men gain about it are everlastingly in
process of mutation-mutation towards a definite goal, it may be--but
still mutation.

Mathematicians can solve problems with two variables. On the
Newtonian theory, for instance, acceleration varies with distance,
but distance also varies with acceleration. In the realm of truth-
processes facts come independently and determine our beliefs
provisionally. But these beliefs make us act, and as fast as they do
so, they bring into sight or into existence new facts which re-
determine the beliefs accordingly. So the whole coil and ball of
truth, as it rolls up, is the product of a double influence. Truths
emerge from facts; but they dip forward into facts again and add to
them; which facts again create or reveal new truth (the word is
indifferent) and so on indefinitely. The 'facts' themselves
meanwhile are not TRUE. They simply ARE. Truth is the function of
the beliefs that start and terminate among them.

The case is like a snowball's growth, due as it is to the
distribution of the snow on the one hand, and to the successive
pushes of the boys on the other, with these factors co-determining
each other incessantly.

The most fateful point of difference between being a rationalist and
being a pragmatist is now fully in sight. Experience is in mutation,
and our psychological ascertainments of truth are in mutation--so
much rationalism will allow; but never that either reality itself or
truth itself is mutable. Reality stands complete and ready-made from
all eternity, rationalism insists, and the agreement of our ideas
with it is that unique unanalyzable virtue in them of which she has
already told us. As that intrinsic excellence, their truth has
nothing to do with our experiences. It adds nothing to the content
of experience. It makes no difference to reality itself; it is
supervenient, inert, static, a reflexion merely. It doesn't EXIST,
it HOLDS or OBTAINS, it belongs to another dimension from that of
either facts or fact-relations, belongs, in short, to the
epistemological dimension--and with that big word rationalism closes
the discussion.

Thus, just as pragmatism faces forward to the future, so does
rationalism here again face backward to a past eternity. True to her
inveterate habit, rationalism reverts to 'principles,' and thinks
that when an abstraction once is named, we own an oracular solution.

The tremendous pregnancy in the way of consequences for life of this
radical difference of outlook will only become apparent in my later
lectures. I wish meanwhile to close this lecture by showing that
rationalism's sublimity does not save it from inanity.

When, namely, you ask rationalists, instead of accusing pragmatism
of desecrating the notion of truth, to define it themselves by
saying exactly what THEY understand by it, the only positive
attempts I can think of are these two:

1. "Truth is just the system of propositions which have an un-
conditional claim to be recognized as valid." [Footnote: A. E.
Taylor, Philosophical Review, vol. xiv, p. 288.]

2. Truth is a name for all those judgments which we find ourselves
under obligation to make by a kind of imperative duty. [Footnote: H.
Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntniss, chapter on 'Die
Urtheilsnothwendigkeit.']

The first thing that strikes one in such definitions is their
unutterable triviality. They are absolutely true, of course, but
absolutely insignificant until you handle them pragmatically. What
do you mean by 'claim' here, and what do you mean by 'duty'? As
summary names for the concrete reasons why thinking in true ways is
overwhelmingly expedient and good for mortal men, it is all right to
talk of claims on reality's part to be agreed with, and of
obligations on our part to agree. We feel both the claims and the
obligations, and we feel them for just those reasons.

But the rationalists who talk of claim and obligation EXPRESSLY SAY
THAT THEY HAVE NOTHING TO DO WITH OUR PRACTICAL INTERESTS OR
PERSONAL REASONS. Our reasons for agreeing are psychological facts,
they say, relative to each thinker, and to the accidents of his
life. They are his evidence merely, they are no part of the life of
truth itself. That life transacts itself in a purely logical or
epistemological, as distinguished from a psychological, dimension,
and its claims antedate and exceed all personal motivations
whatsoever. Tho neither man nor God should ever ascertain truth, the
word would still have to be defined as that which OUGHT to be
ascertained and recognized.

There never was a more exquisite example of an idea abstracted from
the concretes of experience and then used to oppose and negate what
it was abstracted from.

Philosophy and common life abound in similar instances. The
'sentimentalist fallacy' is to shed tears over abstract justice and
generosity, beauty, etc., and never to know these qualities when you
meet them in the street, because there the circumstances make them
vulgar. Thus I read in the privately printed biography of an
eminently rationalistic mind: "It was strange that with such
admiration for beauty in the abstract, my brother had no enthusiasm
for fine architecture, for beautiful painting, or for flowers." And
in almost the last philosophic work I have read, I find such
passages as the following: "Justice is ideal, solely ideal. Reason
conceives that it ought to exist, but experience shows that it can-
not. ... Truth, which ought to be, cannot be. ... Reason is deformed
by experience. As soon as reason enters experience, it becomes
contrary to reason."

The rationalist's fallacy here is exactly like the sentimentalist's.
Both extract a quality from the muddy particulars of experience, and
find it so pure when extracted that they contrast it with each and
all its muddy instances as an opposite and higher nature. All the
while it is THEIR nature. It is the nature of truths to be
validated, verified. It pays for our ideas to be validated. Our
obligation to seek truth is part of our general obligation to do
what pays. The payments true ideas bring are the sole why of our
duty to follow them.

Identical whys exist in the case of wealth and health. Truth makes
no other kind of claim and imposes no other kind of ought than
health and wealth do. All these claims are conditional; the concrete
benefits we gain are what we mean by calling the pursuit a duty. In
the case of truth, untrue beliefs work as perniciously in the long
run as true beliefs work beneficially. Talking abstractly, the
quality 'true' may thus be said to grow absolutely precious, and the
quality 'untrue' absolutely damnable: the one may be called good,
the other bad, unconditionally. We ought to think the true, we ought
to shun the false, imperatively.

But if we treat all this abstraction literally and oppose it to its
mother soil in experience, see what a preposterous position we work
ourselves into.

We cannot then take a step forward in our actual thinking. When
shall I acknowledge this truth and when that? Shall the
acknowledgment be loud?--or silent? If sometimes loud, sometimes
silent, which NOW? When may a truth go into cold-storage in the
encyclopedia? and when shall it come out for battle? Must I
constantly be repeating the truth 'twice two are four' because of
its eternal claim on recognition? or is it sometimes irrelevant?
Must my thoughts dwell night and day on my personal sins and
blemishes, because I truly have them?--or may I sink and ignore them
in order to be a decent social unit, and not a mass of morbid
melancholy and apology?

It is quite evident that our obligation to acknowledge truth, so far
from being unconditional, is tremendously conditioned. Truth with a
big T, and in the singular, claims abstractly to be recognized, of
course; but concrete truths in the plural need be recognized only
when their recognition is expedient. A truth must always be
preferred to a falsehood when both relate to the situation; but when
neither does, truth is as little of a duty as falsehood. If you ask
me what o'clock it is and I tell you that I live at 95 Irving
Street, my answer may indeed be true, but you don't see why it is my
duty to give it. A false address would be as much to the purpose.

With this admission that there are conditions that limit the
application of the abstract imperative, THE PRAGMATISTIC TREATMENT
OF TRUTH SWEEPS BACK UPON US IN ITS FULNESS. Our duty to agree with
reality is seen to be grounded in a perfect jungle of concrete
expediencies.

When Berkeley had explained what people meant by matter, people
thought that he denied matter's existence. When Messrs. Schiller and
Dewey now explain what people mean by truth, they are accused of
denying ITS existence. These pragmatists destroy all objective
standards, critics say, and put foolishness and wisdom on one level.
A favorite formula for describing Mr. Schiller's doctrines and mine
is that we are persons who think that by saying whatever you find it
pleasant to say and calling it truth you fulfil every pragmatistic
requirement.

I leave it to you to judge whether this be not an impudent slander.
Pent in, as the pragmatist more than anyone else sees himself to be,
between the whole body of funded truths squeezed from the past and
the coercions of the world of sense about him, who so well as he
feels the immense pressure of objective control under which our
minds perform their operations? If anyone imagines that this law is
lax, let him keep its commandment one day, says Emerson. We have
heard much of late of the uses of the imagination in science. It is
high time to urge the use of a little imagination in philosophy. The
unwillingness of some of our critics to read any but the silliest of
possible meanings into our statements is as discreditable to their
imaginations as anything I know in recent philosophic history.
Schiller says the true is that which 'works.' Thereupon he is
treated as one who limits verification to the lowest material
utilities. Dewey says truth is what gives 'satisfaction.' He is
treated as one who believes in calling everything true which, if it
were true, would be pleasant.

Our critics certainly need more imagination of realities. I have
honestly tried to stretch my own imagination and to read the best
possible meaning into the rationalist conception, but I have to
confess that it still completely baffles me. The notion of a reality
calling on us to 'agree' with it, and that for no reasons, but
simply because its claim is 'unconditional' or 'transcendent,' is
one that I can make neither head nor tail of. I try to imagine
myself as the sole reality in the world, and then to imagine what
more I would 'claim' if I were allowed to. If you suggest the
possibility of my claiming that a mind should come into being from
out of the void inane and stand and COPY me, I can indeed imagine
what the copying might mean, but I can conjure up no motive. What
good it would do me to be copied, or what good it would do that mind
to copy me, if farther consequences are expressly and in principle
ruled out as motives for the claim (as they are by our rationalist
authorities) I cannot fathom. When the Irishman's admirers ran him
along to the place of banquet in a sedan chair with no bottom, he
said, "Faith, if it wasn't for the honor of the thing, I might as
well have come on foot." So here: but for the honor of the thing, I
might as well have remained uncopied. Copying is one genuine mode of
knowing (which for some strange reason our contemporary
transcendentalists seem to be tumbling over each other to
repudiate); but when we get beyond copying, and fall back on unnamed
forms of agreeing that are expressly denied to be either copyings or
leadings or fittings, or any other processes pragmatically
definable, the WHAT of the 'agreement' claimed becomes as
unintelligible as the why of it. Neither content nor motive can be
imagine for it. It is an absolutely meaningless abstraction.
[Footnote: I am not forgetting that Professor Rickert long ago gave
up the whole notion of truth being founded on agreement with
reality. Reality, according to him, is whatever agrees with truth,
and truth is founded solely on our primal duty. This fantastic
flight, together with Mr. Joachim's candid confession of failure in
his book The Nature of Truth, seems to me to mark the bankruptcy of
rationalism when dealing with this subject. Rickert deals with part
of the pragmatistic position under the head of what he calls
'Relativismus.' I cannot discuss his text here. Suffice it to say
that his argumentation in that chapter is so feeble as to seem
almost incredible in so generally able a writer.]

Surely in this field of truth it is the pragmatists and not the
rationalists who are the more genuine defenders of the universe's
rationality.



Lecture VII

Pragmatism and Humanism

What hardens the heart of everyone I approach with the view of truth
sketched in my last lecture is that typical idol of the tribe, the
notion of THE Truth, conceived as the one answer, determinate and
complete, to the one fixed enigma which the world is believed to
propound. For popular tradition, it is all the better if the answer
be oracular, so as itself to awaken wonder as an enigma of the
second order, veiling rather than revealing what its profundities
are supposed to contain. All the great single-word answers to the
world's riddle, such as God, the One, Reason, Law, Spirit, Matter,
Nature, Polarity, the Dialectic Process, the Idea, the Self, the
Oversoul, draw the admiration that men have lavished on them from
this oracular role. By amateurs in philosophy and professionals
alike, the universe is represented as a queer sort of petrified
sphinx whose appeal to man consists in a monotonous challenge to his
divining powers. THE Truth: what a perfect idol of the rationalistic
mind! I read in an old letter--from a gifted friend who died too
young--these words: "In everything, in science, art, morals and
religion, there MUST be one system that is right and EVERY other
wrong." How characteristic of the enthusiasm of a certain stage of
youth! At twenty-one we rise to such a challenge and expect to find
the system. It never occurs to most of us even later that the
question 'what is THE truth?' is no real question (being irrelative
to all conditions) and that the whole notion of THE truth is an
abstraction from the fact of truths in the plural, a mere useful
summarizing phrase like THE Latin Language or THE Law.

Common-law judges sometimes talk about the law, and school-masters
talk about the latin tongue, in a way to make their hearers think
they mean entities pre-existent to the decisions or to the words and
syntax, determining them unequivocally and requiring them to obey.
But the slightest exercise of reflexion makes us see that, instead
of being principles of this kind, both law and latin are results.
Distinctions between the lawful and the unlawful in conduct, or
between the correct and incorrect in speech, have grown up
incidentally among the interactions of men's experiences in detail;
and in no other way do distinctions between the true and the false
in belief ever grow up. Truth grafts itself on previous truth,
modifying it in the process, just as idiom grafts itself on previous
idiom, and law on previous law. Given previous law and a novel case,
and the judge will twist them into fresh law. Previous idiom; new
slang or metaphor or oddity that hits the public taste:--and presto,
a new idiom is made. Previous truth; fresh facts:--and our mind
finds a new truth.

All the while, however, we pretend that the eternal is unrolling,
that the one previous justice, grammar or truth is simply
fulgurating, and not being made. But imagine a youth in the
courtroom trying cases with his abstract notion of 'the' law, or a
censor of speech let loose among the theatres with his idea of 'the'
mother-tongue, or a professor setting up to lecture on the actual
universe with his rationalistic notion of 'the Truth' with a big T,
and what progress do they make? Truth, law, and language fairly boil
away from them at the least touch of novel fact. These things MAKE
THEMSELVES as we go. Our rights, wrongs, prohibitions, penalties,
words, forms, idioms, beliefs, are so many new creations that add
themselves as fast as history proceeds. Far from being antecedent
principles that animate the process, law, language, truth are but
abstract names for its results.

Laws and languages at any rate are thus seen to be man-made: things.
Mr. Schiller applies the analogy to beliefs, and proposes the name
of 'Humanism' for the doctrine that to an unascertainable extent our
truths are man-made products too. Human motives sharpen all our
questions, human satisfactions lurk in all our answers, all our
formulas have a human twist. This element is so inextricable in the
products that Mr. Schiller sometimes seems almost to leave it an
open question whether there be anything else. "The world," he says,
"is essentially [u lambda nu], it is what we make of it. It is
fruitless to define it by what it originally was or by what it is
apart from us; it IS what is made of it. Hence ... the world is
PLASTIC." [Footnote: Personal Idealism, p. 60.] He adds that we can
learn the limits of the plasticity only by trying, and that we ought
to start as if it were wholly plastic, acting methodically on that
assumption, and stopping only when we are decisively rebuked.

This is Mr. Schiller's butt-end-foremost statement of the humanist
position, and it has exposed him to severe attack. I mean to defend
the humanist position in this lecture, so I will insinuate a few
remarks at this point.

Mr. Schiller admits as emphatically as anyone the presence of
resisting factors in every actual experience of truth-making, of
which the new-made special truth must take account, and with which
it has perforce to 'agree.' All our truths are beliefs about
'Reality'; and in any particular belief the reality acts as
something independent, as a thing FOUND, not manufactured. Let me
here recall a bit of my last lecture.

'REALITY' IS IN GENERAL WHAT TRUTHS HAVE TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF;
[Footnote: Mr. Taylor in his Elements of Metaphysics uses this
excellent pragmatic definition.] and the FIRST part of reality from
this point of view is the flux of our sensations. Sensations are
forced upon us, coming we know not whence. Over their nature, order,
and quantity we have as good as no control. THEY are neither true
nor false; they simply ARE. It is only what we say about them, only
the names we give them, our theories of their source and nature and
remote relations, that may be true or not.

The SECOND part of reality, as something that our beliefs must also
obediently take account of, is the RELATIONS that obtain between our
sensations or between their copies in our minds. This part falls
into two sub-parts: 1) the relations that are mutable and
accidental, as those of date and place; and 2) those that are fixed
and essential because they are grounded on the inner natures of
their terms--such as likeness and unlikeness. Both sorts of relation
are matters of immediate perception. Both are 'facts.' But it is the
latter kind of fact that forms the more important sub-part of
reality for our theories of knowledge. Inner relations namely are
'eternal,' are perceived whenever their sensible terms are compared;
and of them our thought--mathematical and logical thought, so-
called--must eternally take account.

The THIRD part of reality, additional to these perceptions (tho
largely based upon them), is the PREVIOUS TRUTHS of which every new
inquiry takes account. This third part is a much less obdurately
resisting factor: it often ends by giving way. In speaking of these
three portions of reality as at all times controlling our belief's
formation, I am only reminding you of what we heard in our last
hour.

Now however fixed these elements of reality may be, we still have a
certain freedom in our dealings with them. Take our sensations. THAT
they are is undoubtedly beyond our control; but WHICH we attend to,
note, and make emphatic in our conclusions depends on our own
interests; and, according as we lay the emphasis here or there,
quite different formulations of truth result. We read the same facts
differently. 'Waterloo,' with the same fixed details, spells a
'victory' for an englishman; for a frenchman it spells a 'defeat.'
So, for an optimist philosopher the universe spells victory, for a
pessimist, defeat.

What we say about reality thus depends on the perspective into which
we throw it. The THAT of it is its own; but the WHAT depends on the
WHICH; and the which depends on US. Both the sensational and the
relational parts of reality are dumb: they say absolutely nothing
about themselves. We it is who have to speak for them. This dumbness
of sensations has led such intellectualists as T.H. Green and Edward
Caird to shove them almost beyond the pale of philosophic
recognition, but pragmatists refuse to go so far. A sensation is
rather like a client who has given his case to a lawyer and then has
passively to listen in the courtroom to whatever account of his
affairs, pleasant or unpleasant, the lawyer finds it most expedient
to give.

Hence, even in the field of sensation, our minds exert a certain
arbitrary choice. By our inclusions and omissions we trace the
field's extent; by our emphasis we mark its foreground and its
background; by our order we read it in this direction or in that. We
receive in short the block of marble, but we carve the statue
ourselves.

This applies to the 'eternal' parts of reality as well: we shuffle
our perceptions of intrinsic relation and arrange them just as
freely. We read them in one serial order or another, class them in
this way or in that, treat one or the other as more fundamental,
until our beliefs about them form those bodies of truth known as
logics, geometries, or arithmetics, in each and all of which the
form and order in which the whole is cast is flagrantly man-made.

Thus, to say nothing of the new FACTS which men add to the matter of
reality by the acts of their own lives, they have already impressed
their mental forms on that whole third of reality which I have
called 'previous truths.' Every hour brings its new percepts, its
own facts of sensation and relation, to be truly taken account of;
but the whole of our PAST dealings with such facts is already funded
in the previous truths. It is therefore only the smallest and
recentest fraction of the first two parts of reality that comes to
us without the human touch, and that fraction has immediately to
become humanized in the sense of being squared, assimilated, or in
some way adapted, to the humanized mass already there. As a matter
of fact we can hardly take in an impression at all, in the absence
of a pre-conception of what impressions there may possibly be.

When we talk of reality 'independent' of human thinking, then, it
seems a thing very hard to find. It reduces to the notion of what is
just entering into experience, and yet to be named, or else to some
imagined aboriginal presence in experience, before any belief about
the presence had arisen, before any human conception had been
applied. It is what is absolutely dumb and evanescent, the merely
ideal limit of our minds. We may glimpse it, but we never grasp it;
what we grasp is always some substitute for it which previous human
thinking has peptonized and cooked for our consumption. If so vulgar
an expression were allowed us, we might say that wherever we find
it, it has been already FAKED. This is what Mr. Schiller has in mind
when he calls independent reality a mere unresisting [u lambda nu],
which IS only to be made over by us.

That is Mr. Schiller's belief about the sensible core of reality. We
'encounter' it (in Mr. Bradley's words) but don't possess it.
Superficially this sounds like Kant's view; but between categories
fulminated before nature began, and categories gradually forming
themselves in nature's presence, the whole chasm between rationalism
and empiricism yawns. To the genuine 'Kantianer' Schiller will
always be to Kant as a satyr to Hyperion.

Other pragmatists may reach more positive beliefs about the sensible
core of reality. They may think to get at it in its independent
nature, by peeling off the successive man-made wrappings. They may
make theories that tell us where it comes from and all about it; and
if these theories work satisfactorily they will be true. The
transcendental idealists say there is no core, the finally completed
wrapping being reality and truth in one. Scholasticism still teaches
that the core is 'matter.' Professor Bergson, Heymans, Strong, and
others, believe in the core and bravely try to define it. Messrs.
Dewey and Schiller treat it as a 'limit.' Which is the truer of all
these diverse accounts, or of others comparable with them, unless it
be the one that finally proves the most satisfactory? On the one
hand there will stand reality, on the other an account of it which
proves impossible to better or to alter. If the impossibility prove
permanent, the truth of the account will be absolute. Other content
of truth than this I can find nowhere. If the anti-pragmatists have
any other meaning, let them for heaven's sake reveal it, let them
grant us access to it!

Not BEING reality, but only our belief ABOUT reality, it will
contain human elements, but these will KNOW the non-human element,
in the only sense in which there can be knowledge of anything. Does
the river make its banks, or do the banks make the river? Does a man
walk with his right leg or with his left leg more essentially? Just
as impossible may it be to separate the real from the human factors
in the growth of our cognitive experience.

Let this stand as a first brief indication of the humanistic
position. Does it seem paradoxical? If so, I will try to make it
plausible by a few illustrations, which will lead to a fuller
acquaintance with the subject.

In many familiar objects everyone will recognize the human element.
We conceive a given reality in this way or in that, to suit our
purpose, and the reality passively submits to the conception. You
can take the number 27 as the cube of 3, or as the product of 3 and
9, or as 26 PLUS 1, or 100 MINUS 73, or in countless other ways, of
which one will be just as true as another. You can take a chessboard
as black squares on a white ground, or as white squares on a black
ground, and neither conception is a false one. You can treat the
adjoined figure [Figure of a 'Star of David'] as a star, as two big
triangles crossing each other, as a hexagon with legs set up on its
angles, as six equal triangles hanging together by their tips, etc.
All these treatments are true treatments--the sensible THAT upon the
paper resists no one of them. You can say of a line that it runs
east, or you can say that it runs west, and the line per se accepts
both descriptions without rebelling at the inconsistency.

We carve out groups of stars in the heavens, and call them
constellations, and the stars patiently suffer us to do so--tho if
they knew what we were doing, some of them might feel much surprised
at the partners we had given them. We name the same constellation
diversely, as Charles's Wain, the Great Bear, or the Dipper. None of
the names will be false, and one will be as true as another, for all
are applicable.

In all these cases we humanly make an addition to some sensible
reality, and that reality tolerates the addition. All the additions
'agree' with the reality; they fit it, while they build it out. No
one of them is false. Which may be treated as the more true, depends
altogether on the human use of it. If the 27 is a number of dollars
which I find in a drawer where I had left 28, it is 28 minus 1. If
it is the number of inches in a shelf which I wish to insert into a
cupboard 26 inches wide, it is 26 plus 1. If I wish to ennoble the
heavens by the constellations I see there, 'Charles's Wain' would be
more true than 'Dipper.' My friend Frederick Myers was humorously
indignant that that prodigious star-group should remind us Americans
of nothing but a culinary utensil.

What shall we call a THING anyhow? It seems quite arbitrary, for we
carve out everything, just as we carve out constellations, to suit
our human purposes. For me, this whole 'audience' is one thing,
which grows now restless, now attentive. I have no use at present
for its individual units, so I don't consider them. So of an 'army,'
of a 'nation.' But in your own eyes, ladies and gentlemen, to call
you 'audience' is an accidental way of taking you. The permanently
real things for you are your individual persons. To an anatomist,
again, those persons are but organisms, and the real things are the
organs. Not the organs, so much as their constituent cells, say the
histologists; not the cells, but their molecules, say in turn the
chemists.

We break the flux of sensible reality into things, then, at our
will. We create the subjects of our true as well as of our false
propositions.

We create the predicates also. Many of the predicates of things
express only the relations of the things to us and to our feelings.
Such predicates of course are human additions. Caesar crossed the
Rubicon, and was a menace to Rome's freedom. He is also an American
school-room pest, made into one by the reaction of our schoolboys on
his writings. The added predicate is as true of him as the earlier
ones.

You see how naturally one comes to the humanistic principle: you
can't weed out the human contribution. Our nouns and adjectives are
all humanized heirlooms, and in the theories we build them into, the
inner order and arrangement is wholly dictated by human
considerations, intellectual consistency being one of them.
Mathematics and logic themselves are fermenting with human
rearrangements; physics, astronomy and biology follow massive cues
of preference. We plunge forward into the field of fresh experience
with the beliefs our ancestors and we have made already; these
determine what we notice; what we notice determines what we do; what
we do again determines what we experience; so from one thing to
another, altho the stubborn fact remains that there IS a sensible
flux, what is true of it seems from first to last to be largely a
matter of our own creation.

We build the flux out inevitably. The great question is: does it,
with our additions, rise or fall in value? Are the additions WORTHY
or UNWORTHY? Suppose a universe composed of seven stars, and nothing
else but three human witnesses and their critic. One witness names
the stars 'Great Bear'; one calls them 'Charles's Wain'; one calls
them the 'Dipper.' Which human addition has made the best universe
of the given stellar material? If Frederick Myers were the critic,
he would have no hesitation in 'turning-down' the American witness.

Lotze has in several places made a deep suggestion. We naively
assume, he says, a relation between reality and our minds which may
be just the opposite of the true one. Reality, we naturally think,
stands ready-made and complete, and our intellects supervene with
the one simple duty of describing it as it is already. But may not
our descriptions, Lotze asks, be themselves important additions to
reality? And may not previous reality itself be there, far less for
the purpose of reappearing unaltered in our knowledge, than for the
very purpose of stimulating our minds to such additions as shall
enhance the universe's total value. "Die erhohung des vorgefundenen
daseins" is a phrase used by Professor Eucken somewhere, which
reminds one of this suggestion by the great Lotze.

It is identically our pragmatistic conception. In our cognitive as
well as in our active life we are creative. We ADD, both to the
subject and to the predicate part of reality. The world stands
really malleable, waiting to receive its final touches at our hands.
Like the kingdom of heaven, it suffers human violence willingly. Man
ENGENDERS truths upon it.

No one can deny that such a role would add both to our dignity and
to our responsibility as thinkers. To some of us it proves a most
inspiring notion. Signer Papini, the leader of italian pragmatism,
grows fairly dithyrambic over the view that it opens, of man's
divinely-creative functions.

The import of the difference between pragmatism and rationalism is
now in sight throughout its whole extent. The essential contrast is
that for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all
eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits
part of its complexion from the future. On the one side the universe
is absolutely secure, on the other it is still pursuing its
adventures.

We have got into rather deep water with this humanistic view, and it
is no wonder that misunderstanding gathers round it. It is accused
of being a doctrine of caprice. Mr. Bradley, for example, says that
a humanist, if he understood his own doctrine, would have to "hold
any end however perverted to be rational if I insist on it
personally, and any idea however mad to be the truth if only some
one is resolved that he will have it so." The humanist view of
'reality,' as something resisting, yet malleable, which controls our
thinking as an energy that must be taken 'account' of incessantly
(tho not necessarily merely COPIED) is evidently a difficult one to
introduce to novices. The situation reminds me of one that I have
personally gone through. I once wrote an essay on our right to
believe, which I unluckily called the WILL to Believe. All the
critics, neglecting the essay, pounced upon the title.
Psychologically it was impossible, morally it was iniquitous. The
"will to deceive," the "will to make-believe," were wittily proposed
as substitutes for it.

THE ALTERNATIVE BETWEEN PRAGMATISM AND RATIONALISM, IN THE SHAPE IN
WHICH WE NOW HAVE IT BEFORE US, IS NO LONGER A QUESTION IN THE
THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE, IT CONCERNS THE STRUCTURE OF THE UNIVERSE
ITSELF.

On the pragmatist side we have only one edition of the universe,
unfinished, growing in all sorts of places, especially in the places
where thinking beings are at work.

On the rationalist side we have a universe in many editions, one
real one, the infinite folio, or edition de luxe, eternally
complete; and then the various finite editions, full of false
readings, distorted and mutilated each in its own way.

So the rival metaphysical hypotheses of pluralism and monism here
come back upon us. I will develope their differences during the
remainder of our hour.

And first let me say that it is impossible not to see a
temperamental difference at work in the choice of sides. The
rationalist mind, radically taken, is of a doctrinaire and
authoritative complexion: the phrase 'must be' is ever on its lips.
The belly-band of its universe must be tight. A radical pragmatist
on the other hand is a happy-go-lucky anarchistic sort of creature.
If he had to live in a tub like Diogenes he wouldn't mind at all if
the hoops were loose and the staves let in the sun.

Now the idea of this loose universe affects your typical
rationalists in much the same way as 'freedom of the press' might
affect a veteran official in the russian bureau of censorship; or as
'simplified spelling' might affect an elderly schoolmistress. It
affects him as the swarm of protestant sects affects a papist
onlooker. It appears as backboneless and devoid of principle as
'opportunism' in politics appears to an old-fashioned french
legitimist, or to a fanatical believer in the divine right of the
people.

For pluralistic pragmatism, truth grows up inside of all the finite
experiences. They lean on each other, but the whole of them, if such
a whole there be, leans on nothing. All 'homes' are in finite
experience; finite experience as such is homeless. Nothing outside
of the flux secures the issue of it. It can hope salvation only from
its own intrinsic promises and potencies.

To rationalists this describes a tramp and vagrant world, adrift in
space, with neither elephant nor tortoise to plant the sole of its
foot upon. It is a set of stars hurled into heaven without even a
centre of gravity to pull against. In other spheres of life it is
true that we have got used to living in a state of relative
insecurity. The authority of  'the State,' and that of an absolute
'moral law,' have resolved themselves into expediencies, and holy
church has resolved itself into 'meeting-houses.' Not so as yet
within the philosophic class-rooms. A universe with such as US
contributing to create its truth, a world delivered to OUR
opportunisms and OUR private judgments! Home-rule for Ireland would
be a millennium in comparison. We're no more fit for such a part
than the Filipinos are 'fit for self-government.' Such a world would
not be RESPECTABLE, philosophically. It is a trunk without a tag, a
dog without a collar, in the eyes of most professors of philosophy.

What then would tighten this loose universe, according to the
professors?

Something to support the finite many, to tie it to, to unify and
anchor it. Something unexposed to accident, something eternal and
unalterable. The mutable in experience must be founded on
immutability. Behind our de facto world, our world in act, there
must be a de jure duplicate fixed and previous, with all that can
happen here already there in posse, every drop of blood, every
smallest item, appointed and provided, stamped and branded, without
chance of variation. The negatives that haunt our ideals here below
must be themselves negated in the absolutely Real. This alone makes
the universe solid. This is the resting deep. We live upon the
stormy surface; but with this our anchor holds, for it grapples
rocky bottom. This is Wordsworth's "central peace subsisting at the
heart of endless agitation." This is Vivekananda's mystical One of
which I read to you. This is Reality with the big R, reality that
makes the timeless claim, reality to which defeat can't happen. This
is what the men of principles, and in general all the men whom I
called tender-minded in my first lecture, think themselves obliged
to postulate.

And this, exactly this, is what the tough-minded of that lecture
find themselves moved to call a piece of perverse abstraction-
worship. The tough-minded are the men whose alpha and omega are
FACTS. Behind the bare phenomenal facts, as my tough-minded old
friend Chauncey Wright, the great Harvard empiricist of my youth,
used to say, there is NOTHING. When a rationalist insists that
behind the facts there is the GROUND of the facts, the POSSIBILITY
of the facts, the tougher empiricists accuse him of taking the mere
name and nature of a fact and clapping it behind the fact as a
duplicate entity to make it possible. That such sham grounds are
often invoked is notorious. At a surgical operation I heard a
bystander ask a doctor why the patient breathed so deeply. "Because
ether is a respiratory stimulant," the doctor answered. "Ah!" said
the questioner, as if relieved by the explanation. But this is like
saying that cyanide of potassium kills because it is a 'poison,' or
that it is so cold to-night because it is 'winter,' or that we have
five fingers because we are 'pentadactyls.' These are but names for
the facts, taken from the facts, and then treated as previous and
explanatory. The tender-minded notion of an absolute reality is,
according to the radically tough-minded, framed on just this
pattern. It is but our summarizing name for the whole spread-out and
strung-along mass of phenomena, treated as if it were a different
entity, both one and previous.

You see how differently people take things. The world we live in
exists diffused and distributed, in the form of an indefinitely
numerous lot of eaches, coherent in all sorts of ways and degrees;
and the tough-minded are perfectly willing to keep them at that
valuation. They can stand that kind of world, their temper being
well adapted to its insecurity. Not so the tender-minded party. They
must back the world we find ourselves born into by "another and a
better" world in which the eaches form an All and the All a One that
logically presupposes, co-implicates, and secures each EACH without
exception.

Must we as pragmatists be radically tough-minded? or can we treat
the absolute edition of the world as a legitimate hypothesis? It is
certainly legitimate, for it is thinkable, whether we take it in its
abstract or in its concrete shape.

By taking it abstractly I mean placing it behind our finite life as
we place the word 'winter' behind to-night's cold weather. 'Winter'
is only the name for a certain number of days which we find
generally characterized by cold weather, but it guarantees nothing
in that line, for our thermometer to-morrow may soar into the 70's.
Nevertheless the word is a useful one to plunge forward with into
the stream of our experience. It cuts off certain probabilities and
sets up others: you can put away your straw-hats; you can unpack
your arctics. It is a summary of things to look for. It names a part
of nature's habits, and gets you ready for their continuation. It is
a definite instrument abstracted from experience, a conceptual
reality that you must take account of, and which reflects you
totally back into sensible realities. The pragmatist is the last
person to deny the reality of such abstractions. They are so much
past experience funded.

But taking the absolute edition of the world concretely means a
different hypothesis. Rationalists take it concretely and OPPOSE it
to the world's finite editions. They give it a particular nature. It
is perfect, finished. Everything known there is known along with
everything else; here, where ignorance reigns, far otherwise. If
there is want there, there also is the satisfaction provided. Here
all is process; that world is timeless. Possibilities obtain in our
world; in the absolute world, where all that is NOT is from eternity
impossible, and all that IS is necessary, the category of
possibility has no application. In this world crimes and horrors are
regrettable. In that totalized world regret obtains not, for "the
existence of ill in the temporal order is the very condition of the
perfection of the eternal order."

Once more, either hypothesis is legitimate in pragmatist eyes, for
either has its uses. Abstractly, or taken like the word winter, as a
memorandum of past experience that orients us towards the future,
the notion of the absolute world is indispensable. Concretely taken,
it is also indispensable, at least to certain minds, for it
determines them religiously, being often a thing to change their
lives by, and by changing their lives, to change whatever in the
outer order depends on them.

We cannot therefore methodically join the tough minds in their
rejection of the whole notion of a world beyond our finite
experience. One misunderstanding of pragmatism is to identify it
with positivistic tough-mindedness, to suppose that it scorns every
rationalistic notion as so much jabber and gesticulation, that it
loves intellectual anarchy as such and prefers a sort of wolf-world
absolutely unpent and wild and without a master or a collar to any
philosophic class-room product, whatsoever. I have said so much in
these lectures against the over-tender forms of rationalism, that I
am prepared for some misunderstanding here, but I confess that the
amount of it that I have found in this very audience surprises me,
for I have simultaneously defended rationalistic hypotheses so far
as these re-direct you fruitfully into experience.

For instance I receive this morning this question on a post-card:
"Is a pragmatist necessarily a complete materialist and agnostic?"
One of my oldest friends, who ought to know me better, writes me a
letter that accuses the pragmatism I am recommending, of shutting
out all wider metaphysical views and condemning us to the most
terre-a-terre naturalism. Let me read you some extracts from it.

"It seems to me," my friend writes, "that the pragmatic objection to
pragmatism lies in the fact that it might accentuate the narrowness
of narrow minds.

"Your call to the rejection of the namby-pamby and the wishy-washy
is of course inspiring. But although it is salutary and stimulating
to be told that one should be responsible for the immediate issues
and bearings of his words and thoughts, I decline to be deprived of
the pleasure and profit of dwelling also on remoter bearings and
issues, and it is the TENDENCY of pragmatism to refuse this
privilege.

"In short, it seems to me that the limitations, or rather the
dangers, of the pragmatic tendency, are analogous to those which
beset the unwary followers of the 'natural sciences.' Chemistry and
physics are eminently pragmatic and many of their devotees, smugly
content with the data that their weights and measures furnish, feel
an infinite pity and disdain for all students of philosophy and
meta-physics, whomsoever. And of course everything can be expressed-
-after a fashion, and 'theoretically'--in terms of chemistry and
physics, that is, EVERYTHING EXCEPT THE VITAL PRINCIPLE OF THE
WHOLE, and that, they say, there is no pragmatic use in trying to
express; it has no bearings--FOR THEM. I for my part refuse to be
persuaded that we cannot look beyond the obvious pluralism of the
naturalist and the pragmatist to a logical unity in which they take
no interest."

How is such a conception of the pragmatism I am advocating possible,
after my first and second lectures? I have all along been offering
it expressly as a mediator between tough-mindedness and tender-
mindedness. If the notion of a world ante rem, whether taken
abstractly like the word winter, or concretely as the hypothesis of
an Absolute, can be shown to have any consequences whatever for our
life, it has a meaning. If the meaning works, it will have SOME
truth that ought to be held to through all possible reformulations,
for pragmatism.

The absolutistic hypothesis, that perfection is eternal, aboriginal,
and most real, has a perfectly definite meaning, and it works
religiously. To examine how, will be the subject of my next and
final lecture.



Lecture VIII

Pragmatism and Religion

At the close of the last lecture I reminded you of the first one, in
which I had opposed tough-mindedness to tender-mindedness and
recommended pragmatism as their mediator. Tough-mindedness
positively rejects tender-mindedness's hypothesis of an eternal
perfect edition of the universe coexisting with our finite
experience.

On pragmatic principles we cannot reject any hypothesis if
consequences useful to life flow from it. Universal conceptions, as
things to take account of, may be as real for pragmatism as
particular sensations are. They have indeed no meaning and no
reality if they have no use. But if they have any use they have that
amount of meaning. And the meaning will be true if the use squares
well with life's other uses.

Well, the use of the Absolute is proved by the whole course of men's
religious history. The eternal arms are then beneath. Remember
Vivekananda's use of the Atman: it is indeed not a scientific use,
for we can make no particular deductions from it. It is emotional
and spiritual altogether.

It is always best to discuss things by the help of concrete
examples. Let me read therefore some of those verses entitled "To
You" by Walt Whitman--"You" of course meaning the reader or hearer
of the poem whosoever he or she may be.

Whoever you are, now I place my hand upon you, that you be my poem;
I whisper with my lips close to your ear,
I have loved many women and men, but I love none better than you.


O I have been dilatory and dumb;
I should have made my way straight to you long ago;
I should have blabb'd nothing but you, I should have chanted nothing
but you.


I will leave all, and come and make the hymns of you;
None have understood you, but I understand you;
None have done justice to you--you have not done justice to
yourself;
None but have found you imperfect--I only find no imperfection in
you.


O I could sing such grandeurs and glories about you!
You have not known what you are--you have slumber'd upon yourself
all your life;
What you have done returns already in mockeries.


But the mockeries are not you;
Underneath them, and within them, I see you lurk;
I pursue you where none else has pursued you;
Silence, the desk, the flippant expression, the night, the
accustom'd routine, if these conceal you from others, or from
yourself, they do not conceal you from me;
The shaved face, the unsteady eye, the impure complexion, if these
balk others, they do not balk me,
The pert apparel, the deform'd attitude, drunkenness, greed,
premature death, all these I part aside.


There is no endowment in man or woman that is not tallied in you;
There is no virtue, no beauty, in man or woman, but as good is in
you;
No pluck, no endurance in others, but as good is in you;
No pleasure waiting for others, but an equal pleasure waits for you.


Whoever you are! claim your own at any hazard!
These shows of the east and west are tame, compared to you;
These immense meadows--these interminable rivers--you are immense
and interminable as they;
You are he or she who is master or mistress over them,
Master or mistress in your own right over Nature, elements, pain,
passion, dissolution.


The hopples fall from your ankles--you find an unfailing
sufficiency;
Old or young, male or female, rude, low, rejected by the rest,
whatever you are promulges itself;
Through birth, life, death, burial, the means are provided, nothing
is scanted;
Through angers, losses, ambition, ignorance, ennui, what you are
picks its way.

Verily a fine and moving poem, in any case, but there are two ways
of taking it, both useful.

One is the monistic way, the mystical way of pure cosmic emotion.
The glories and grandeurs, they are yours absolutely, even in the
midst of your defacements. Whatever may happen to you, whatever you
may appear to be, inwardly you are safe. Look back, LIE back, on
your true principle of being! This is the famous way of quietism, of
indifferentism. Its enemies compare it to a spiritual opium. Yet
pragmatism must respect this way, for it has massive historic
vindication.

But pragmatism sees another way to be respected also, the
pluralistic way of interpreting the poem. The you so glorified, to
which the hymn is sung, may mean your better possibilities
phenomenally taken, or the specific redemptive effects even of your
failures, upon yourself or others. It may mean your loyalty to the
possibilities of others whom you admire and love so, that you are
willing to accept your own poor life, for it is that glory's
partner. You can at least appreciate, applaud, furnish the audience,
of so brave a total world. Forget the low in yourself, then, think
only of the high. Identify your life therewith; then, through
angers, losses, ignorance, ennui, whatever you thus make yourself,
whatever you thus most deeply are, picks its way.

In either way of taking the poem, it encourages fidelity to
ourselves. Both ways satisfy; both sanctify the human flux. Both
paint the portrait of the YOU on a gold-background. But the
background of the first way is the static One, while in the second
way it means possibles in the plural, genuine possibles, and it has
all the restlessness of that conception.

Noble enough is either way of reading the poem; but plainly the
pluralistic way agrees with the pragmatic temper best, for it
immediately suggests an infinitely larger number of the details of
future experience to our mind. It sets definite activities in us at
work. Altho this second way seems prosaic and earthborn in
comparison with the first way, yet no one can accuse it of tough-
mindedness in any brutal sense of the term. Yet if, as pragmatists,
you should positively set up the second way AGAINST the first way,
you would very likely be misunderstood. You would be accused of
denying nobler conceptions, and of being an ally of tough-mindedness
in the worst sense.

You remember the letter from a member of this audience from which I
read some extracts at our previous meeting. Let me read you an
additional extract now. It shows a vagueness in realizing the
alternatives before us which I think is very widespread.

"I believe," writes my friend and correspondent, "in pluralism; I
believe that in our search for truth we leap from one floating cake
of ice to another, on an infinite sea, and that by each of our acts
we make new truths possible and old ones impossible; I believe that
each man is responsible for making the universe better, and that if
he does not do this it will be in so far left undone.

"Yet at the same time I am willing to endure that my children should
be incurably sick and suffering (as they are not) and I myself
stupid and yet with brains enough to see my stupidity, only on one
condition, namely, that through the construction, in imagination and
by reasoning, of a RATIONAL UNITY OF ALL THINGS, I can conceive my
acts and my thoughts and my troubles as SUPPLEMENTED: BY ALL THE
OTHER PHENOMENA OF THE WORLD, AND AS FORMING--WHEN THUS
SUPPLEMENTED--A SCHEME WHICH I APPROVE AND ADOPT AS MY I OWN; and
for my part I refuse to be persuaded that we cannot look beyond the
obvious pluralism of the naturalist and pragmatist to a logical
unity in which they take no interest or stock."

Such a fine expression of personal faith warms the heart of the
hearer. But how much does it clear his philosophic head? Does the
writer consistently favor the monistic, or the pluralistic,
interpretation of the world's poem? His troubles become atoned for
WHEN THUS SUPPLEMENTED, he says, supplemented, that is, by all the
remedies that THE OTHER PHENOMENA may supply. Obviously here the
writer faces forward into the particulars of experience, which he
interprets in a pluralistic-melioristic way.

But he believes himself to face backward. He speaks of what he calls
the rational UNITY of things, when all the while he really means
their possible empirical UNIFICATION. He supposes at the same time
that the pragmatist, because he criticizes rationalism's abstract
One, is cut off from the consolation of believing in the saving
possibilities of the concrete many. He fails in short to distinguish
between taking the world's perfection as a necessary principle, and
taking it only as a possible terminus ad quem.

I regard the writer of this letter as a genuine pragmatist, but as a
pragmatist sans le savoir. He appears to me as one of that numerous
class of philosophic amateurs whom I spoke of in my first lecture,
as wishing to have all the good things going, without being too
careful as to how they agree or disagree. "Rational unity of all
things" is so inspiring a formula, that he brandishes it offhand,
and abstractly accuses pluralism of conflicting with it (for the
bare names do conflict), altho concretely he means by it just the
pragmatistically unified and ameliorated world. Most of us remain in
this essential vagueness, and it is well that we should; but in the
interest of clear-headedness it is well that some of us should go
farther, so I will try now to focus a little more discriminatingly
on this particular religious point.

Is then this you of yous, this absolutely real world, this unity
that yields the moral inspiration and has the religious value, to be
taken monistically or pluralistically? Is it ante rem or in rebus?
Is it a principle or an end, an absolute or an ultimate, a first or
a last? Does it make you look forward or lie back? It is certainly
worth while not to clump the two things together, for if
discriminated, they have decidedly diverse meanings for life.

Please observe that the whole dilemma revolves pragmatically about
the notion of the world's possibilities. Intellectually, rationalism
invokes its absolute principle of unity as a ground of possibility
for the many facts. Emotionally, it sees it as a container and
limiter of possibilities, a guarantee that the upshot shall be good.
Taken in this way, the absolute makes all good things certain, and
all bad things impossible (in the eternal, namely), and may be said
to transmute the entire category of possibility into categories more
secure. One sees at this point that the great religious difference
lies between the men who insist that the world MUST AND SHALL BE,
and those who are contented with believing that the world MAY BE,
saved. The whole clash of rationalistic and empiricist religion is
thus over the validity of possibility. It is necessary therefore to
begin by focusing upon that word. What may the word 'possible'
definitely mean?

To unreflecting men the possible means a sort of third estate of
being, less real than existence, more real than non-existence, a
twilight realm, a hybrid status, a limbo into which and out of which
realities ever and anon are made to pass. Such a conception is of
course too vague and nondescript to satisfy us. Here, as elsewhere,
the only way to extract a term's meaning is to use the pragmatic
method on it. When you say that a thing is possible, what difference
does it make?

It makes at least this difference that if anyone calls it impossible
you can contradict him, if anyone calls it actual you can contradict
HIM, and if anyone calls it necessary you can contradict him too.
But these privileges of contradiction don't amount to much. When you
say a thing is possible, does not that make some farther difference
in terms of actual fact?

It makes at least this negative difference that if the statement be
true, it follows that there is nothing extant capable of preventing
the possible thing. The absence of real grounds of interference may
thus be said to make things not impossible, possible therefore in
the bare or abstract sense.

But most possibles are not bare, they are concretely grounded, or
well-grounded, as we say. What does this mean pragmatically? It
means, not only that there are no preventive conditions present, but
that some of the conditions of production of the possible thing
actually are here. Thus a concretely possible chicken means: (1)
that the idea of chicken contains no essential self-contradiction;
(2) that no boys, skunks, or other enemies are about; and (3) that
at least an actual egg exists. Possible chicken means actual egg--
plus actual sitting hen, or incubator, or what not. As the actual
conditions approach completeness the chicken becomes a better-and-
better-grounded possibility. When the conditions are entirely
complete, it ceases to be a possibility, and turns into an actual
fact.

Let us apply this notion to the salvation of the world. What does it
pragmatically mean to say that this is possible? It means that some
of the conditions of the world's deliverance do actually exist. The
more of them there are existent, the fewer preventing conditions you
can find, the better-grounded is the salvation's possibility, the
more PROBABLE does the fact of the deliverance become.

So much for our preliminary look at possibility.

Now it would contradict the very spirit of life to say that our
minds must be indifferent and neutral in questions like that of the
world's salvation. Anyone who pretends to be neutral writes himself
down here as a fool and a sham. We all do wish to minimize the
insecurity of the universe; we are and ought to be unhappy when we
regard it as exposed to every enemy and open to every life-
destroying draft. Nevertheless there are unhappy men who think the
salvation of the world impossible. Theirs is the doctrine known as
pessimism.

Optimism in turn would be the doctrine that thinks the world's
salvation inevitable.

Midway between the two there stands what may be called the doctrine
of meliorism, tho it has hitherto figured less as a doctrine than as
an attitude in human affairs. Optimism has always been the regnant
DOCTRINE in european philosophy. Pessimism was only recently
introduced by Schopenhauer and counts few systematic defenders as
yet. Meliorism treats salvation as neither inevitable nor
impossible. It treats it as a possibility, which becomes more and
more of a probability the more numerous the actual conditions of
salvation become.

It is clear that pragmatism must incline towards meliorism. Some
conditions of the world's salvation are actually extant, and she
cannot possibly close her eyes to this fact: and should the residual
conditions come, salvation would become an accomplished reality.
Naturally the terms I use here are exceedingly summary. You may
interpret the word 'salvation' in any way you like, and make it as
diffuse and distributive, or as climacteric and integral a
phenomenon as you please.

Take, for example, any one of us in this room with the ideals which
he cherishes, and is willing to live and work for. Every such ideal
realized will be one moment in the world's salvation. But these
particular ideals are not bare abstract possibilities. They are
grounded, they are LIVE possibilities, for we are their live
champions and pledges, and if the complementary conditions come and
add themselves, our ideals will become actual things. What now are
the complementary conditions? They are first such a mixture of
things as will in the fulness of time give us a chance, a gap that
we can spring into, and, finally, OUR ACT.

Does our act then CREATE the world's salvation so far as it makes
room for itself, so far as it leaps into the gap? Does it create,
not the whole world's salvation of course, but just so much of this
as itself covers of the world's extent?

Here I take the bull by the horns, and in spite of the whole crew of
rationalists and monists, of whatever brand they be, I ask WHY NOT?
Our acts, our turning-places, where we seem to ourselves to make
ourselves and grow, are the parts of the world to which we are
closest, the parts of which our knowledge is the most intimate and
complete. Why should we not take them at their face-value? Why may
they not be the actual turning-places and growing-places which they
seem to be, of the world--why not the workshop of being, where we
catch fact in the making, so that nowhere may the world grow in any
other kind of way than this?

Irrational! we are told. How can new being come in local spots and
patches which add themselves or stay away at random, independently
of the rest? There must be a reason for our acts, and where in the
last resort can any reason be looked for save in the material
pressure or the logical compulsion of the total nature of the world?
There can be but one real agent of growth, or seeming growth,
anywhere, and that agent is the integral world itself. It may grow
all-over, if growth there be, but that single parts should grow per
se is irrational.

But if one talks of rationality and of reasons for things, and
insists that they can't just come in spots, what KIND of a reason
can there ultimately be why anything should come at all? Talk of
logic and necessity and categories and the absolute and the contents
of the whole philosophical machine-shop as you will, the only REAL
reason I can think of why anything should ever come is that someone
wishes it to be here. It is DEMANDED, demanded, it may be, to give
relief to no matter how small a fraction of the world's mass. This
is living reason, and compared with it material causes and logical
necessities are spectral things.

In short the only fully rational world would be the world of
wishing-caps, the world of telepathy, where every desire is
fulfilled instanter, without having to consider or placate
surrounding or intermediate powers. This is the Absolute's own
world. He calls upon the phenomenal world to be, and it IS, exactly
as he calls for it, no other condition being required. In our world,
the wishes of the individual are only one condition. Other
individuals are there with other wishes and they must be propitiated
first. So Being grows under all sorts of resistances in this world
of the many, and, from compromise to compromise, only gets organized
gradually into what may be called secondarily rational shape. We
approach the wishing-cap type of organization only in a few
departments of life. We want water and we turn a faucet. We want a
kodak-picture and we press a button. We want information and we
telephone. We want to travel and we buy a ticket. In these and
similar cases, we hardly need to do more than the wishing--the world
is rationally organized to do the rest.

But this talk of rationality is a parenthesis and a digression. What
we were discussing was the idea of a world growing not integrally
but piecemeal by the contributions of its several parts. Take the
hypothesis seriously and as a live one. Suppose that the world's
author put the case to you before creation, saying: "I am going to
make a world not certain to be saved, a world the perfection of
which shall be conditional merely, the condition being that each
several agent does its own 'level best.' I offer you the chance of
taking part in such a world. Its safety, you see, is unwarranted. It
is a real adventure, with real danger, yet it may win through. It is
a social scheme of co-operative work genuinely to be done. Will you
join the procession? Will you trust yourself and trust the other
agents enough to face the risk?"

Should you in all seriousness, if participation in such a world were
proposed to you, feel bound to reject it as not safe enough? Would
you say that, rather than be part and parcel of so fundamentally
pluralistic and irrational a universe, you preferred to relapse into
the slumber of nonentity from which you had been momentarily aroused
by the tempter's voice?

Of course if you are normally constituted, you would do nothing of
the sort. There is a healthy-minded buoyancy in most of us which
such a universe would exactly fit. We would therefore accept the
offer--"Top! und schlag auf schlag!" It would be just like the world
we practically live in; and loyalty to our old nurse Nature would
forbid us to say no. The world proposed would seem 'rational' to us
in the most living way.

Most of us, I say, would therefore welcome the proposition and add
our fiat to the fiat of the creator. Yet perhaps some would not; for
there are morbid minds in every human collection, and to them the
prospect of a universe with only a fighting chance of safety would
probably make no appeal. There are moments of discouragement in us
all, when we are sick of self and tired of vainly striving. Our own
life breaks down, and we fall into the attitude of the prodigal son.
We mistrust the chances of things. We want a universe where we can
just give up, fall on our father's neck, and be absorbed into the
absolute life as a drop of water melts into the river or the sea.

The peace and rest, the security desiderated at such moments is
security against the bewildering accidents of so much finite
experience. Nirvana means safety from this everlasting round of
adventures of which the world of sense consists. The hindoo and the
buddhist, for this is essentially their attitude, are simply afraid,
afraid of more experience, afraid of life.

And to men of this complexion, religious monism comes with its
consoling words: "All is needed and essential--even you with your
sick soul and heart. All are one with God, and with God all is well.
The everlasting arms are beneath, whether in the world of finite
appearances you seem to fail or to succeed." There can be no doubt
that when men are reduced to their last sick extremity absolutism is
the only saving scheme. Pluralistic moralism simply makes their
teeth chatter, it refrigerates the very heart within their breast.

So we see concretely two types of religion in sharp contrast. Using
our old terms of comparison, we may say that the absolutistic scheme
appeals to the tender-minded while the pluralistic scheme appeals to
the tough. Many persons would refuse to call the pluralistic scheme
religious at all. They would call it moralistic, and would apply the
word religious to the monistic scheme alone. Religion in the sense
of self-surrender, and moralism in the sense of self-sufficingness,
have been pitted against each other as incompatibles frequently
enough in the history of human thought.

We stand here before the final question of philosophy. I said in my
fourth lecture that I believed the monistic-pluralistic alternative
to be the deepest and most pregnant question that our minds can
frame. Can it be that the disjunction is a final one? that only one
side can be true? Are a pluralism and monism genuine incompatibles?
So that, if the world were really pluralistically constituted, if it
really existed distributively and were made up of a lot of eaches,
it could only be saved piecemeal and de facto as the result of their
behavior, and its epic history in no wise short-circuited by some
essential oneness in which the severalness were already 'taken up'
beforehand and eternally 'overcome'? If this were so, we should have
to choose one philosophy or the other. We could not say 'yes, yes'
to both alternatives. There would have to be a 'no' in our relations
with the possible. We should confess an ultimate disappointment: we
could not remain healthy-minded and sick-minded in one indivisible
act.

Of course as human beings we can be healthy minds on one day and
sick souls on the next; and as amateur dabblers in philosophy we may
perhaps be allowed to call ourselves monistic pluralists, or free-
will determinists, or whatever else may occur to us of a reconciling
kind. But as philosophers aiming at clearness and consistency, and
feeling the pragmatistic need of squaring truth with truth, the
question is forced upon us of frankly adopting either the tender or
the robustious type of thought. In particular THIS query has always
come home to me: May not the claims of tender-mindedness go too far?
May not the notion of a world already saved in toto anyhow, be too
saccharine to stand? May not religious optimism be too idyllic? Must
ALL be saved? Is NO price to be paid in the work of salvation? Is
the last word sweet? Is all 'yes, yes' in the universe? Doesn't the
fact of 'no' stand at the very core of life? Doesn't the very
'seriousness' that we attribute to life mean that ineluctable noes
and losses form a part of it, that there are genuine sacrifices
somewhere, and that something permanently drastic and bitter always
remains at the bottom of its cup?

I can not speak officially as a pragmatist here; all I can say is
that my own pragmatism offers no objection to my taking sides with
this more moralistic view, and giving up the claim of total
reconciliation. The possibility of this is involved in the
pragmatistic willingness to treat pluralism as a serious hypothesis.
In the end it is our faith and not our logic that decides such
questions, and I deny the right of any pretended logic to veto my
own faith. I find myself willing to take the universe to be really
dangerous and adventurous, without therefore backing out and crying
'no play.' I am willing to think that the prodigal-son attitude,
open to us as it is in many vicissitudes, is not the right and final
attitude towards the whole of life. I am willing that there should
be real losses and real losers, and no total preservation of all
that is. I can believe in the ideal as an ultimate, not as an
origin, and as an extract, not the whole. When the cup is poured
off, the dregs are left behind forever, but the possibility of what
is poured off is sweet enough to accept.

As a matter of fact countless human imaginations live in this
moralistic and epic kind of a universe, and find its disseminated
and strung-along successes sufficient for their rational needs.
There is a finely translated epigram in the greek anthology which
admirably expresses this state of mind, this acceptance of loss as
unatoned for, even tho the lost element might be one's self:

"A shipwrecked sailor, buried on this coast, Bids you set sail.
Full many a gallant bark, when we were lost, Weathered the gale."

Those puritans who answered 'yes' to the question: Are you willing
to be damned for God's glory? were in this objective and magnanimous
condition of mind. The way of escape from evil on this system is NOT
by getting it 'aufgehoben,' or preserved in the whole as an element
essential but 'overcome.' It is by dropping it out altogether,
throwing it overboard and getting beyond it, helping to make a
universe that shall forget its very place and name.

It is then perfectly possible to accept sincerely a drastic kind of
a universe from which the element of 'seriousness' is not to be
expelled. Whoso does so is, it seems to me, a genuine pragmatist. He
is willing to live on a scheme of uncertified possibilities which he
trusts; willing to pay with his own person, if need be, for the
realization of the ideals which he frames.

What now actually ARE the other forces which he trusts to co-operate
with him, in a universe of such a type? They are at least his fellow
men, in the stage of being which our actual universe has reached.
But are there not superhuman forces also, such as religious men of
the pluralistic type we have been considering have always believed
in? Their words may have sounded monistic when they said "there is
no God but God"; but the original polytheism of mankind has only
imperfectly and vaguely sublimated itself into monotheism, and
monotheism itself, so far as it was religious and not a scheme of
class-room instruction for the metaphysicians, has always viewed God
as but one helper, primus inter pares, in the midst of all the
shapers of the great world's fate.

I fear that my previous lectures, confined as they have been to
human and humanistic aspects, may have left the impression on many
of you that pragmatism means methodically to leave the superhuman
out. I have shown small respect indeed for the Absolute, and I have
until this moment spoken of no other superhuman hypothesis but that.
But I trust that you see sufficiently that the Absolute has nothing
but its superhumanness in common with the theistic God. On
pragmatistic principles, if the hypothesis of God works
satisfactorily in the widest sense of the word, it is true. Now
whatever its residual difficulties may be, experience shows that it
certainly does work, and that the problem is to build it out and
determine it, so that it will combine satisfactorily with all the
other working truths. I cannot start upon a whole theology at the
end of this last lecture; but when I tell you that I have written a
book on men's religious experience, which on the whole has been
regarded as making for the reality of God, you will perhaps exempt
my own pragmatism from the charge of being an atheistic system. I
firmly disbelieve, myself, that our human experience is the highest
form of experience extant in the universe. I believe rather that we
stand in much the same relation to the whole of the universe as our
canine and feline pets do to the whole of human life. They inhabit
our drawing-rooms and libraries. They take part in scenes of whose
significance they have no inkling. They are merely tangent to curves
of history the beginnings and ends and forms of which pass wholly
beyond their ken. So we are tangents to the wider life of things.
But, just as many of the dog's and cat's ideals coincide with our
ideals, and the dogs and cats have daily living proof of the fact,
so we may well believe, on the proofs that religious experience
affords, that higher powers exist and are at work to save the world
on ideal lines similar to our own.

You see that pragmatism can be called religious, if you allow that
religion can be pluralistic or merely melioristic in type. But
whether you will finally put up with that type of religion or not is
a question that only you yourself can decide. Pragmatism has to
postpone dogmatic answer, for we do not yet know certainly which
type of religion is going to work best in the long run. The various
overbeliefs of men, their several faith-ventures, are in fact what
are needed to bring the evidence in. You will probably make your own
ventures severally. If radically tough, the hurly-burly of the
sensible facts of nature will be enough for you, and you will need
no religion at all. If radically tender, you will take up with the
more monistic form of religion: the pluralistic form, with its
reliance on possibilities that are not necessities, will not seem to
afford you security enough.

But if you are neither tough nor tender in an extreme and radical
sense, but mixed as most of us are, it may seem to you that the type
of pluralistic and moralistic religion that I have offered is as
good a religious synthesis as you are likely to find. Between the
two extremes of crude naturalism on the one hand and transcendental
absolutism on the other, you may find that what I take the liberty
of calling the pragmatistic or melioristic type of theism is exactly
what you require.



THE END




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